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Online advertising constitutes one of the main sources of revenue for the majority of busi-
nesses on the web. Online advertising inventory was traditionally traded via bilateral
contracts between publishers and advertisers, vastly through a number of intermediaries.
However, what caused an explosion in the volume and, consequently, the revenue of on-
line ads was the incorporation of auctions as the major mechanism for trading sponsored
search ads in all major search engines. This reduced transaction costs and allowed for
the advertisement of small websites which constitute the majority of Internet trac.
Auction-based markets were harder to establish in the display advertising industry due
to the higher volume of inventory and the pre-existence of traditional intermediaries,
often leading to ineciencies and lack of transparency. Nevertheless, this has recently
changed with the introduction of the ad exchanges, centralized marketplaces for the al-
location of display advertising inventory that support auctions and real-time bidding.
The appearance of ad exchanges has also altered the market structure of both demand-
side and supply-side intermediaries which increasingly adopt auctions to perform their
business operations. Hence, each time a user enters a publisher's website, the contracted
ad exchange runs an auction among a number of demand-side intermediaries, each of
which represents their interested advertisers and typically submits a bid by running a
local auction among these advertisers.
Against this background, within this thesis, we look both at the auction design problem
of the ad exchange and the demand-side intermediaries as well as at the strategies to be
adopted by advertisers. Specically, we study the revenue and eciency eects of the
introduction and competition of the demand-side intermediaries in a single-item auction
setting with independent private valuations. The introduction of these intermediaries
constitutes a major issue for ad exchanges since they hide some of the demand from the
ad exchange and hence can make a prot by pocketing the dierence between what they
receive from their advertisers and what they pay at the exchange.iv
Ad exchanges were created to oer transparency to both sides of the market, so it
is important to study the share of the revenue that intermediaries receive to justify
their services oered given the competition they face by other such intermediaries. The
existence of mediators is a well-known problem in other settings. For this reason, our
formulation is general enough to encompass other areas where two levels of auctions
arise, such as procurement auctions with subcontracting and auctions with colluding
bidders.
In more detail, we study the eects of the demand-side intermediaries' choice of auction
for three widely-used mechanisms, two variations of the second-price sealed-bid (known
as Vickrey) auction, termed PRE and POST, and rst-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auctions.
We rst look at a scenario with a nite number of intermediaries, each implementing the
same mechanism, where we compare the prots attained for all stakeholders. We nd
that there cannot be a complete prot ranking of the three auctions: FPSB auctions yield
higher expected prot for a small number of competing intermediaries, otherwise PRE
auctions are better for the intermediaries. We also nd that the ad exchange benets
from intermediaries implementing POST auctions.
We then let demand-side intermediaries set reserve (or oor) prices, that are known to
increase an auctioneer's expected revenue. For issues of analytical tractability, we only
consider scenarios with two intermediaries but we also compare the two Vickrey varia-
tions in heterogeneous settings where one intermediary implements the rst whereas the
other implements the second variation. We nd that intermediaries, in general, follow
mixed reserve-price-setting strategies whose distributions are dicult to derive analyt-
ically. For this reason, we use the ctitious play algorithm to calculate approximate
equilibria and numerically compare the revenue and eciency of the three mechanisms
for specic instances. We nd that PRE seems to perform best in terms of attained
prot but is less ecient than POST. Hence, the latter might be a better option for
intermediaries in the long term.
Finally, we extend the previous setting by letting advertisers strategically select one of
the two intermediaries when the latter implement each of the two Vickrey variations.
We analytically derive the advertisers' intermediary selection strategies in equilibrium.
Given that, in some cases, these strategies are rather complex, we use again the ctitious
play algorithm to numerically calculate the intermediaries' and the ad exchange's best
responses for the same instances as before. We nd that, when both intermediaries im-
plement POST auctions, advertisers always select the low-reserve intermediary, otherwise
they generally follow randomized strategies. Last, we nd that the ad exchange benets
from intermediaries implementing the pre-award Vickrey variation compared to a setting
with two heterogeneous Vickrey intermediary auctioneers, whereas the opposite is true
for the intermediaries.Contents
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Introduction
Online advertising constitutes the main source of revenue for the majority of businesses
on the web and is the reason why people can enjoy many online services for free. It is
estimated that online advertising saves each Internet user approximately $140 a year1.
The rst online advertisement (also called an ad) appeared on 27 October 1994, when
HotWired, the rst commercial web magazine, sold and displayed a banner clickable
ad for AT&T (Kaye and Merdo, 2001). According to some sources, Global Network
Navigator (GNN) was the rst company to serve an online advertisement on 19932
(Rubinfeld and Ratli, 2010). However, it was not until 1999 that interest in online
advertising increased, as the Internet bubble began attracting more and more advertisers.
Since then, it has become a multi-billion business with an annual prot of $42:8 billions
only in the U.S. for 2013 (PwC, 2014), a 17% increase over 2012 (see Figure 1.1). In
Europe, online advertising revenue for 2013 was approximately e27.3 billions, 11:2%
higher than 2012, with the U.K. having by far the highest total revenue of e7.4 billions
among the 26 countries included in the study (IHS, 2014).
The major reason for such a growth, besides the rapid expansion of the Internet, is the
vast technological innovation that nowadays allows for the targeting of users browsing the
web. Although traditional advertising has been around for several centuries, companies
using it have no other option than showing their advertisements to an audience based
on previous statistics on its expected demographics, using surveys with questionnaires.
The main problem with this approach for advertisers working with traditional media,
such as TV, radio and newspapers, was pointedly stated by John Wanamaker, the father
of modern advertising, in 1875:\Half the money I spend on advertising is wasted; the
trouble is I don't know which half". This problem is nowadays less apparent. Current
1Source: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/11047801/Would-you-pay-140-a-year-for-an-
ad-free-web.html
2Probably Prodigy, a joint venture of IBM and Sears, was the rst company to oer online but
non-clickable advertisements.
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Figure 1.1: Online advertising annual revenue and compound annual growth rate
(Source: Interactive Advertising Bureau).
technology makes it possible in most cases3 to target each user separately, tracking their
browsing behavior and transaction history via special les, known as \cookies", that
are installed on their browser. In this way, advertisers can now match each individual
advertisement placement to a user.
The abundance of information about each specic user's intentions and characteristics
led to the development of new markets for the trading of online advertisements. More
specically, in 1998, GoTo.com (later renamed as Overture and now owned by Yahoo!)
introduced the rst sponsored search ads, i.e. advertisements on search engines, which
since then have been traded using auctions based on query terms (keywords) that users
enter. One of the novelties was also in the pricing rule, called cost-per-click (CPC),
whereby payments are made only when a user clicks on an ad (Jansen and Mullen,
2008).
In contrast, marketeers in display (i.e. banner/video) advertising, although better es-
tablished, followed the traditional cost-per-mille (CPM) (i.e. per thousand ad views,
known as impressions in the context of online advertising) pricing model. Similar to the
oine advertising process, in this market, known as guaranteed delivery, owners of web
pages (called the publishers) would contact advertisers to trade advertising space in bulk
on their websites via a negotiation process that led to bilateral contracts long before the
3This is not true for advertisements shown on social network platforms, such as Facebook, or other
types of online advertising, such as viral marketing or mobile advertising. Moreover, one of the most
prominent issues is how to perform cross-device targeting, i.e. how to recognize the same user on dierent
devices (mobile, tablets and PCs) or browsers.Chapter 1 Introduction 5
start of the advertising campaigns. These contracts specify an agreed upon volume and
price for advertisements to be shown for specied dates to a future set of users that
match the advertiser's desired demographics. For instance, an advertiser could agree
with The New York Times to have 1 million advertisements displayed on its website
during the following December and only to males, 25-35 years old, from California, with
income $100,000 - $200,000 for $5 CPM. This was a time-consuming process with high
search costs for both sides (see Figure 1.2 for the steps involved in a typical display
advertisement order). For this reason, the vast majority of publishers and advertisers
started working with specialized intermediaries, known as ad networks. These inter-
mediaries were responsible for matching the supply with the demand for ads, taking a
percentage cut for their services. This, in turn, created a number of complications, the
most important of which is that often complex, long chains of ad networks would form
between publishers and advertisers, taking most of the surplus generated, and leading
to ineciencies as well as opaque trades on the two ends of this chain.
Figure 1.2: A typical online display advertisement order (Source: NextMark).
To alleviate the aforementioned problems, borrowing ideas from sponsored search, the
use of auctions was adopted in 2005, when Right Media (now owned by Yahoo!) in-
troduced the rst auction-based marketplace for display advertisements, known as an
ad exchange4 (Muthukrishnan, 2009). This allowed for the programmatic trading of
advertising space, reducing the number of intermediaries, and increasing transparency.
However, it was not until the early 2010 when ad exchanges gained substantial growth,
4There have been previous reported eorts on creating such exchanges in 2001 (MediaPort ad ex-
change, founded by the three largest ad networks of that time), but the market was not technologically
mature enough to accept these institutions during that period, and the dot-com bubble was one of the
main reasons for their collapse (Fiss and Kennedy, 2008).6 Chapter 1 Introduction
with the introduction of real-time bidding (RTB), the ability to bid dierently for each
specic user visiting a specic website in almost real time5. In 2013, approximately $4:5
billions have been traded worldwide on RTB, 66% higher than 2012 (IDC, 2013) and
this number is expected to grow up to $20:8 billions in 2017 (see Figure 1.3). Nowadays,
two parallel markets are present: the guaranteed delivery market, trading mainly ads
for brand recognition between large partners (known as premium inventory), and the ad
exchange spot market, trading the remaining advertising space (known as the remnant
inventory), mainly for performance-driven advertisers6 (Evans, 2008).
Figure 1.3: Real-time bidding historical and projected revenue (Source: International
Data Corporation).
Ad exchanges are characterized by the extremely high speed of trades (each auction lasts
approximately 100ms) and immense number of advertising slots traded (billions of such
auctions are conducted daily, (McAfee, 2011)). On top of this, there is an exponential
number of attributes that advertisers can target for (Lahaie et al., 2008; Engel and
Tennenholtz, 2013). These facts make it impossible for humans to handle trading and
so both the bidding and auctioning are performed by specialized, autonomous pieces of
software, known as intelligent agents (Wooldridge, 2001). All these challenges make clear
the importance of properly designing these auctions by careful analysis of the strategic
interactions of all stakeholders.
Against this background, in the remainder of this chapter, we provide more details on
the operation of ad exchanges and outline the requirements and contributions of our
study. More specically, Section 1.1 gives a general description of the online display
advertising industry. Section 1.2 discusses the research challenges as well as the main
motivation for this thesis. Then, Section 1.3 outlines our major contributions. Finally,
in Section 1.4, we outline the content of the remaining chapters within this thesis.
5Source: http://www.infectiousmedia.com/birth-real-time-bidding/
6These are advertisers whose target is to get some immediate action from the user, such as clicking
an ad, buying a product or lling in a form, an event known as conversion.Chapter 1 Introduction 7
1.1 The Online Ad Exchange Landscape
As described before, ad exchanges are technology platforms that bring together buyers
and sellers of advertising space in a centralized online auction-based marketplace, provid-
ing better liquidity, and thus increasing competition and eciency. The main reason for
their introduction was the opaque, bulk trading of impressions through a series of inter-
mediaries. However, even today, the display advertising market is quite fragmented, as
the landscape of Figure 1.4 illustrates. More specically, the technological advancement
requires specialization which the majority of both publishers and advertisers nd di-
cult to acquire by themselves. For this reason, similar to nancial exchanges, publishers
and advertisers participate in the ad exchanges via the use of sell- and demand-side
intermediaries, called supply- or sell-side (SSPs) and demand-side platforms (DSPs),
respectively. These intermediaries provide the technical infrastructure, relevant tools,
as well as a centralized point of access to the various ad exchanges, acting as brokers and
executing orders on behalf of their customers. Another stakeholder that plays a crucial
role in the trading of ads in real time are data management platforms (DMPs), also
called data exchanges (O'Connell and Greene, 2011), which oer user proling data to
the intermediaries or their clients in order to increase the eectiveness of their targeting.
The existence of these intermediaries creates a number of complications for designing
the auction at the exchange, as will be shown in the remainder of this thesis. This is in
contrast with sponsored search advertising where the publisher (search engine) contacts
advertisers directly and which has been the focus of the majority of research (we refer
the interested reader to (Maill e et al., 2010) for a survey). Other characteristics that
need to be taken into account include:
 Goods are extremely perishable: as soon as an impression is generated, an appro-
priate advertisement must be shown, otherwise there is no value for any of the
involved parties.
 Goods are heterogeneous: the expected prot of an advertiser for each ad is
uniquely determined by the user that visits the web page and the context of that
page.
 There are information asymmetries: dierent intermediaries (or advertisers) can
have dierent information about the user visiting the web page based on the track-
ing cookies they have previously installed on his browser. This means that some
intermediaries can target the user more eectively and have more precise infor-
mation on how much he is worth to them (i.e. better estimation on the expected
prot from showing him their selected ad).
 Delivery of ads must be fast: the time between the user visiting the web page and
the display of impressions is innitesimal, in the order of milliseconds, which means8 Chapter 1 Introduction
that the rules of the auction must be simple and yet eective, while implementation
must be robust to failures.
 The volume of impressions is extremely high whereas the value of the ads is minis-
cule: every day, billions of impressions are generated whereas pricing is performed
on a per thousand scale, and the average CPM for an ad is usually around $1-$5
(which means that the cost for a single impression is small, typically from 0:1 to
0:5 cents)7.
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Figure 1.4: The online advertising landscape (Source: LUMA Partners).
The auction process for one advertising slot is shown in Figure 1.5. The timing is as
follows. Whenever some user enters a web page, the owner of that web page (i.e. the
publisher) contacts the ad exchange, either directly or indirectly through an SSP, sending
relevant information about the user and the web page. The ad exchange/SSP then calls
for bids from the DSPs each of which represents a number of advertisers. This process
is known as a call out and lasts approximately 100ms (Chakraborty et al., 2010). Then
DSPs run some local mechanism of their choice to determine the bid(s) and the ad(s)
to send on behalf of their advertisers. Then the ad exchange/SSP runs an auction with
those bids, determining a winner and a payment, and the ad is nally displayed to the
7We refer the reader to http://yourvalue.inrialpes.fr/ for an interesting online experiment on the
value of impressions.Chapter 1 Introduction 9
user. This whole process takes approximately 150ms8. Formal models will be provided
in sections 2.2.1 and 3.3.
Figure 1.5: The online ad exchange auction (Netmining, 2011).
1.1.1 Research in Ad Exchanges
Given their recent appearance and complexity, research on ad exchanges has risen over
the last years. Muthukrishnan (2009) oers a succinct introduction to the research
challenges that arise in this area. More specically, emphasis has been given on the
publishers' problem of optimally allocating their inventory in the guaranteed and ad
exchange markets so as to maximize revenue but also reduce their risk (Ghosh et al.,
2009a; Yang et al., 2010; Chen, 2010; Balseiro et al., 2011). For the advertisers, most
of the literature has focused on bidding strategies, usually employing optimization tech-
niques (Ghosh et al., 2009b; Chen et al., 2011; Bartels et al., 2012; Amin et al., 2012;
Zhang et al., 2014; Tran-Thanh et al., 2014). Notable exceptions are the works of Gum-
madi et al. (2012); Balseiro et al. (2013) who have also taken into account the strategic
interactions between advertisers. Another problem that the stakeholders face is the
asymmetry of information between publishers and advertisers but also among the ad-
vertisers themselves. This is due to the fact that some advertisers or DSPs have (free or
paid) access to more data which increases the eectiveness of their targeting and leads to
an eect called cream skimming or cherry picking, whereby informed advertisers obtain
all good-quality inventory, leaving only low-quality inventory to the uninformed ones
(McAfee, 2011). The publisher/ad exchange might also have information that can be
shared and researchers have looked at the eect of such a revelation on its revenue (Levin
and Milgrom, 2010; Abraham et al., 2011; Fu et al., 2012; Emek et al., 2012; Babaio
et al., 2012; Mahdian et al., 2012; Arnosti et al., 2014; Miltersen and Sheet, 2012).
Probably one of the major challenges in this context is the design of the auction at
the exchange. Some of the problems include, but are not limited to, the facts that the
auctions are repeated, advertisers vary, have budgets and also have dierent incentives
8We refer the reader to http://cmsummit.com/behindthebanner/ for a clear animated depiction.10 Chapter 1 Introduction
(mainly brand promotion versus performance advertising), advertisements come in dif-
ferent sizes and multiple ad slots are usually available (see Section 2.2 for more details
as well as the excellent articles of Muthukrishnan (2009); McAfee (2011)).
1.1.2 The Eect of DSPs
Probably the most crucial issue in auction design by ad exchanges is the introduction
of the demand-side intermediaries, i.e. DSPs. These intermediaries typically9 submit
a single bid at the ad exchange on behalf of their (multiple) advertisers, thus hiding
some of the demand from the ad exchange. This can potentially reduce the exchange's
revenue and can decrease its eciency since the advertising space might not always be
allocated to the advertiser that values it most (this will be more evident throughout
the thesis, starting from the examples of Section 3.4). This situation is reminiscent of
auctions with colluding bidders for the exchange (see Section 2.4 for an exposition). In
the ad exchange setting, DSPs are seen as colluding groups by the ad exchange and
hamper its successful operation. More specically, the majority of DSPs run some local
mechanism (i.e. decisions about which advertiser wins the advertising space and how
much to get charged) and determine a typically single bid to send at the exchange.
There are currently two types of such intermediaries: self-service (also known as self-
serve) and managed service. The latter type follow the classical ad network model,
whereby the intermediary agrees with each advertiser the budget, pricing and number
as well as type of delivered impressions, and the intermediary manages the campaign
on behalf of each advertiser. On the other hand, self-service intermediaries, which ap-
peared along with RTB, oer only the necessary tools and infrastructure and advertisers
manage their campaigns by themselves10. For this reason, the predominant mechanism
implemented by self-service intermediaries is the use of local auctions among their clients.
Although managed-service intermediaries seem to be the prevalent type of such demand-
side intermediaries, more and more such intermediaries are moving to the self-service
type11. The competition between the latter type of demand-side intermediaries where
they pocket the dierence between what they get paid by their advertisers and what
they pay at the exchange is the problem studied within this thesis, as will be described
in detail in the following section.
9Some DSPs might be contracted not to hide any of the demand from their advertisers (Mansour
et al., 2012).
10There is a tendency in the advertising world to consider demand-side intermediaries true DSPs only
if they belong to the self-service category (see http://www.adexchanger.com/data-driven-thinking/not-
every-demand-side-platform-dsp-is-created-equal-what-is-a-true-dsp/).
11See http://www.adexchanger.com/data-driven-thinking/whats-behind-the-rise-in-self-serve-
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1.2 Research Objectives
The aim of the work in this thesis is to analyze the eects of the existence and com-
petition between a small, nite number of demand-side intermediaries (i.e. imperfect
competition) on the prots of each of the main stakeholders in these systems, namely
the ad exchange/publisher, the DSPs and the advertisers.
More specically, our research objectives within this thesis include:
 Analysis of the competition between real-world demand-side intermedi-
aries. As has been mentioned before, DSPs implement local auctions that compete
at the ad exchange for the advertising space. Hence, it becomes necessary to study
the impact of the choice of auction and bid submission strategies at the exchange
that are currently predominantly used by DSPs on the revenue generated as well as
the eciency of the ad exchange marketplace. This can help both the ad exchange
and DSP auctioneers to eciently design their markets as this will determine the
future adoption of RTB in the world of online advertising.
 Analysis of the prot maximization problem of the ad exchange and
demand-side intermediaries when the latter compete. Auction theory pro-
vides guidance on what auctioneers can do to increase their revenue, mainly by
setting a reserve (also known as a oor) price that, if appropriately determined,
has been shown to maximize the revenue of a monopolistic auctioneer. It is thus
important to study the benets and drawbacks, if any, of setting suitable reserve
prices for both the ad exchange and the intermediaries.
 Analysis of the advertisers' demand-side intermediary selection strate-
gies. The objective of advertisers in ad exchanges is to maximize their surplus,
which is the dierence between what they receive from displaying an advertisement
and what they pay. This can be done by appropriately adjusting their bids based
on the rules of the auction. However, in such markets, the advertisers must select
the DSP to operate their trades. Advertisers are oered similar services from a
multitude of demand-side intermediaries and must decide which is the best trading
partner to work with for their campaigns. Doing so, they need to take into account
the intermediary selections of the other advertisers, as this crucially determines
their probability of winning and payment. Hence, our aim is to characterize stable
outcomes of these strategic decisions of the advertisers that provide guidance and
can serve as a benchmark against simpler, heuristic approaches that advertisers
often take.
 Analysis of the competition between demand-side intermediaries with
strategic advertisers' allocation. Given that advertisers have incentives to12 Chapter 1 Introduction
strategically select a DSP for their trades, the latter should take advertisers' ex-
pected decisions into account along with the designs of their opponent intermedi-
aries when designing their auctions. This is also true for the ad exchanges which
need to consider the expected behavior of the intermediaries and the advertisers,
when optimizing their auctions for revenue or any other objective.
Having explained our research objectives for this thesis, in the next section we detail
the research contributions in this direction.
1.3 Research Contributions
Given the research objectives outlined in the previous section, the research reported in
this thesis provides insights into the following aspects of ad exchanges:
1. Competing real-world demand-side intermediaries (Chapter 4). We rst
analyze the eect of competition between intermediaries that implement three
widely-used auctions for their operations: two variations of the second-price sealed-
bid auction and the rst-price sealed-bid auction. Specically, we consider a single
advertising slot auctioned at an ad exchange (the publisher and the ad exchange
will be considered a single entity throughout the rest of the thesis) that sets a
reserve price. We focus on homogeneous intermediaries, i.e. intermediaries imple-
menting the same auction. Moreover, we assume that all intermediaries have the
same number of advertisers12 and that advertisers have contractual agreements
with their intermediaries and hence cannot move between them (i.e. are captive).
We nd that the reserve price of the ad exchange increases with the number of
buyers and/or intermediaries even for a single-intermediary setting. We also show
that there cannot be a complete prot ranking between the three auctions but
rst-price sealed-bid auctions seem to provide a good trade-o between prot and
eciency.
2. Competing demand-side intermediaries with reserve prices (Chapter 5).
We extend the above-mentioned analysis by letting intermediaries set appropriate
reserve prices. This problem has been rst studied by Feldman et al. (2010) who
have determined the optimal (i.e. prot maximizing) mechanism for the interme-
diaries, but only for the case of one advertiser per intermediary. They show that
their results generalize to more than one advertiser per intermediary, but cannot
analytically derive the reserve prices of the intermediaries in equilibrium. The
authors show that intermediaries follow complex reserve-price-setting strategies
that involve randomization of reserve prices from a dened interval. Given these
12Each intermediary has a dierent, nite set of advertisers whose cardinality is the same for all
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issues of technical tractability, we limit our setting to two competing DSPs. In
this duopoly scenario, we keep the symmetry and captivity assumptions for the
intermediaries. We then numerically nd the resulting approximate equilibria for
the auction studied by Feldman et al. (2010) as well as the other two auctions.
We show that our numerical technique provides a good approximation to the the-
oretical results, when those are available, and that, in general, intermediaries still
follow randomized reserve-price-setting strategies. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the rst attempt to formally study the eects of reserve prices for dierent
DSP mechanisms and the ad exchange. Our numerical examples depict that the
mechanism studied by Feldman et al. (2010) yields the highest prot among the
mechanisms studied but is less ecient than other mechanisms, i.e. the ad space
is not always allocated to the advertiser that values it the most.
3. Competing demand-side intermediaries with reserve prices and strate-
gic intermediary selecting advertisers (Chapter 6). We then remove the
captivity assumption for the advertisers and let them strategically select their in-
termediary in a setting with two intermediaries, each implementing one of the
second-price auction variations with a reserve price. We assume that advertisers
single-home, i.e. select only one intermediary. Letting the advertisers select both
intermediaries would give less insight since, in our model, that would mean that ad-
vertisers select all intermediaries, which cannot happen in reality where hundreds
of DSPs operate. Moreover, there is an inherent cost of managing a campaign13.
This is the rst time that this problem has been addressed given the fact that
little is known about the operation of ad exchanges but also due to the complex-
ity increased by the presence of the intermediaries. We show that, in contrast
to previous literature on competing auctions, in some settings, the advertisers'
intermediary selection strategies involve non-uniform randomization between the
intermediaries. Finally, we numerically derive the intermediaries' prot and the ad
exchange's revenue in an approximate equilibrium using learning techniques. We
nd that the center and the ad exchange system as a whole benets from inter-
mediaries implementing the same auction from our restricted set of mechanisms,
whereas the opposite is true for the intermediaries.
The work described in this thesis has led to the following peer-reviewed publications:
 L. C. Stavrogiannis, E. H. Gerding and M. Polukarov. Competing Intermediary
Auctions. In Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS '13), pp. 667 - 674, St. Paul, MN,
U.S.A., 2013.
138-28% of each advertiser's budget is estimated to be spent on operational costs (Source:
http://www.admonsters.com/blog/get-ready-coming-operationally-driven-marketplace/).14 Chapter 1 Introduction
 L. C. Stavrogiannis, E. H. Gerding and M. Polukarov. Auction mechanisms for
demand-side intermediaries in online advertising exchanges. In Proceedings of the
2014 international conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
(AAMAS '14), pp. 1037 - 1044, Paris, France, 2014.
The author's work has also resulted in the following peer-reviewed publications that are
not reported here as they do not t perfectly into the context of this work:
 L. C. Stavrogiannis, E. H. Gerding and M. Polukarov. Competing Intermediaries
in Online Display Advertising. Proceedings of AAMAS Joint Workshop on Trading
Agent Design and Analysis and Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, pp. 103 -
116, Valencia, Spain, 2012.
This work deals with the demand-side intermediary selection problem of the ad-
vertisers in a two-intermediary setting, where both intermediaries implement the
same second-price sealed-bid auction, for a single item auctioned at an ad exchange
when the latter sets no reserve price, i.e. minimum bid. The setting studied here
is a complete-information one, where advertisers' valuations for the item are pub-
licly known. We nd that an innite number of symmetric Nash equilibria exist
for the advertisers' selection strategies, and that the reserve-price-setting prob-
lem of the intermediaries admits a symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium, where
both intermediaries set a reserve price equal to the second-highest valuation of the
advertisers.
 L. Tran-Thanh, L. C. Stavrogiannis, V. Naroditskiy, V. Robu, N. R. Jennings,
P. Key. Ecient regret bounds for online bid optimisation in budget-limited
sponsored search auctions. Proceedings of the 30th Conference on Uncertainty
in Articial Intelligence (UAI 2014), pp. 809 - 818, Quebec, Canada, 2014.
This work deals with the problem of an advertiser who needs to allocate her budget,
B, across a number, T, of real-time second-price sealed-bid auctions. It is assumed
that the highest opponent bid gets revealed at the end of each auction only if the
advertiser wins the auction14, i.e. the data is right-censored, where it is assumed
that this bid is independent and identically (i.i.d.) drawn from a xed but unknown
distribution. It is shown that two previously proposed algorithms achieve O(
p
T)
regret with high probability compared to the optimal stochastic algorithm and
another algorithm, -First, is proposed and is shown to achieve O(T
2
3) regret with
high probability. The results are numerically veried using real sponsored search
bidding data.
14This is commonly done in the vast majority of ad exchanges.Chapter 1 Introduction 15
1.4 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:
 In Chapter 2, we provide a short introduction to the area of game theory that
includes the tool set we use for our analysis. We then present the state-of-the-
art in the ad exchanges literature from an auction theoretic perspective. We also
summarize literature on competing mechanisms, auctions with intermediaries and
auctions with bidding rings, which are closely related to the setting we study.
 Chapter 3 introduces a formal model of an ad exchange with competing demand-
side intermediaries and then presents a number of motivating examples that shed
some light in the issues related to the presence of these intermediaries.
 In Chapter 4, we present our analysis of the competing demand-side intermediaries
with captive advertisers. We start with the special case of a single intermediary
and then move to the more general setting with multiple homogeneous interme-
diaries where we compare, both theoretically and numerically, the three auction
mechanisms studied. Finally, we conclude with the analysis of heterogeneous in-
termediary auctions.
 Chapter 5 deals with the competition of the same auction mechanisms but now
including appropriate reserve prices. We start again with the motivating case of
a single intermediary and then study the equilibrium reserve prices of the three
intermediary mechanisms in a two-intermediary setting. We nd that, in general,
intermediaries should follow randomized reserve-price-setting strategies, so we con-
clude oering numerical results for the case where advertisers' private valuations
are i.i.d. random variables following the uniform distribution.
 Chapter 6 then considers the intermediary selection problem of the advertisers in
a duopoly setting with both homogeneous and heterogeneous second-price sealed-
bid intermediary auctioneers. Based on these results, the reserve-price-setting
problem is considered for the intermediaries and the ad exchange, where, given
the complexity of their strategies, numerical results are depicted and comparisons
are made against the previous settings with captive advertisers.
 Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the contributions of this thesis and provides direc-
tions for future work that will increase the practical applicability of our work to
real-world ad exchanges.Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, we discuss related work on the eld of online display advertising and
auction theory. We begin by introducing the notions of game theory, emphasizing on
two of its sub-areas, namely mechanism design and auction theory (Section 2.1) that are
necessary to follow the remainder of this thesis. We then review related work in the eld
of online advertising exchanges, the main application area of this thesis, where we focus
on the auction theoretic issues that arise (Section 2.2). Following this, we provide a
short introduction to the areas of auctions with intermediaries and collusion in Sections
2.3 and 2.4 respectively, that share some similarities with the setting studied within
this thesis. After that, Section 2.5 discusses previous work on competition between
auctioneers. Finally, Section 2.6 summarizes.
2.1 Introduction to Game Theory, Mechanism Design and
Auction Theory
In this section, we provide a short introduction to game theory, emphasizing on two of its
sub-areas that are of immediate interest, namely mechanism design and auction theory.
More specically, we rst formally dene the notion of a game and the strategic interac-
tions it encompasses, and then move to the description of the general task of designing
such games for the allocation of resources, known as mechanism design. Following this,
we review some of the most important results in the eld of auction theory.
2.1.1 Game Theory
Game theory can be dened as the mathematical study of strategic interactions, such
as conict or cooperation, between intelligent, rational decision makers (Myerson, 1991;
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Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008). A game is a formal representation of such interac-
tions and comprises (i) a set of players (the decision makers), (ii) the rules, i.e. the
order of moves and information available to each player as well as his available choices
(called actions), (iii) the outcomes, which are the possible results of the game, given the
actions by the players, (iv) the payos for each player related to each possible outcome
(Mas-Colell et al., 1995). A player is rational if his decisions are made only with regard
to his own objectives, and he is intelligent if he knows everything that is available to
him and makes inferences about the situation based on his knowledge (Myerson, 1991).
For the remainder of this thesis we will use the terms player and agent interchangeably,
and assume that agents' rationality is common knowledge among them.
Games can be described using two main types of representation: the strategic or normal
form and the extensive form. The former makes use of a matrix to specify player
actions and their corresponding payos and is mostly used to represent simultaneous-
move games, i.e. one-stage games where players perform actions at the same time.
The extensive form is preferred in sequential-move games, where players take actions
in turns. The game is represented by a tree (called the game tree) which species all
possible states and actions until the end of the game, unraveling the tree at each action
selection stage. Although there are many other forms to represent a game, each of
them has an \induced normal form", which is an equivalent normal-form representation
that maintains game-theoretic properties (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008). A formal
denition of a normal-form game (NFG) follows.
Denition 2.1. A nite, n-person normal-form (or strategic-form) game,  N, is a tuple
(N;S;u), where:
 N is a nite set of n players, indexed by i;
 S = iSi, is the set of all possible strategy proles, where Si is a nite set of
(pure) strategies available to player i. A player's strategy si 2 Si is a complete
contingency plan, i.e. a function mapping each state of the game to an action. A
vector s = (s1;s2;:::;sn) is called a strategy prole. The notation s = (si;s i)
can be used instead, where s i = (s1;s2;:::;si 1;si+1;:::;sn);
 u = (u1;u2;:::;un) where ui : S ! R is a real-valued utility (or payo) function
for player i. It provides the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility levels associated
with the outcome produced by strategies s.
An example of a normal-form game representation is shown in Figure 2.1(a), for a
game known as the Battle of the Sexes. In this game, there are two players, namely the
husband (H) and the wife (W), who must decide whether to go to a ght (F) or an opera
(O) play. In the matrix shown, the row player is the husband and the column player is
the wife. Each element of the matrix contains two numbers, the rst corresponding to
the utility of the row player and the second to that of the column player.Chapter 2 Literature Review 19
(a) Normal form representation. (b) Extensive form representation.
Figure 2.1: The Battle of the Sexes game.
Games can be separated in two broad categories based on the information available
to each player on his opponents, namely perfect-information and imperfect-information
games. Informally, in the former type of games, players can observe their opponents' pre-
vious moves (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). On the other hand, in the imperfect-information
case, players might need to make decisions with limited or no knowledge of their oppo-
nents' past actions or they might even have limited record of their own actions (Shoham
and Leyton-Brown, 2008). Let us dene formally these two categories, making use of
the extensive-form representation:
Denition 2.2. Perfect-information extensive-form game. A nite, perfect-information
extensive-form game,  E, is a tuple (N;A; H;Z;act;;;u), where:
 N is a nite set of n players, indexed by i;
 A is a (single) set of actions;
 H is a set of non-terminal choice nodes;
 Z is a set of terminal nodes, disjoint from H;
 act : H ! 2A is the action function, assigning a set of possible actions to each
choice node;
  : H ! N is the player function, assigning to each non-terminal node a player i
who selects an action at that node;
  : H A ! H [Z is the successor function, mapping a choice node and action to
a new choice or terminal node such that 8h1;h2 2 H and 1;2 2 A, if (h1;1) =
(h2;2) then h1 = h2 and 1 = 2;
 u = (u1;u2;:::;un), where ui : Z ! R is a real-valued utility (or payo) function
for player i on the terminal nodes Z.20 Chapter 2 Literature Review
The Battle of Sexes is a perfect-information game whose extensive form is illustrated in
Figure 2.1(b).
Below we dene a game with imperfect information:
Denition 2.3. Imperfect-information extensive-form game. A nite, imperfect-
information extensive-form game,  IE, is a tuple (N;A; H;Z;act;;;u;I), where:
 (N;A;H;Z;act;;;u) is a perfect-information game;
 I = (I1;I2;:::;In), where for each player i, Ii = (Ii;1;Ii;2;:::;Ii;ki) is a partition
of fh 2 H : (h) = ig with the property that act(h) = act(h0) whenever there
exists a j for which h 2 Ii;j and h0 2 Ii;j. That is, player i does not distinguish
between nodes h and h0 that belong to the same subset of partition Ii.
Until now we have assumed that a strategy of a player is deterministic, yielding a single
action for each possible state of the game. These strategies are called pure strategies.
However, in many cases, players may have to randomize over their possible choices, so
as to be unpredictable in the eyes of their opponents. This leads to the concept of a
mixed strategy (Mas-Colell et al., 1995):
Denition 2.4. Mixed strategy. Given player i's (nite) pure strategy set, Si, a
mixed strategy for him, i : Si ! [0;1], assigns to each pure strategy si 2 Si a probability
i(si)  0 that si will be played, where
P
si2Si i(si) = 1.
Given that players follow mixed strategies, a player's payo is his expected utility where
the expectation is taken with respect to the probabilities on the pure-strategy proles
induced by the incorporation of the former type of strategies.
Denition 2.5. Expected utility. Given a game  , the expected utility, E[ui(s)],
for player i of the mixed-strategy prole  = (1;2;:::;n), where the expectation
is taken with respect to the probabilities induced by  on pure strategy proles s =
(s1;s2;:::;sn), is
P
s2S ui(s)
Qn
j=1 j(sj), where S = S1  S2   Sn.
Moreover, if for any set X, (X) denotes the set of all probability distributions over X:
(X) = fq : X ! Rj
X
x2X
q(x) = 1 and q(x)  0;8x 2 Xg (2.1)
then the set of mixed strategies for player i is i = (Si).
In both types of games dened above, we have implicitly made the assumption that
players have full knowledge of the parameters of the game played, such as the number
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This is not true in many real cases, where players must infer all this information and
make decisions in this limited environment. This leads to the denition of an incomplete-
information game, also known as a Bayesian game, introduced by Harsanyi (1967). This
type of games can be modeled as an imperfect-information game with the incorpora-
tion of a special player, called Nature, that makes probabilistic choices in a way that
is common knowledge to all agents and has no (or has constant) utility function. More
specically, we can imagine the user's private preferences (called his type) being deter-
mined by a random variable, whose prior probability distribution is common knowledge,
and whose realization is performed by Nature1. Formally (Shoham and Leyton-Brown,
2008):
Denition 2.6. Bayesian game. A Bayesian game,  B, is a tuple (N;S;;pr;u)
where:
 N is a nite set of n players, indexed by i;
 S = S1S2Sn, where Si is the set of strategies available to player i, known
as the strategy space of i;
  = 1  2    n, where i is the space of (epistemic) types of player i;
 pr :  ! [0;1] is a common prior over types;
 u = (u1;u2;:::;un), where ui = S   ! R is the utility function of i.
In such a game, there is an additional source of uncertainty due to the introduction of
players' types. Hence, we can have three dierent types of expected utilities for a player,
dened as follows (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008; Mas-Colell et al., 1995):
Denition 2.7. Ex-post expected utility. Given a Bayesian game,  B = (N;S;;
pr;u), the ex-post expected utility, EUi(;), for player i of the mixed-strategy prole
 = (1;2;:::;n) on pure-strategy proles s = (s1;s2;:::;sn) when agent's types are
given by  = (1;2;:::;n), is:
EUi(;) =
X
s2S
ui(s;)
n Y
j=1
j(sjjj) (2.2)
Denition 2.8. Ex-interim expected utility. Given a Bayesian game,  B = (N;S;;
pr;u), the ex-interim expected utility, EUi(;i), for player i of the mixed-strategy pro-
le  = (1;2;:::;n) on pure-strategy proles s = (s1;s2;:::;sn), when i's type is i,
is:
EUi(;i) =
X
 i2 i
pr( iji)
X
s2S
ui(s; i;i)
n Y
j=1
j(sjjj) (2.3)
1We limit the scope of this denition to settings with common prior beliefs for all agents.22 Chapter 2 Literature Review
Denition 2.9. Ex-ante expected utility. Given a Bayesian game,  B = (N;S;;
pr;u), the ex-ante expected utility, EUi(), for player i of the mixed-strategy prole
 = (1;2;:::;n) on pure-strategy proles s = (s1;s2;:::;sn), is:
EUi() =
X
2
pr()
X
s2S
ui(s;)
n Y
j=1
j(sjjj) (2.4)
As mentioned above, the objective of game theory is to analyze the strategic behavior
of players in a game so as to predict actual, stable where possible, outcomes and hence
propose optimal actions to them at every state. We now dene some of the involved
so called solution concepts that help provide answers to these questions. Before this,
it is useful to dene the strategy that satises the single player's objective of utility
maximization given the strategies of the others (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008):
Denition 2.10. Best response. Player i's best response to the strategy prole  i
is a mixed strategy 
i 2 i such that ui(
i ; i)  ui(i; i) for all strategies i 2 i.
However, in a Bayesian game, a player's set2 of best responses is dened on her ex-ante
expected utility (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008):
Denition 2.11. Best response in a Bayesian game. The set of player i's best
responses to mixed-strategy prole  i are given by:
BRi( i) = argmax
0
i2i
EUi(0
i; i) (2.5)
The rst solution concept to introduce is that of dominance. A strategy si 2 Si for
player i is (weakly) dominant if, no matter what other agents select, i will do at least as
well as he would do if he would select any other strategy (Wooldridge, 2001). Formally:
Denition 2.12. Very weakly dominant strategy. A strategy si 2 Si is a very
weakly dominant strategy for player i in game  N = (N;S;u), if for all s0
i 6= si;ui(si;s i) 
ui(s0
i;s i);8s i 2 S i.
Denition 2.13. Weakly dominant strategy. A strategy si 2 Si is a weakly dom-
inant strategy for player i in game  N = (N;S;u), if for all s0
i 6= si;ui(si;s i) 
ui(s0
i;s i);8s i 2 S i, and for at least one s i 2 S i, ui(si;s i) > ui(s0
i;s i).
Denition 2.14. Strictly dominant strategy. A strategy si 2 Si is a strictly dom-
inant strategy for player i in game  N = (N;S;u), if for all s0
i 6= si;ui(si;s i) >
ui(s0
i;s i);8s i 2 S i.
All the above-mentioned notions of dominance generalize to mixed strategies in a straight-
forward manner.
2Since many strategies might lead to the same expected utility.Chapter 2 Literature Review 23
Dominance is quite a strong concept, as players may not always be in position to nd a
best action without taking into consideration the strategies of their opponents. A more
widely-used solution concept is that of Nash equilibrium (NE) (Nash, 1951). Under this
concept, when an agent has selected an action and knows the strategies of other agents,
he cannot benet from unilaterally deviating from the current strategy prole. This
situation is formally expressed in the following denition for pure strategies (Mas-Colell
et al., 1995):
Denition 2.15. Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE). A pure strategy prole
s = (s1;s2;:::;sn) constitutes a (weak) Nash equilibrium of the game  N = (N;S;u), if
for every i = 1;2;:::;n, ui(si;s i)  ui(s0
i;s i);8s0
i 2 Si.
A stronger type of equilibrium is the strict Nash equilibrium:
Denition 2.16. Strict PSNE. A pure strategy prole s = (s1;s2;:::;sn) constitutes
a strict Nash equilibrium of the game  N = (N;S;u), if for every i = 1;2;:::;n, and
8s0
i 6= si;ui(si;s i) > ui(s0
i;s i).
The concept of such an equilibrium naturally extends the case of mixed strategies:
Denition 2.17. Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE). A mixed strategy
prole  = (1;2;:::;n) constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the game  N = (N;(S);u)
if for every i = 1;2;:::;n, ui(i; i)  ui(0
i; i);80
i 2 (Si).
Now, we can introduce the famous Nash's theorem, proving the existence of a NE in
every nite strategic game (Nash, 1951):
Theorem 2.18. Every game  N = (N;(S);u) in which the sets S1;S2;:::;Sn have a
nite number of elements has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
It is clear that a strategy prole where every agent has a dominant strategy is also
a Nash equilibrium, known as the equilibrium in dominant strategies, which will be
unique for the case of strictly dominant strategies (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008).
Finally, another (weaker) solution concept is that of an -Nash equilibrium (Shoham and
Leyton-Brown, 2008):
Denition 2.19. -Nash equilibrium ( NE). Fix (a small)  > 0. A strategy prole
s = (s1;s2;:::;sn) constitutes an -Nash equilibrium of the game  N = (N;S;u), if for
every i = 1;2;:::;n, and 8s0
i 6= si;ui(si;s i)  ui(s0
i;s i)   .
This is an extremely useful concept for algorithms that try to nd Nash equilibria, since
the oating-point approximation of all computing devices means that the latter can
only nd such equilibria even though exact solutions may be claimed. It is also true24 Chapter 2 Literature Review
L R
T 1;1 0;0
B 1 + 
2;1 20;20
Figure 2.2: In this game (B;R) is the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, but
both (B;R) and (T;L) are -Nash equilibria.
that every NE is always surrounded by -NE, hence -NE always exist, although the
opposite is not always true (cf. Figure 2.2).
Another useful solution concept that arises in perfect-information extensive-form games
is that of a subgame-perfect equilibrium. To dene this it is necessary to formally present
what is known as a subgame of such games (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008):
Denition 2.20. Subgame. Given a game,  E = (N;A; H;Z;act;;;u), the subgame
of  E, rooted at node h, is the restriction of G to the descendants of h.
Following this, we can now dene the solution concept of a subgame-perfect equilibrium,
rst introduced by Selten (1965), (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008):
Denition 2.21. Subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE). The subgame-perfect equi-
libria of a game,  E, are all strategy proles s such that for any subgame  0
E of  E, the
restriction of s to  0
E is a Nash equilibrium of  0
E.
Every SPE is also a NE, but the opposite does not always hold, and SPE always exist
in every perfect-information extensive-form game.
We now move to the Bayesian game setting to obtain similar types of equilibria. In such
a game, a strategy si of player i is a mapping from his type to an action, i.e. si : i ! Ai,
and similarly mixed strategies can be dened as probability distributions over the space
of pure strategies. In this case, a player's expected payo given the pure strategies of all
agents can be written as E[ui(s1(1);s2(2);:::;sn(n));i]. A Bayesian or Bayes-Nash
equilibrium (BNE) can then be dened as follows (Mas-Colell et al., 1995):
Denition 2.22. Bayes-Nash equilibrium. A (pure-strategy) Bayes-Nash or Bayesian
equilibrium for the game  B = (N;S;; pr;u) is a prole of strategies (s1;s2;:::;sn)
that constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the game  N = (N;S;E[u]). That is, for every
i = 1;2;:::;n, E[ui(si;s i)]  E[ui(s0
i;s i)];8s0
i 2 Si.
Until now, we have presented the basic notions of game theory and its fundamental con-
cept, that of a Nash equilibrium. In what follows, we now describe one of the techniques
that have been devised to numerically nd such an equilibrium or an approximation of
it (-NE), ctitious play.Chapter 2 Literature Review 25
2.1.2 The Fictitious Play Algorithm
Finding both pure- and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria is a topic of considerable research
and a lot of eort has been taken in being able to do this using numerical techniques.
There are currently two strands of literature on this area. First, researchers have devised
optimization techniques to nd exact or approximate Nash equilibria, starting with the
celebrated Lemke-Howson algorithm by formulating the problem as a linear comple-
mentarity one (Von Stengel, 2002). However, nding Nash equilibria has been proved to
be computationally hard, even in the simplest two-player case (Chen and Deng, 2006;
Daskalakis et al., 2006).
Given the exponential time it sometimes takes to nd a Nash equilibrium, the other
approach taken is the development of learning algorithms that converge to exact or -
NE. The main three categories of such learning algorithms are ctitious play, partial
best response and replicator dynamics. However, in what follows, we just focus on the
rst, since this is the technique that we use in some of the settings to compute the
equilibria where theoretical results are not available. We refer the reader to (Fudenberg
and Levine, 1998) for a concise introduction to the theory of learning in games.
Fictitious play is the oldest and probably most well-studied learning algorithm (Brown,
1951; Robinson, 1951). In a two-player ctitious play, each player believes that the
opponent is using an unknown but stationary mixed strategy. At each time-step, t, a
player then keeps track of the sequence of the opponent's actions up to t   1 and best
responds to the observed opponent strategy distribution. This distribution is assumed
to be uniform over the actions observed so far, i.e. the player best responds to the
empirical frequency of opponent actions, called the empirical distribution. Hence, in
this class of learning algorithms, players best respond myopically, disregarding the eect
of their choices on the opponents' future play. In more detail, each player i has a function
of initial weight, i
0 : S i 7! R+, exogenously given, which represents his initial beliefs
about the opponent and which is updated every time the opponent plays as follows
(Fudenberg and Levine, 1998):
i
t(s i) = i
t 1(s i) + 1fs i
t 1=s ig (2.6)
thus giving a probability of opponent play for each of her strategies:
i
t(s i) =
i
t(s i)
P
~ s i2S i i
t(~ s i)
(2.7)
Given this, in ctitious play, a player plays a best response to these beliefs, pi
t(i
t) 2
BRi(i
t). This is a simple rule that assumes stationarity of strategies from the players'
point of view, so myopic best response is consistent with the players' beliefs. This
assumption is not in general realistic. However, it has been shown that, if a strategy26 Chapter 2 Literature Review
prole constitutes a strict Nash equilibrium and is played at some time, t, then it will be
played in all subsequent steps (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998), and this strategy prole is
called a steady or absorbing state (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008). The relation of
ctitious play and Nash equilibria is established in the following theorem (Shoham and
Leyton-Brown, 2008):
Theorem 2.23. If the empirical distribution of each player's strategies converges in
ctitious play, then it converges to a Nash equilibrium.
Fictitious play has been proved theoretically to always converge to a NE for two-player
games that are zero-sum or solvable by iterated elimination of strictly dominated strate-
gies, or when these are potential games, or 2  n and have generic payos3 (Shoham
and Leyton-Brown, 2008; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). In all other cases, ctitious
play can converge but there are no theoretical guarantees for it. One famous exam-
ple of non-convergence is that of Shapley (1964) who has shown cyclic behavior in a
modication of the rock-scissors-paper game. Recently, Conitzer (2009) has shown that
ctitious play is guaranteed to converge to an -NE with  = t+1
2t
4, t being the number
of rst time-steps for which both players uniformly randomize over their actions, for a
two-player normal-form game where the players' utilities lie in [0;1].
Having introduced the basic notions of game theory and the ctitious play algorithm,
we now continue by shortly presenting the foundations of mechanism design, the area
of games with private information where the designer of the mechanism designs the
structure of their payos.
2.1.3 Mechanism Design
Mechanism design is a sub-eld of game theory that studies how social solutions with
good system properties can be implemented when aggregating individual preferences
that are privately known to each agent. Mechanism design deals with the problem of
designing the rules of these social systems so that some desirable objectives are met.
Some of these objectives can be expressed via the social choice function, which selects
optimal outcomes given agents' private information (i.e. types) (Mas-Colell et al., 1995;
Parkes, 2001):
Denition 2.24. Social choice function. A social choice function scf : 1  2 
:::  n ! O chooses an outcome for each possible prole of the agent's types  =
(1;2;:::;n). An element in the set of possible outcomes O may dene an allocation
of items or a task assignment, a public good alternative, an elected committee or a
candidate, or another social decision, depending on the problem in question.
3The denition of genericity in payos is out of the scope of this thesis.
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Mechanism design is the art of engineering mechanisms. But what is a mechanism? In-
formally, a mechanism includes the possible strategies to players as well as the technique
to select an outcome based on agents' actual strategies. More formally (Parkes, 2001):
Denition 2.25. Mechanism. A mechanism M = (S1;S2;:::;Sn;g()) includes the
set of strategies Si available to each agent i, and an outcome rule g : S1S2:::Sn !
O, such that g(s) is the outcome implemented by the mechanism for the strategy prole
s = (s1;s2;:::;sn).
We say that a mechanism implements a social choice function scf() if the mechanism's
game equilibrium outcome is a solution to scf() for each possible type prole of the
agents  = (1;2;:::;n), as stated in the following denition (Mas-Colell et al., 1995):
Denition 2.26. Implementation. The mechanism M = (S1;S2;:::;Sn;g()) im-
plements social choice function scf() if there is an equilibrium strategy prole (s
1;s
2;
:::;s
n) of the game induced by M such that g(s
1(1);s
2(2);:::;s
n(n)) = scf(1;2;
:::;n), 8(1; 2;:::;n) 2 1  2  :::  n.
In general, the equilibrium in the aforementioned denition can refer to any of the
solution concepts stated before, such as Bayes-Nash or dominant-strategy equilibrium.
A common assumption in the mechanism design literature is that the utility functions
of agents are quasi-linear (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008):
Denition 2.27. Quasi-linear utility. A quasi-linear utility function for agent i with
type i in an n player game, when the set of outcomes is O = L  Rn for a nite set
L, has the form ui(o;i) = i(x;i)   fi(pi), where o = (x;p) 2 O is an element of O
dening a choice x 2 L from a discrete choice set, i : L  i ! R is the valuation
function, expressing his value for a choice x 2 L, fi : R ! R is a strictly monotonically
increasing function, and pi is the payment for the agent when p is the vector of all agent
payments.
Quasi-linear utility functions allow for the separation of the outcome of a social choice
function and an outcome rule into a choice x 2 L and a payment pi() to be made by
each agent i.
As was previously stated, we are interested in designing mechanisms with desirable
properties. We now focus on the most important and general of these properties that
will be necessary for the following sections. The rst of them is direct revelation. In
this type of mechanisms, agent i's strategy is to express his reported type ^ i = si(i):
Denition 2.28. Direct-revelation mechanism. A direct-revelation mechanism
M = (1;2;:::;n;g()) restricts the strategy set Si to i;8i and has outcome
rule g : 1  2  :::  n ! O, which selects an outcome g(^ ) based on reported
types ^  = (^ 1; ^ 2;:::; ^ n).28 Chapter 2 Literature Review
Another signicant property of some mechanisms is incentive compatibility (IC), ac-
cording to which it is optimal for the agents to reveal their preferences truthfully in
equilibrium, i.e. si(i) = i 8i 2 i for agent i. This type of strategies is called
truth-telling or truth-revealing. This is crucial in many cases, as the designer of the
mechanism can make agents' expected behavior to be according to his objectives and,
moreover, knowing the valuations is many times the only way to evaluate the proper-
ties of the outcome. If we restrict our solution concept to dominant strategies5, then
strategy-proofness can be dened as follows:
Denition 2.29. Strategy-proofness. A direct-revelation mechanism M is strategy-
proof or dominant-strategy incentive-compatible if truth-revelation is a dominant strat-
egy equilibrium.
Importantly, when designing a mechanism, we can restrict our attention to these truth-
revealing direct-revelation mechanisms; this is due to a theorem called the revelation
principle (Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Parkes, 2001), although details are out of the scope of
this thesis. Finally, another important property of a mechanism is individual rationality
(IR). A mechanism is individually rational if agents yield as much utility in expectation
from participating in the mechanism than not taking part in it. Formally (Parkes, 2001):
Denition 2.30. Individual rationality. A mechanism M is (interim) individu-
ally rational if for all preferences i it implements a social choice function scf() with
E i[ui(scf(i; i))]  ui(i), where ui(i) is the expected utility for non-participation
(usually zero).
From the perspective of the society, it is often desirable to achieve (allocative) eciency,
that is, to maximize total value over agents. First, let us dene the corresponding social
choice function:
Denition 2.31. Allocatively ecient social choice function. Social choice func-
tion scf() = (x();p()) is allocatively ecient if for all preferences  = (1;2;:::;n)
Pn
i=1 i(x();i) 
Pn
i=1 i(x0();i);8x0 2 L.
Consequently, an allocatively ecient mechanism is one that implements an allocatively
eciently social choice function scf(). Such a mechanism is said to maximize the social
welfare, where the latter equals the sum of all agents' valuations. Formally:
Denition 2.32. Social welfare. The social welfare of a choice x 2 L is dened as
the sum of all agents' valuations for x, i.e.
Pn
i=1 i(x();i),  = (1;2;:::;n).
A well-known family of direct mechanisms with all the previous properties (allocative ef-
ciency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality) is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
5Similar de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family (Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Parkes, 2001). For this type of mechanisms, we consider
agents with quasi-linear utility functions. In a VCG mechanism, each agent i submits
his (reported) type, ^ i = si(i), and then the choice rule computes the correspond-
ing optimal choice, x, based on agents' reported type prole ^  = (^ 1; ^ 2;:::; ^ n), that
maximizes the total reported value over the agents:
x(^ ) = argmax
x2L
n X
i=1
i(x(^ ); ^ i) (2.8)
The payment, pi, of agent i according to this class of mechanisms is then:
pi(^  i) = hi(^  i)  
X
j6=i
j(x(^ ); ^ j) (2.9)
where hi :  i ! R is an arbitrary function.
A special case of the VCG family is the Pivotal mechanism (Clarke, 1971) where hi()
takes the form:
hi(^  i) =
X
j6=i
j(x
 i(^  i); ^ j) (2.10)
where x
 i(^  i) is the optimal choice without the agent i in the mechanism: x
 i(^  i) =
argmaxx2L
P
j6=i j(x; ^ j). In this way the mechanism achieves individual rationality
and maximizes agent payments to the designer.
The most crucial property of the VCG family is that an agent's payment does not depend
on his reported type but only on the others' reported types, thus providing incentives to
the agent for truthfully expressing his private information, i.e. it is dominant-strategy
incentive compatible (DSIC). After this (very) short introduction to the eld of mecha-
nism design, we now introduce the main application area of this work, auction theory,
which is a special area of mechanism design where there is a seller.
2.1.4 Auction Theory
According to McAfee and McMillan (1987), an auction can be dened as \a market
institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and prices on
the basis of bids from the market participants" which naturally arises in settings with
asymmetries of information between sellers and buyers of goods. From a game theoretic
perspective, auctions are usually considered as games of incomplete information given
the fact that valuations for the goods to be traded are, in general, private information to
participants. There are two characteristics that distinguish auctions from other mech-
anisms, namely, that outcomes are reached based on information elicitation from the
bidders, and the fact that these institutions are anonymous, meaning that all bidders
are treated in the same way, so prices are only based on bids and not on their identities30 Chapter 2 Literature Review
(Krishna, 2010). Usually, it is assumed that valuations are independent between bidders
(independent private values (IPV) setting), i.e. that each bidder receives a valuation
which is independently drawn from a commonly-known distribution function. However,
in some cases, valuations might be inuenced by the information of opponent bidders
(called interdependent values setting) or the valuations could be equal and unknown to
all bidders (common value (CV) setting). A key concept in the latter setting is that of
the \winner's curse"; the winner always has the highest estimation among all partici-
pants and thus in many cases he will pay more than the actual value of the good. In
this section, we focus on single-object, single-unit symmetric IPV auctions which is the
setting studied throughout this thesis. For an in-depth introduction to auction theory,
we refer the reader to the excellent textbooks of Krishna (2010); Menezes and Monteiro
(2005); Milgrom (2004), and Cassady (1967) for a eld study.
There are four widely-used formats of auctions, namely the English, the second-price
sealed-bid (SPSB) (or Vickrey after the name of its inventor6 who is also the rst re-
searcher that has formally analyzed auctions (Vickrey, 1961)), the Dutch and the rst-
price sealed-bid (FPSB) auction (Krishna, 2010). In an English auction, an auctioneer
initiates the auction by announcing a very low price that is steadily increased until there
is only one bidder who is willing to buy the good7. English auctions are often used to
sell pieces of art and are the most commonly-used form of auctions. On the other hand,
in a Dutch auction, the auctioneer announces an articially high price that is continu-
ously lowered until a bidder declares his interest in buying the item at the current price.
Applications of this auction include the selling of owers in the Netherlands, as well as
shes in other countries such as Australia, Spain and France. An FPSB (or sealed-bid
tender) auction requires bidders to submit bids in sealed envelopes to the auctioneer,
and then the winner (i.e. the owner of the highest bid) pays the auctioneer the price of
his bid. This is the most widely-used form of procurement auctions. However, probably
the most theoretically important type of auctions is the Vickrey auction; in this auction,
bidders also submit sealed bids, but the winner pays the second-highest bid instead of
his own bid. The importance of this auction lies in the fact that it is a special case of the
general VCG family of mechanisms, enjoying all its desirable properties (as described in
Section 2.1.3). This is the main type of auction used to trade display ads. These four
types of auctions are pairwise equivalent under some conditions. More specically, an
FPSB auction is strategically equivalent to the Dutch auction, and the English auction
shares the same optimal strategies with Vickrey auction when valuations are indepen-
dent (IPV) or when there are only two bidders (weak equivalence). More specically,
in a symmetric IPV FPSB or Dutch auction with n bidders whose private valuations
are i.i.d. drawn from the strictly increasing cumulative distribution F with support in
[0;!], the equilibrium bidding strategy, (), of a bidder with private valuation  will
6It has been claimed that stamps have been traded via SPSB auctions long before Vickrey's analysis
though.
7Actually, this specic variation where there are no bid jumps is known as the Japanese auction.Chapter 2 Literature Review 31
be (Krishna, 2010):
() =   
R 
0 Fn 1(y)dy
Fn 1()
(2.11)
i.e. bidders shade their bids, bidding below their valuations. In contrast, bidders in
IPV Vickrey or English auctions have a weakly dominant strategy of bidding their true
valuations (Krishna, 2010).
Moreover, according to a well-known result, called the revenue equivalence principle, the
expected revenue to the seller from any of these auctions is the same for independent
private valuations. Formally (Riley and Samuelson, 1981; Myerson, 1981; Vickrey, 1961;
Milgrom and Weber, 1982):
Theorem 2.33. Revenue equivalence principle. If valuations are independent and
identically distributed and all bidders are risk neutral (i.e. have quasi-linear utility func-
tions), then any symmetric and increasing equilibrium of any standard auction8, such
that the expected payment of a bidder with zero valuation is zero, yields the same expected
revenue to the seller.
It is important to note that this principle holds only under the assumptions of inde-
pendence, risk neutrality, identical valuation distributions9 as well as absence of budget
constraints for the bidders. If any of them is violated, then the principle is no longer
valid. This is due to the allocation of the good; Myerson (1981) has rst shown that
all auctions that implement the same allocation rule should have the same expected
payments.
As in any mechanism design problem, dierent objectives might be required by the
designer. Nevertheless, probably the most commonly-found are (allocative) eciency
(or, equivalently, social welfare) and optimality. As already mentioned, an auction is
ecient if the good is allocated to the bidder that values it most, which is indeed the
case with the four aforementioned auction formats. On the other hand, optimal auctions
maximize the auctioneer's revenue. Although not always, these two objectives are often
in conict (Krishna, 2010). Other common objectives include simplicity of the rules as
well as prevention of collusion among bidders (see Section 2.4).
One of the tools that auctioneers usually implement to achieve optimality are reserve
(or oor) prices. These are minimum acceptable prices attached to the good so as to
guarantee a minimum desirable revenue for the seller. This of course requires that there
is at least one bidder who is willing to bid no less than these prices. For a Vickrey
8An auction is called standard if it dictates that the good is awarded to the bidder with the highest
bid.
9Myerson (1981) has shown that the revenue equivalence still holds for asymmetric bidders, i.e. whose
private valuations are independently drawn from dierent distributions, but only if the probability of
winning the auction is independent of the auction type for any realization of the valuations. This is not
typically true in asymmetric auctions (Fibich et al., 2004).32 Chapter 2 Literature Review
auction with independent private valuations, where a reserve price is set at r, the ex-
interim expected payment of a bidder whose valuation is   r, is (Krishna, 2010):
p(;r) = rFn 1(r)+
Z 
r
y(n   1)Fn 2(y)f(y)dy = Fn 1() 
Z 
r
Fn 1(y)dy (2.12)
The ex-ante expected payment of such a bidder is then:
E[p(;r)] =
Z !
r
p(;r)f()d =
=
1
n
Z !
r
f
(n)
1 ()d  
Z !
r
f()(
Z 
r
Fn 1(y)dy)d (2.13)
where f
(n)
1 (x) = nFn 1(x)f(x) is the probability density function (p.d.f.) of the highest-
order statistic10 among n samples i.i.d. drawn from F. Then the ex-ante expected
revenue of the auctioneer with a valuation of 0 for the good in an auction with n such
bidders will be equal to n times this expected payment plus 0 if there is no sale (Riley
and Samuelson, 1981):
revenue(r) = 0Fn(r) +
Z !
r
f
(n)
1 ()d   n
Z !
r
f()(
Z 
r
Fn 1(y)dy)d (2.14)
Integrating by parts yields:
Z !
r
f()(
Z 
r
Fn 1(y)dy)d =
Z !
r
Fn 1()d  
Z !
r
Fn()d =
=
1
n
Z !
r
f
(n)
1 ()
1   F()
f()
d (2.15)
Hence the former equation yields:
revenue(r) = 0Fn(r) +
Z !
r
f
(n)
1 ()(  
1   F()
f()
)d (2.16)
where the function () =   
1 F()
f() is known as the virtual valuation function, the
dierence between the valuation and the multiplicative inverse hazard rate, which can
be translated as the auctioneer's marginal revenue from a bidder11. Taking the rst-
order condition (FOC) on this equation yields the equation that the auctioneer's optimal
reserve price12, r, should solve (Riley and Samuelson, 1981):
r = 0 +
1   F(r)
f(r)
(2.17)
which is independent of the number of bidders. This solution is unique if the hazard
rate of the distribution function,
f()
1 F(), is strictly monotone increasing.
10Auction theorists call this the rst-order statistic.
11We refer the reader to Bulow and Roberts (1989) for an explanation of the connection of an auc-
tioneer's revenue maximization and a monopolist's third-degree price discrimination.
12This is the reserve price that maximizes the auctioneer's revenue.Chapter 2 Literature Review 33
For an FPSB auction, the introduction of the reserve price naturally induces a dierent
bid shading for bidders, who are bidding more aggressively compared to a setting with
no reserve prices. Indeed, given that (r) = r, the equilibrium bidding function for a
bidder with valuation   r in this case will be:
() =   
R 
r Fn 1(y)dy
Fn 1()
(2.18)
After our short introduction to the eld of game theory and, more specically, to the
areas of mechanism design and auction theory, in the following section, we provide a
survey of the literature on our main application area, advertising exchanges, emphasizing
on its auction theoretic side, since this is the most relevant to the work within this thesis.
2.2 Online Advertising Exchanges
In this section, we provide a review of the relevant literature on ad exchanges, which is
the main application area of this thesis. As stated in Chapter 1, the display advertising
marketplace is a complex system, comprising two types of markets: a long-term mar-
ket for guaranteed delivery where trading is performed via bilateral negotiations, and a
short term one for the remnant inventory which is currently performed via ad exchanges,
implementing some of the aforementioned auction types. The dominant form of pricing
in the latter markets is cost per thousand impressions13 (CPM). In general, advertisers
prefer paying per click (CPC pricing), given that they require visibility and good-quality
inventory, whereas publishers prefer the current CPM model that reduces their risk. On
the other hand, the latter pricing model induces high-quality advertisements (i.e. adver-
tisements leading to clicks), whereas the former creates incentives for good trac to the
publisher (McAfee and Vassilvitskii, 2012). This is because, in a CPM model, advertisers
pay irrespective of the users' interest on the ad, so are incentivized to provide relevant
advertisements to increase their revenue. In contrast, in a CPC model, publishers take
the responsibility of showing the advertisements to interested users since otherwise they
receive zero revenue by getting no clicks. Advertisers can either buy advertisements in
CPM or CPC (and less often cost-per-acquisition (CPA)), where the conversion is made
in terms of expected click-through rate (E[CTR]), the probability of a click given an
impression, so the term eective CPM (eCPM) is often used instead (eCPM = E[CTR]
 CPC  1000). This creates a number of complicating issues, such as the bias of the es-
timation (Edelman and Lee, 2008; Bax et al., 2012; Shanahan and Kurra, 2011). Hence,
it is common for specialized intermediaries to undertake this risk of conversion, arbitrag-
ing between the two pricing formats (Cavallo et al., 2012). Another interesting pricing
model was recently proposed by Goldstein et al. (2012), who consider time-based pricing
of display advertisements and show that, under general assumptions, this will increase
13This is for historical reasons where ads have been traded in bulk. Ad exchanges allow for individual
impression pricing, leading to an equivalent cost-per-impression (CPI) pricing model.34 Chapter 2 Literature Review
revenue for publishers and provide better targeting (i.e. increased value) for advertisers
as well. However, it is still not clear which type of pricing will prevail. Hence, to avoid all
aforementioned issues, CPM pricing is adopted throughout the remainder of this thesis.
We now continue by presenting a generic model of ad exchanges.
2.2.1 The AdX Model
Although there is no standard format for the operation of ad exchanges (e.g. Yahoo!'s
Right Media ad exchange organizes its market with the use of constrained path optimiza-
tion algorithms14 (Lang et al., 2011)), Muthukrishnan (2009) has presented a general
model to describe the operation of ad exchanges for a single advertising slot, which he
calls the AdX model, illustrated in Figure 2.3. This is the basis of the model we have
extended and used for our study (see Chapter 3 for details). The sequence of actions in
AdX proceeds as follows:
1. User enters a web page belonging to publisher P.
2. P provides to the ad exchange E information about the web page, the user, as
well as the publisher's minimum accepted price, r, for the ad to be placed.
3. E contacts ad networks adn1;adn2; ;adnjadnj with this information, which might
mask some of the attributes of the web page or the user based on the contract with
the publisher. Moreover, E will typically demand a higher reserve price than what
P has asked.
4. Each adni returns a bid15 (bi;di) to E on behalf of his more suitable (winning)
advertiser, based on some local auction or other allocation mechanism, which com-
prises a price, bi, and an ad, di, to be shown. However, ad networks have the
possibility of not submitting a bid.
5. E determines a winner, i, and its price, c
i, such that r  c
i  b
i via an auction
and informs the winning ad network.
6. P shows the winning ad within the web page to the user for the current impression.
The AdX model is quite generic and many research questions remain to be answered.
Some of the those questions were pointedly stated in the same paper by Muthukrishnan
(2009). However, since the focus of this work is on the auctions involved, in the following
subsection we focus on research related to the design of auctions of for both the ad
exchange and the ad networks.
14More recently, Right Media has implemented a mixture of rst- and second-price auctions for its
operation (Johnson, 2013).
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Figure 2.3: The AdX model.
2.2.2 Auction Design Issues
The vast majority of current ad exchanges implement variants of the SPSB auction with
an appropriately set reserve price16. However, advertisers do not, in general, bid directly
in the ad exchange but participate via a number of demand-side intermediaries, described
as ad networks in the above-mentioned AdX model. Designing an appropriate auction for
both the ad exchange and the demand-side intermediaries is a challenging task, especially
given the volume and time constraints of the system (billions of impressions are traded
every day, whereas each auction must be conducted in less than 100 milliseconds). Two
main issues that should be taken into account when designing an auction for the exchange
are as follows.
First, the ad exchange is in principle a matching platform and hence must optimize
its operations so that these satisfy the short- and long-term objectives of both the
publishers, the advertisers (and their representatives) in terms of relevance and revenue
or prot, as well as maximizing its own long-term prot. Other desirable properties of an
ad exchange include (McAfee and Vassilvitskii, 2012): (i) eciency, i.e. maximizing the
total value produced in the exchange, (ii) expressiveness, i.e. devising suitable bidding
languages that describe the preferences of the participants in the best possible manner,
(iii) neutrality, i.e. being fair towards all participants (being in accordance with the
objectives of the exchange) and (iv) strategic simplicity, which makes it simple and less
costly for the participants to enter the exchange.
Second, another crucial issue is the existence of the ad networks which extract some of the
potential revenue from the ad exchange (an eect called double marginalization (Tirole,
1993)). In this vein, one of the open problems proposed by Muthukrishnan (2009) is how
the ad exchange can extract a revenue close to the book value, i.e. the second among all
advertisers' bids, given that the former does not have full information about the entire
book of bids. This was recently studied in (Mansour et al., 2012), where the authors
16Variations include the OSP auction in Google's DoubleClick, explained later, or mixtures of rst-
price and second-price auctions using what is called hard and soft oor (reserve) prices (Yuan et al.,
2013) or rst-price/second-price discriminating auctions based on the type of bids (xed or real-time)
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describe the auction they have devised, and which is currently implemented in Google's
DoubleClick ad exchange. More specically, the authors propose a variant of the Vickrey
auction with a reserve price, called the Optional Second Price (OSP) auction. In this
auction, ad networks submit a mandatory bid and an optional, second bid (lower than or
equal to the rst one). Then a regular Vickrey auction with a reserve price is run among
these bids to determine the winner and the price to be paid. Although this might not
be the case, the authors note that in many cases ad networks are contractually obliged
to submit only truthful reports. OSP allows for a variety of auction formats for the ad
networks, especially a second-price logic, as the one implemented by Google AdWords.
The authors provide a simple analysis where K advertisers are uniformly assigned at
random to one of jadnj ad networks and show that the expected loss of the ad exchange
from an ad network not truthfully reporting its second price is O( 1
Kjadnj) of the book
value, which is small as long as no network has a signicantly high share of the market.
Feldman et al. (2010) also consider the problem of auction design at the ad exchange
as well as the ad networks, when the latter compete for a single good in a Bayesian
setting by running local auctions to determine a single bid to send at the exchange.
This is the most closely-related work to this thesis, where it is assumed that advertisers
are allocated to ad networks such that each ad network has exactly the same number of
advertisers and advertisers cannot change their allocated ad network (i.e. remain captive
in their ad network). The authors assume that both the ad exchange (called the center in
their terminology) and the ad networks (called the intermediaries) implement Vickrey
auctions with reserve prices, where the ad networks decide about the allocation and
payment in their local mechanisms before the center's auction. Hence the ad networks'
auctions are contingent, meaning that the ad network trades with its advertisers the
obligation to deliver the ad at a specic price only if it wins at the central auction.
The authors start their analysis by considering a single advertiser per ad network and
prove that the only DSIC mechanism for them is to oer a take-it-or-leave-it price to
their advertiser. They also prove that there is an MSNE for the ad networks where they
oer such prices drawn randomly from an interval according to a derived probability
distribution function. They show that the upper bound of this interval increases with
the number of the ad networks and the mass of the probability distribution function gets
closer to this upper bound under the same condition. On the other hand, the reserve
price of the ad exchange decreases but remains strictly positive as the number of ad
networks increases. Finally, the authors extend their results for the case of ad networks
with more than one advertiser per network, where the number of advertisers is the same
for each of the networks. They show that ad networks will use randomized reserve prices
in equilibrium but do not manage to explicitly characterize the equilibrium distribution.
Ghosh et al. (2013) have considered a similar problem, albeit in a complete-information
setting, where buyers compete for a good via a number of intermediaries in a series of
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that the winning bidder at level ` gets a revenue share of w` and submits (1 w`) of the
bid to the next level until the root of the tree, i.e. the seller, is reached. These correspond
to fee-based mechanisms that intermediaries implement sometimes. The authors prove
the existence of a unique xed point that can be eciently (i.e. in polynomial time)
calculated by reducing the problem to a path-bargaining one.
Related to this, Gomes and Mirrokni (2014) also study the design of the auction at the
exchange when a publisher is present. However, they do not consider the presence of
intermediaries. In more detail, the authors study the problem of designing an optimal
revenue-sharing double auction for the ad exchange auctioneer, given that, in practice,
ad exchanges often forward publishers' reserve prices and get a xed share of the rev-
enue. The authors nd the optimal revenue-sharing mechanism. In doing so, they deal
with the possibility of competition by other ad exchanges in their design by expressing
the exchange's objective function as a weighted sum of its revenue and the publisher's
prot. They then compare this mechanism with a revenue-sharing mechanism with xed
shares, as is common in practice, and nd that such a scheme is optimal only when the
publisher's distribution of opportunity cost has a power form, which can be translated
to a constant elasticity of demand. Finally, they characterize optimal revenue-sharing
mechanisms where the exchange's objective is the maximization of the seller's prot
subject to a minimum revenue on its side, and nd that such an optimization cannot be
implemented by constant revenue shares. The use of a double auction for ad exchanges
has also been proposed in (Deng et al., 2014).
For a similar setting, where ad networks and advertisers are treated in the same way
(as bidders), Celis et al. (2011, 2012) consider a dierent type of mechanism for the
exchange, called the Buy-It-Now or Take-A-Chance (BIN-TAC) mechanism, which is a
hybrid of an auction and a take-it-or-leave-it price and which they claim to be truthful
in expectation. Their argument is that, in reality, valuations are not drawn from a single
distribution, but there are high-valued and low-valued advertisers based on the matching
between their desired ad and the user or content available, i.e. there is a small probability
of matching between an advertiser and a publisher-user pair, due to targeting. In their
analysis, they assume two types of bidders, high-valued and low-valued ones, and that
the virtual valuation function is increasing over two intervals (corresponding to low and
high values). According to the BIN-TAC mechanism, the center rst oers a (high) take-
it-or-leave-it price to the bidders, tlp; if more than one agree on this price, then a Vickrey
auction with the former price as a reserve price is run among them. However, if no bidder
agrees, then the top di bidders are considered and the slot is given to one of these bidders
uniformly at random at the (di + 1)-st price (a second reserve price, r, can be dened
for this auction). The authors characterize the equilibrium of this mechanism: there
is a unique pure-strategy BNE with a threshold so that bidders with valuations above
it will go for the BIN option. Moreover, advertisers always bid their true valuations
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auction is not the optimal mechanism analyzed by Myerson (1981), it provides similar
rules to the former in the setting under investigation. Finally, experiments on real data
from Microsoft's AdECN ad exchange show that, after determining the best di;r;tlp,
BIN-TAC achieves 4:5% more revenue than the \optimal" Vickrey auction with reserve
price, increasing at the same time consumer surplus by 11%.
Balseiro et al. (2013) have studied the auction design problem of the exchange in a re-
peated setting with no intermediaries but where bidders have budgets and stochastically
enter and leave the exchange. The authors use a new type of equilibrium that they name
the uid mean-eld equilibrium. This is a concept that can be used in games with very
large populations, as is the case in ad exchanges. In such games, the agent is assumed
to best respond to a mass of other agents instead of treating each of them individu-
ally, using a stochastic approximation17. Balseiro et al. also consider simplied bidding
strategies for buyers that are only functions of their valuations, disregarding the history
of play. They show that, in this unique uid mean-eld equilibrium, advertisers will
shade their bids by a constant factor when their budgets are tight (otherwise they bid
truthfully in equilibrium as in the Vickrey auction). They also study the publisher/ad
exchange's problem of optimizing the reserve price, the rate of impressions sent to the
exchange and the information disclosed to the advertisers. They nd that the reserve
price is higher compared to a single-shot setting and that publishers should disclose all
information when enforcing this optimal reserve price.
Another interesting design is proposed by Arnosti et al. (2014), who study the problem
of auction design in a private ad exchange for a publisher with both brand and perfor-
mance advertisers. In their setting, the former have contracts for guaranteed delivery,
seeking brand recognition, whereas the latter are targeting for immediate interaction
(i.e. clicks or conversions), getting the most valuable audience. The authors provide
a list of properties that a mechanism should satisfy so as to be fair to both types of
clients. More specically, according to the authors, a qualifying mechanism should be
deterministic, strategy-proof, false-name proof (i.e. advertisers should be incentivized
not to submit multiple bids) and anonymous among performance advertisers, and only
winning bidders should pay. Moreover, they propose a mechanism, called the modied
second-price auction, that satises these properties for valuation distributions that are
fat-tailed (such as the power law), in a setting with valuations that are the product of a
common random variable (i.e. they are dierent for every impression) and an advertiser-
specic variable. According to this mechanism, the highest performance advertiser's bid
wins and pays the second-highest performance bid, if their dierence is above a pre-
specied threshold. Otherwise the brand advertiser wins. Finally, they show that this
mechanism is also adverse-selection free, meaning that the probability of the brand ad-
vertiser winning the impression is independent of the common factor of the performance
advertisers' valuations.
17For an introduction to this area, we refer the interested reader to (Lasry and Lions, 2007).Chapter 2 Literature Review 39
Game theorists have sometimes been criticized for setting unrealistic assumptions or
information that is not available in real settings. Given this, a number of researchers
have worked on the optimization of auctions for an ad exchange using learning-based
methods. One such work is that of Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2013) who study the reserve price
optimization problem of an ad exchange/publisher who runs a repeated Vickrey auction.
In their setting, bidders are symmetric but their number is either unknown or stochastic
and the second-highest bid is the only bid revealed given that this is higher than the
reserve price (left-censored data). The authors propose a learning algorithm with regret,
i.e. the dierence between the optimal revenue and the revenue achieved,

O(
p
T), T
being the number of auctions. This work has been extended by Mohri and Medina (2014)
who also consider user features in their algorithm. A similar problem to that of Cesa-
Bianchi et al. (2013) has been studied by Amin et al. (2013) who nevertheless consider
a repeated single-bidder posted-price auction where the bidder is strategic. Kanoria
and Nazerzadeh (2014) study a similar setting (with respect to the strategic aspects
of bidders' strategies) with multiple bidders for repeated auctions where the good is
of binary type which is unknown to the auctioneer (only probabilities of each type are
available) but known to the bidders and their private valuations are i.i.d. drawn at
the beginning and then remain xed. The authors propose an approximately incentive
compatible threshold mechanism where a low reserve price is set until there is a bid
above a predened threshold, at which point a higher reserve price is set. They show
that, if the bidders' distribution of private valuations is regular18, then a Vickrey auction
with an a priori set, xed reserve price is no worse than setting a dynamic reserve price.
However, if this is not the case, they show that their threshold mechanism yields higher
revenue, albeit in a probably approximately correct (PAC) framework.
The problem of auction design for the ad exchanges has also been studied by Feige
et al. (2013) who propose a mechanism to deal with the existence of the demand-side
intermediaries in a complete-information single-item setting. The proposed mechanism
is a randomized auction where one of the top di bidders (where di is selected by the
auctioneer) obtains the good according to some predened probability mass function
and incurs VCG payments. The authors show that, when the advertisers are allowed to
submit any number of bids both through intermediaries and directly at the exchange,
they prefer bidding through the intermediaries and that the revenue generated is higher
compared to the predominantly-used Vickrey auction.
2.3 Auctions Involving Intermediaries
As the previous section depicts, one of the main problems for ad exchanges is the exis-
tence of various types of intermediaries. This is not the only area where such intermedi-
aries exist. For this reason, in this section we shortly survey literature on auctions where
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intermediaries are present. Besides the work of Feldman et al. (2010) on ad exchange
auctions with intermediaries, there are two other relevant areas, namely procurement
auctions19 with subcontracting and network resource allocation markets.
Our setting is similar to that of auctions with resale where bidders in an auction resell
the won item either to their competitors or to other buyers. There is a signicant
literature on this topic (e.g. Bikhchandani and Huang (1989); Haile (2003)), however
the majority focuses on the reselling to competitor bidders. Reselling to other (non-
competitor) buyers seems more relevant to the setting with ad exchanges and demand-
side intermediaries. However, in both cases, resale auctions typically take place after
the primary auction, inducing dierent dynamics (Bose and Deltas, 2007).
Auctions with subcontracting are procurement auctions which are typically used by
governments and other public organizations to assign public projects, such as highways.
Given the size of such projects, often large companies, called the contractors, are unable
to take on the whole project but instead assign parts of it to smaller companies, called
the subcontractors. Although contractors can implement some other mechanism with
the subcontractors, such as bargaining, they often organize local auctions before or after
the allocation at the central auction to determine the ones with which they will share
the project. Ad exchanges with intermediaries are a limiting case of such auctions where
intermediaries, in contrast to contractors, have no valuation for the object. Traditional
works in this area deal with the principal-agency relation of a contractor with its sub-
contractors, focusing on how and when (before or after the main auction) to optimally
divide the project (e.g. Kawasaki and McMillan (1987); Mar echal and Morand (2003)).
Nevertheless, there are two works which are closely related to the topic of this thesis.
A very relevant work is that of Wambach (2009) who studies the eects of auction de-
sign for subcontracting before the main auction, for a single contractor with exclusive,
captive subcontractors. More specically, the author compares FPSB and Vickrey sub-
contracting auctions with no reserve prices, taking the allocation function at the main
auction as exogenous. Translated to our setting, the author shows that the contractor
receives higher revenue with an FPSB than with a Vickrey auction, making a connec-
tion with auctions where bidders are risk-averse, and justifying this result to the fact
that the subcontracting auction is contingent. Finally, the author takes a mechanism
design approach to characterize the properties of the optimal contractor's mechanism.
Specically, the mechanism is ecient, the optimal contractor's bid depends only on the
highest-valuation subcontractor and this bid is the same as with a bidder whose private
valuation is the contractor's private valuation plus the virtual valuation of the highest
subcontractor.
19Procurement auctions are reverse auctions where the lowest bidder wins, since the auctioneer is a
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The second relevant work regarding auctions with subcontracting is that of Watan-
abe and Nakabayashi (2011). The authors have experimentally studied auctions with
subcontracting in a single-object, two-contractor setting with two subcontractors each
whose private valuations (costs) are i.i.d. drawn from the uniform distribution. The
authors show theoretically and experimentally that Vickrey auctions yield higher prot
to the contractors than FPSB auctions when all contractors use the same mechanism
and that the latter auctions are more ecient than the former. They also emphasize
on the risk aversion of bidders in their experimental setting. Nakabayashi (2010), in a
subsequent work, studies the same problem in a more general symmetric setting, where
he nds that FPSB auctions yield higher revenue for the contractors than Vickrey auc-
tions, in agreement with the result of Wambach (2009). More specically, he studies the
equilibrium FPSB bidding function of the subcontractors for a standard main auction,
showing that the aggressiveness level increases with the number of contractors and de-
creases with the auction's reserve price. Then, he proves that, if contractors' costs are
xed, the subcontractors' bidding function is non-concave and there is no reserve price,
contractors increase their prot by implementing FPSB auctions compared to Vickrey.
The author notes that the competition between contractors induces a downward shift
of the distribution of bids at the central auction, making a connection to the work of
Hansen (1988) on auctions with downstream markets where the quantity is induced by
the winning bid. Finally, he also shows that the auctioneer's reserve price is a function
of the number of bidders and that the FPSB auction is generally more ecient (this is
in agreement with our results in Chapter 4).
Another relevant stream of literature is on the allocation of network (spectrum) re-
sources, such as bandwidth, where there are multiple levels of markets, and the target
is to achieve eciency (Bitsaki et al., 2006). Tang and Jain (2012) have considered such
a setting in a complete-information environment, where a seller auctions o a good to
some intermediaries who then resell this to their exclusive lower-level bidders, who then
do the same, in a tree-like structure, until the nal buyers obtain the item. The authors
compare FPSB and Vickrey auctions in a setting with a single unit, where they once
again conrm the increased ineciency of second-price auctions, and then continue with
auctions involving multiple items where they show that VCG-type auctions, which they
call the hierarchical network second-price auctions, can achieve eciency and budget
balance. Iosidis (2012) considers a similar problem in a Bayesian setting where he
proposes a novel mechanism for the case where the central auctioneer aims to maximize
eciency whereas intermediaries are purely prot maximizers. Other issues, such as
the stability of tree structures with multiple intermediary levels, have been studied by
Polanski and Cardona (2012) for an FPSB auction and uniformly distributed private
valuations for buyers, where it was shown that only a single level of intermediaries is
stable.
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since only a single bid is submitted on behalf of their advertisers, thus suppressing
competition at the exchange. For this reason, in the next section, we review related
literature on collusion in auctions.
2.4 Bidding Rings
One of the most important issues that auction designers should take into account in
selecting their mechanisms is the possibility of collusion between the bidders, which is
known as bid-rigging in the context of auctions (Marshall and Marx, 2012; Hendricks
et al., 2013; von Ungern-Sternberg, 1988). Often a subset of bidders form cartels, also
called bidding rings (or sometimes \kippers" (Cassady, 1967)), in an eort to depress the
closing price and, consequently, capture some of the revenue from the seller { called the
collusive surplus, collusive gain or spoils (Hendricks et al., 2013; McAfee and McMillan,
1992). The latter surplus can be positive only when the cartel includes both the highest
and second-highest valuation bidders, and is maximized when the former bidder is the
one that bids in the main auction. In such a situation, the collusion is said to be ecient
(Mailath and Zemsky, 1991).
Collusion between bidders can be either explicit, where side-payments between the ring
members are permitted (strong cartels), or implicit, also known as tacit collusion, where
bidders coordinate indirectly on their actions, using some bid rotation scheme (Comanor
and Schankerman, 1976), so as to decrease the probability for the bidding ring to be
detected by the auctioneer or other antitrust authorities (weak cartels). This section
focuses on the former type of collusion in single-item single-shot IPV auction settings,
since this is the main type of auctions implemented in advertising exchanges and there
are no legal issues regarding the operation of the demand-side intermediaries20.
The design of the bidding ring comprises three dierent decisions that need to be made:
(i) the amount of the bids that will be submitted in the auction (including the potential
winning bids, known as the serious bids, along with other, non-serious, bids that might
be submitted so that the cartel cannot be detected or for enforcing the ring's agreement);
(ii) the allocation of the won items to the ring members; (iii) the way that the collusive
surplus will be divided between the members of the ring for strong cartels. In line
with the classical mechanism design approach, these decisions must take into account
the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints for the ring members
along with an additional \no-cheat" constraint; ring members should be incentivized to
bid in the auction according to the ring's directions (Marshall et al., 2012). Often the
mechanism is assumed to be implemented by the ring's \center", a coordinating device
that ensures that the rules of the ring are enforced as agreed, acting as a banker. One
20For a general study on collusion, including tacit collusion in repeated auction settings, we refer the
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of the most frequently-used mechanisms for the determination of winner and payments
in single-item settings is for the ring to organize an internal auction before or after the
main auction, known as pre- or post-auction knockout (PAKT) (Hendricks and Porter,
1989; McAfee and McMillan, 1992). For repeated settings, bidding rings often use some
bid rotation scheme, such as bidding based on the phases of the moon, to determine the
winner (Hendricks and Porter, 1989; Marshall and Marx, 2012; Hendricks et al., 2013).
In a simple complete-information setting, when there is no uncertainty about the valu-
ations of all bidders, Marshall et al. (2012) illustrate that in both English, second-price
and rst-price sealed bid auctions with more than one ring, when no ring includes both
the highest and second-highest bid, no surplus can be realized by collusion (the ring is
\ineective"). In the same setting, there is no incentive for the highest-valuation bidder
to participate in the rst place in such a ring since the side-payment that needs to be
paid equals his extra surplus from participation. This eect becomes more apparent as
the number of bidders increases, as the highest bidder's surplus decreases compared to
non-cooperative bidding. Also, in FPSB auctions, the collusion is not sustainable since
the highest-valuation bidder's necessary side-payments so that ring members refrain
from cheating are too costly.
In his seminal work, Robinson (1984) provides a rst attempt to formally study collusion
in auctions where, among other results, he shows that English and SPSB auctions are
more susceptible to bid rigging than FPSB or Dutch auctions in a complete-information
case, both for IPV and CV settings, albeit when cartel membership is exogenously de-
termined. Graham and Marshall (1987) study collusion in single-item SPSB and English
auctions where there is a single bidding ring and both the auctioneer and non-ring mem-
bers are unaware of this. They describe a mechanism whereby the ring members run an
incentive-compatible pre-auction knockout auction to determine the bid to be submitted,
which is the highest internal bid, and all ring members receive a xed payment which
is an equal share of the collusive surplus (i.e. the dierence between the ring's second-
highest bid and the second-highest bid outside the auction, if it is positive, otherwise
zero). They show that PAKT achieves budget balance in expectation and that revenue
equivalence between the two auction formats still holds in such a collusive environment.
Finally, they prove that the reserve price of the auctioneer increases with the number of
collusive bidders and that bidders will form an all-inclusive ring in equilibrium. More
specically, if there are n total bidders, m > 1 of which form a bidding ring, whose
private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from the same distribution, F, with support [0;1]
and positive density f > 0, then the auctioneer's ex-ante expected revenue, if a reserve
price, r, is set, is:
revenuePAKT = rf(n   m)[1   F(r)]Fn 1(r) + [1   Fm(r)]Fn m(r)g+
+
Z 1
r
y(n   m)[(n   1)Fn 2(y)   nFn 1(y) + Fn m 1(y)]f(y)dy (2.19)44 Chapter 2 Literature Review
The rst term corresponds to the probability of the second-highest bid being less than
the reserve price times the reserve price, and the second term is the probability that
the opposite happens times the conditional expected second-highest bid given that this
is the case. Taking the rst-order condition on the aforementioned revenue yields the
following expression for the optimal reserve price, r:
(n   m)[1   F(r)]Fn 1(r) + [1   Fm(r)]Fn m(r) = rnFn 1(r)f(r) (2.20)
Graham et al. (1990) extend the aforementioned analysis where nested cartels are also
considered, i.e. cartels where a subset of the members form another cartel, participating
as a single entity in the original cartel. They rst establish an equivalence between a
member's surplus and the Shapley value in a complete-information scenario with hetero-
geneous bidders. Then, they extend their analysis for the incomplete-information case
where they assume that knockout auctions take place after the main auction and homo-
geneous bidders. The authors show that, in this case, members will overbid in equilib-
rium. Finally, their analysis includes the incomplete-information case of heterogeneous
bidders, where they consider a single bidding ring and propose the same second-price
PAKT as in (Graham and Marshall, 1987), where they again establish the correspon-
dence between members' side-payments and their ex-ante Shapley value of the auction
game. Heterogeneous bidder collusion in SPSB auctions is also studied in (Mailath and
Zemsky, 1991), where, using a mechanism design approach, it is shown that an ex-post
ecient collusive mechanism21 exists both for complete (i.e. all-inclusive) and partial
rings, and, using concepts from cooperative game theory, that the payments can be
designed in such a way so that once the grand coalition, i.e. an all-inclusive bidding
ring, is formed, it will be stable. Finally, the authors conrm that the auctioneer's op-
timal reserve price increases with the ring size under conditions that guarantee that it
is unique and is aected by the size of the ring.
McAfee and McMillan (1992) discuss collusion in an unrepeated single-item IPV FPSB
setting, both for weak and strong all-inclusive cartels, i.e. when m = n. In the latter,
more relevant case, they also describe an ecient PAKT where the highest bidder wins
and pays each ring member (including himself) an equal share of the expected dierence
between his valuation and the reserve price, given that his valuation is higher than the
reserve price, and also submits a bid equal to the latter price to the auctioneer. This
mechanism can be implemented by using an FPSB PAKT or a Vickrey PAKT, and the
authors show that no other mechanism can yield higher surplus for the ring. FPSB
PAKT allows for ex-post budget balance but bidding strategies are in NE, whereas
Vickrey PAKT allows for budget balance only in expectation but is DSIC. They then
consider non-inclusive (partial) cartels, where, they show that both members and non-
members will randomize their bids when their private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from
21A bidding ring is called ex-post ecient if for each vector of valuations, the outcome of the ring
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a distribution with support f0;1g22. Leyton-Brown et al. (2002) study the behavior
of multiple bidding rings in single-item IPV FPSB auctions where they additionally
assume that bidders have probabilistic estimates about the number of bidders and can
voluntarily enter in a bidding ring, whereas non-ring members are not aware of the
number of bids suppressed by a bidding ring, and it is required that the identity of the
winner is announced after the end of the auction. They nd that bidders truthfully
reveal their valuations to the ring centers (called the coordinators) and both members
and non-members benet from the existence of the bidding rings, however they cannot
characterize all resulting BNE of the game23 and the ring centers are assumed to be
incentiveless.
Another interesting work is that by Marshall and Marx (2007) who consider collusion in
single-item FPSB and Vickrey auctions with heterogeneous bidders and a partial (less
than all-inclusive) bidding ring where potential ring members are common knowledge
and decide whether to enter the ring before learning their private valuations. The authors
study the possibility of suppressing competition in the ring, given the competition from
non-ring members, under two scenarios. In the rst one, the ring can only provide bid
and payment recommendations to its members but cannot enforce a single bid submission
on behalf of the ring (BCM setting). According to the second scenario, the ring can
additionally enforce submitting a single bid on behalf of the ring members (BSM setting).
It is found that, in the former scenario, there cannot be a mechanism which is incentive
compatible, individually rational, budget balanced and ex-post ecient that can enforce
such a submission in FPSB auctions. This is because some members have an incentive
to bid above their suggested amount and get the item, hence it is shown that at least
two bids will be submitted that are very close to each other and higher than the single
recommended bid. In contrast, for the BSM setting, rings can suppress within-ring
competition for both types of auctions, under individual rationality constraints that
need to be evaluated numerically for each private valuation distribution for the case
of FPSB auctions. In line with the previous work, Lopomo et al. (2011) show that
all-inclusive BSM bidding rings in FPSB auctions are not stable (i.e. they yield the
same expected surplus to the colluders) in a simple 2-bidder setting with binary private
valuations.
Finally, Laont and Martimort (1997); Che and Kim (2006); Pavlov (2008) have stud-
ied the optimal auction design problem of an auctioneer in the presence of a group of
colluders from a mechanism design perspective. They nd that, in some environments,
the auctioneer can design an optimal mechanism that yields the same revenue as a fully
competitive optimal auction.
22As the authors note, this setting is the same as asymmetric FPSB auctions where it is not, in general,
known when equilibria of the bidding function exist.
23Actually, a BNE is identied where all potential ring members decline the ring's invitation and bid
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In this section, we shortly reviewed the literature in bidding rings for single-item auc-
tions and strong cartels. As we have shown, most of the literature has focused on the
ring's allocation of the bids and side-payments to its members, so that the ring is e-
cient, stable and budget balanced. However, the vast majority of the work in this area
deals with a single bidding ring (with and without competition from non-ring members)
and assumes that the ring center acts as a means of coordination. In contrast, in the
advertising exchange marketplace, demand-side intermediaries correspond to such ring
centers which are, in contrast, purely self-interested and prot-maximizing. Moreover,
demand-side intermediaries compete both when bidding in the ad exchange but also in
an eort to attract the qualied demand from the advertisers. For this reason, in the
following section, we provide a summary of the closely related literature on competition
between auctioneers.
2.5 Competing Mechanisms
The majority of studies in mechanism design and auction theory consider the case of
a monopolist seller who is auctioning goods to a number of bidders so as to maximize
revenue or allocative eciency. In this case, the optimal reserve price is such that
the marginal cost of increasing the reserve price (and hence excluding buyers with low
valuations) equals the marginal prot due to extracting more surplus from high-valued
buyers (Myerson, 1981). However, much less is known in settings where sellers compete
to attract buyers by announcing appropriate mechanisms, a situation that often arises in
real markets, such as search engines, nancial markets, auction houses, or online auction
sites. In contrast to the monopolistic setting, in these cases an increase in the reserve
price might not yield enough surplus extraction from the buyers, as the latter now have
the opportunity to select another mechanism.
There is relatively little research in the area of competing auctions. The main reasons
for the scarcity of results in this area are the intractability of analysis and the fact that,
until recently, auctions were standalone events and of limited use (Haruvy et al., 2008).
Pai (2010) provides two major explanations for the former fact. First, there is no analog
to the revelation principle; even when xing the mechanisms of others, calculating the
revenue of a seller's mechanism requires knowledge of the buyers' selection decisions in
equilibrium (i.e. how many buyers will visit the seller and what is the distribution of
their valuations, both of which are endogenously determined based on the selection of
mechanism). This makes the seller's revenue maximization an optimization problem
involving a xed-point subroutine (see also (Epstein and Peters, 1999; Martimort and
Stole, 1999; Peters, 2010; Attar et al., 2011a,b; Peters, 2012)). Second, the design of
a mechanism will inuence the response of other mechanisms, resulting in an innite
regress whose xed point is dicult to nd and utilize. For these reasons, the vast
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Haruvy et al., 2008) or focuses on the two ends of the competition, i.e. duopoly markets
and markets with an innite number of agents. Moreover, often the mechanisms consid-
ered are inevitably xed, transforming the mechanism competition to that of price or
quantity competition which are more amenable to analysis. Competition in prices and
quantities between rms has a long history with the models of Bertrand and Cournot re-
spectively (Mas-Colell et al., 1995), although the institutions considered are exogenously
determined and information about demand is considered to be perfect.
Analysis of competing mechanisms starts with the seminal paper of McAfee (1993) in
a multi-period setting with multiple sellers and buyers having single-unit supply and
demand, where the latter single-home (i.e. can only select one seller at each period).
This work is based on a \large market hypothesis", meaning that the number of agents
tends to innity in the limit. Also, the ratio of buyers to sellers is kept constant and the
work focuses on the steady-state result of the competition. The rst hypothesis ensures
that a change of one mechanism does not inuence the available surplus of the buyers not
participating in the mechanism and hence the response of the other mechanisms. McAfee
shows that there is a unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium24 where sellers hold
Vickrey auctions with reserve prices that equal their production costs, whereas buyers
select one of these auctions uniformly at random.
In a subsequent work, Peters (1997) validates the results of McAfee in a more general
setting, relaxing McAfee's assumptions about symmetric mechanisms and ignorance
about a seller's mechanism eect of deviation on the buyers and opponent sellers. In
a follow-up paper, Peters and Severinov (1997) consider a similar setting for Vickrey
auctions, where they study two dierent variations: cases where buyers select an auction
before learning their valuation and cases where the selection is done after having acquired
such information. The authors express the revenue of the sellers in a closed form for
nite populations of agents and then get the limit as this number goes to innity. They
show that, in the former scenario, there exist symmetric equilibria for the sellers with
reserve prices between their production costs and the monopolist optimal reserve price.
In the latter case, they show that, in their formulation, there will also be a symmetric
equilibrium where sellers set zero reserve prices, and buyers randomize equally between
the auctions.
Hernando-Veciana (2005) extends the aforementioned results to a nite population of
sellers with asymmetric production costs that implement Vickrey auctions25 and can
select among a nite set of reserve prices. He shows that there exists a unique MSNE
for the buyers' entry game, involving ns cut-o points (where ns is the number of
sellers), so that buyers with valuations above each corresponding cut-o point select one
of the eligible auctions (i.e. having a reserve price lower or equal than their valuations)
24McAfee considers an equilibrium concept he terms the Competitive Subform Consistent Equilibrium
(CSCE).
25He mentions that the results can be generalized to FPSB auctions resulting from the revenue equiv-
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uniformly at random. Moreover, he shows that, when the number of sellers is large
enough, there is also a unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in the sellers' game,
where reserve prices equal production costs. A crucial assumption for this result is that
production costs have the same support as the available reserve prices.
In a more recent study, Vir ag (2010) generalizes the previous results for nite markets
with ns Vickrey auctions with a continuum of feasible reserve prices, and nb buyers
where, in contrast to all previous works, he relaxes the requirement for the ratio ns=nb
to be xed. First, he conrms the result that the buyers' selection game admits a
unique MSNE, involving ns cut-o points, as before. Then, he also shows that there are
mixed-strategy equilibria with reserve prices converging to the symmetric production
cost, zero, in the limit, once the market is large enough. He argues that this happens
because sellers in such a market cannot inuence the surplus of buyers and hence should
only decrease their reserve prices which will induce more buyer visits. Crucially, he is
also able to provide necessary conditions for the existence of a symmetric pure-strategy
equilibrium for the sellers that do not depend on the distribution of valuations, by
assuming that the lowest valuation is higher than the production cost of the sellers (i.e.
positive), in contrast to previous literature. Finally, he illustrates that these symmetric
reserve prices quickly converge to zero as the market becomes large, as long as the ratio
of buyers to sellers does not converge to innity fast enough. Valverde (2012) extends
these results to heterogeneous goods, showing that the buyers' entry game involves pure
cut-o strategies, where buyers either select or do not enter a seller's auction based on
their valuation for the item under consideration, and equilibrium reserve prices tend to
production costs under the condition that (only) the buyers' population is large enough.
Damianov (2005) reaches a similar conclusion for a nite number of competing sellers
(and buyers) implementing general mechanisms, where buyers select their auction be-
fore learning their valuation. He shows that the buyers' entry game admits a symmetric
MSNE where they uniformly randomize between the sellers, and that the sellers' sym-
metric mechanism in equilibrium is a Vickrey auction with zero reserve price and an
entrance fee which is independent of the number of buyers in the auction.
At the other end of the competing mechanisms spectrum, Burguet and S akovics (1999)
studied the duopoly competition of two Vickrey auctions with reserve prices. They show
that the buyers' entry game admits a unique BNE involving a cut-o point, so that
buyers with valuations below this point always select the low-reserve auction, whereas
buyers with valuations higher than this cut-o point equally randomize between the two
auctions. What's more, they show that the sellers' reserve-price-setting game cannot
have a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, as is the case with large markets, but will
involve a mixed-strategy equilibrium with reserve prices above their production costs
(i.e. positive). However, they cannot fully characterize it. Finally, the authors extend
their results for a larger class of mechanisms, called quasi-ecient. These are mecha-
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entry decisions are identical to the ones obtained under Vickrey auctions, hence ine-
ciencies arise only from the seller withholding the good. For this class of mechanisms,
they show that the entry game of the buyers involves two cut-o points, so that buyers
with valuations lower than the low cut-o point do not attend any seller's mechanism,
buyers with valuations between the cut-o points all select the same seller, and buyers
with valuations higher than the high cut-o point randomize equally between the mech-
anisms. Pai (2009) considers more general mechanisms, incorporating a \hierarchical
allocation rule" (i.e. the allocation is based on a declared priority on the bidder types,
each above a specied threshold), for a duopoly market. More specically, he consid-
ers the best response of an auctioneer when his opponent implements a quasi-ecient
mechanism. He shows that the equilibrium strategy of buyers' entry game is as before
(Burguet and S akovics, 1999) and then proves the existence of a symmetric weak-perfect
BNE in the sellers' game where both implement a quasi-ecient mechanism when the
probability distribution function of buyers' valuations satises the monotone hazard rate
condition and, additionally, is a weakly decreasing function. As noticed, this means that
auctioneers' mechanisms will involve a posted-price component.
Moreover, Gerding et al. (2007) consider the case where sellers oer Vickrey auctions
with reserve prices in the presence of a mediator (such as eBay) and can make use of
shill bids (i.e. bids submitted on behalf of the seller without buyers knowing it so that
selling price is increased). The authors analytically nd the equilibrium strategies of the
sellers in the case of two auctions (by iteratively discretizing the space of reserve prices)
and then implement evolutionary experiments to study the setting with more sellers.
They show that sellers have incentives to adopt shill bids which can be deferred by the
mediator by charging them appropriate auction fees. In another study, Ellison et al.
(2004) study the competition of two mediators with multiple sellers and buyers, where
both can select one of the mediators, and buyers learn their valuations after entering
the corresponding market. Hence, in this model, participants face network eects, both
from their opponents (i.e. higher competition leads to smaller expected prot) and their
counterparts (i.e. large numbers of sellers/buyers induces higher expected prot for
buyers/sellers respectively). The authors nd that under some conditions, mediators
with dierent sizes can co-exist.
In sponsored search auctions, Liu et al. (2008) have studied the competition between
two search engines that dier in their ranking rule, which can either be according to bids
or according to revenue (i.e. adjusted bids by quality). Moreover, advertisers are split
in two categories, low-quality and high-quality ones. The authors nd that if the search
engines adopt dierent such rules, the equilibrium behavior of the advertisers depends
on the ratio of high- to low-quality advertisers. If this ratio is greater than half, then
low-quality bidders go to the bid-based ranking mechanism, and high-quality advertisers
will go to each of them with a probability that is a function of the aforementioned ratio.
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probability which is a function of their private valuation as well as the ratio of the low-
and high-quality values selected. In this case, high-quality advertisers always select the
search engine with the revenue-based ranking rule.
In line with the previous work, Ashlagi et al. (2011b) consider a setting with two auctions
that dier in their click-through rate (i.e. popularity). One of their ndings is that,
when sellers oer VCG auctions with reserve prices, there is a unique equilibrium for
the buyers' selection subgame, involving more complex strategies. More specically,
the equilibrium strategy is uniquely dened by two cut-o points, so that buyers with
valuations in the interval dened by the cut-o points follow a strictly mixed strategy,
whereas buyers with valuations outside of this interval follow pure strategies. However,
none of the previous works considers the problem of competing intermediaries in a non-
captive setting, whose presence fundamentally changes the nature of the problem. More
specically, the auctions are no longer independent, as they have to compete additionally
as bidders at the central auction for the same good, and so the buyers' intermediary
selection aects both the intermediaries' prot as well as the center's revenue. Finally,
intermediary auctioneers face similar tradeos as the buyers: the higher their prot
the smaller is their probability of obtaining the item at the center. In (Ashlagi et al.,
2011a), the same authors extend their work allowing for buyer participation costs and
capacity dierences for generalized second-price search engines. They show that, under
this model, large advertisers are likely to multi-home (where the buyers' entry game
admits a PSNE with a single cut-o point), and that joining of the two search engines,
such as the Microsoft-Yahoo! deal on 2008, may or may not benet social welfare, based
on the dierence in capacities and popularities between the search engines.
Motivated by the online display advertising marketplace, Polevoy et al. (2014) extend
the work of Emek et al. (2012) for multiple sellers that compete to attract buyers with
binary valuations for a set of goods. The authors consider revenue maximizing sellers
each of whom has a good (that corresponds to a ow of ads) and must decide what kind
of attribute partitions should be revealed to the buyers. They show that the buyers'
selection problem is a potential game26 (hence admits a pure NE strategy) where the
potential is the social welfare. Then, they study how competition aects social welfare,
and they provide tight bounds, showing that competition might minimally increase social
welfare but can also lead to signicant loss compared to the setting with a monopolist.
Finally, another growing strand of literature deals with the competition between two-
sided platforms, such as nancial exchanges (Rochet and Tirole, 2006; Cantillon and Yin,
2011). However, the vast majority of this literature emphasizes on the network eects
that inuence the traders' decision about which platform to select as well as fee-based
platforms where the focus is on the structure of the fees. Our model (see Section 3.3)
26A game, G =(N;S;u), is a potential game if there exists a function  : S 7! R such that, for all
i 2 N, all s i 2 S i and si;s
0
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0
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departs from these settings, since intermediaries represent only one side of the market
and are assumed to make a prot by pocketing the dierence between what they get
paid by their advertisers and what they pay at the exchange.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we reviewed related literature on auctions for ad exchanges and, more
generally, auctions involving intermediaries. In particular, we began by introducing the
key notions of game theory, the theory of strategic interaction among agents, and put
an emphasis on auction theory, the main area of interest to this thesis.
We then presented related work in the area of online ad exchanges from an auction-
theoretic perspective. More specically, we described the AdX model along with the
state-of-the-art literature in the auction design problems for the ad exchange and the
publisher. As depicted, some of the problems that ad exchanges face include the exis-
tence of advertisers with dierent incentives and budgets, the fact that goods are het-
erogeneous and billions of auctions are conducted daily, so auctions need to be simple
and fast. There are also important issues that need to be considered by all stakeholders,
such as the limited information on opponents and bids that need to be learned over time.
Finally, one of the most important issues is the existence of the intermediaries that hide
some of the demand to the exchange and publisher.
This last issue is of immediate relevance to this thesis. For this reason, we continued our
literature review on domains with auctions involving intermediaries where we showed
the connection between ad exchanges, procurement auctions with subcontracting and
auctions for network resource allocation. Specically, we have seen that other researchers
have compared rst-price and second-price auctions in these settings. However, although
some of the results share similarities with the work within this thesis, there are a number
of issues that have not been addressed before to satisfy our research aims. Specically,
in these works, the intermediaries are assumed to be homogeneous and have no strategic
tools to increase their prot, such as reserve prices. The only exception is the work by
Feldman et al. (2010) who nevertheless derive results for intermediaries with a single
buyer each. In addition, the related literature considers competing intermediary auc-
tions where both the allocation and payments are determined before the central auction.
Wambach (2009) has considered this timing issue but avoids explicitly modeling compe-
tition by other intermediaries. We aim to bridge this gap by considering both pre- and
post-award intermediary auctioneers (see Section 3.4 for the mechanisms studied) and
letting both the central auctioneer and the intermediaries set appropriate reserve prices
(Chapter 5).
Intermediary auctions act as bidding rings in the eyes of the ad exchange auctioneer. For
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in explicit collusion, colluders often organize local auctions to determine the bid at the
central auction, as well as the local payment and allocation if the ring wins. However,
the emphasis in this stream of literature has been on a single bidding ring, in contrast to
our competing intermediaries setting. Moreover, the main issues studied are related to
the enforcement of the agreed bids, since bidders can directly bid at the central auction.
Currently, this is not an issue in our ad exchange setting, since advertisers typically
lack the expertise and infrastructure, or are not allowed to bid directly at the exchange.
We complement some of the works in this area by considering dierent mechanisms
for the rings, when multiple, competing such bidding rings are present in Chapter 4.
More specically, we nd that the reserve price of the central auctioneer increases with
the number of bidders and that it can also depend on the number of intermediaries for
some types of PAKT. Finally, within the same chapter, our insights from competing,
self-interested intermediary auctioneers, can also provide insights on which collusion
mechanism colluders should choose in face of competition from other rings.
Finally, given that intermediary auctioneers are in direct competition, we oered a short
survey of the growing literature on the problem of competition between auctioneers,
which is the main broad area of our work. Specically, we pointed out the diculties in
applying traditional mechanism design techniques, such as the revelation principle, in
imperfect competition settings. This stream of literature considers the competition be-
tween auctioneers by predominantly xing the mechanisms and converting the problem
to that of price or quantity competition. Also, works in this literature consider either
duopoly or perfect competition, mainly for tractability issues. In this thesis, we take
the former approach, considering settings with two intermediaries that use predened
auction mechanisms and compete by setting appropriate reserve prices. This is the rst
time that this has been studied, since the vast majority of previous literature has focused
on independent auctioneers, whereas in our ad exchange setting, intermediaries act as
both auctioneers and bidders. In Chapter 6, we rst study the intermediary selection
problem faced by the advertisers, which is shown to be complex and remarkably dier-
ent than that of previous works. Given this complexity, learning algorithms are used to
calculate the intermediaries' equilibrium reserve-price-setting strategies.
In summary, we showed that the literature up to now has not suciently addressed the
problem of competition between intermediary auctioneers. Against this background,
in the next chapters, we aim to ll this gap, by analyzing the imperfect competition
between demand-side intermediaries that satises our research objectives (Section 1.2).
In particular, we study the imperfect (i.e. small, nite) competition between demand-
side intermediaries with captive buyers when the latter do not impose any reserve prices
(Chapter 4). We then look at the impact of such reserve prices in the revenue and
eciency of the ad exchange ecosystem, in Chapter 5. Finally, in Chapter 6, we remove
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in a simple two-intermediary setting. Before doing this, in the next chapter, we formally
present our model and assumptions.Chapter 3
The Problem of Competing
Intermediary Auctioneers
In this chapter, we provide a general formalization of the problem of competing interme-
diaries that will be studied in the following chapters within this thesis. The aim of this
discussion is to present a high-level model of the setting considered along with a number
of necessary assumptions that will form the basis for the theoretical analysis presented
in the remainder of this thesis.
To this end, rst, the roles of each set of agents within our setting are outlined in Section
3.1. Then, Section 3.2 lays down the assumptions taken that were deemed necessary for
the analytical tractability of the results. Following this, Section 3.3 presents a general
formulation of the model that will be used in the next chapters. Next, Section 3.4
provides a description of the three mechanisms that are studied in the chapters that
follow along with a number of motivating examples that show some of the implications
of the presence of competing intermediaries and their strategic interaction. Finally,
Section 3.5 concludes this chapter.
3.1 The Agents
As it has been discussed in Chapter 1, the online advertising industry is signicantly
complex, comprising a large variety of companies, each specializing in a dierent area.
However, for issues of clarity and tractability of our model and since our focus is on the
competition between demand-side platforms, in the setting studied, three dierent types
of strategic participants are considered1:
1We borrow the terminology from Feldman et al. (2010).
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 The center represents an ad exchange or a supply-side platform that calls out a
number of interested advertisers (or, mainly, their representative intermediaries, as
discussed below) every time a user visits a web page of a publisher whose supply is
managed by the platform. The center takes the role of an auctioneer that forwards
eligible information (if any) about the user and the web page to the bidders and
conducts an auction in which the latter have to submit an advertisement tag along
with a price oer (henceforth called a bid). The winning bidder's advertisement is
then shown to the user (an event known as an impression) and the center shares
the obtained revenue with the publisher based on a predetermined commission
rate. In what follows, the publisher and third-party running the ad exchange or
supply-side platform will be considered as a single entity.
 A number of demand-side intermediaries. These intermediaries provide advertis-
ers with the technical infrastructure, expertise, relevant tools as well as a central-
ized point of access to the various ad exchanges. There are two broad categories
of such intermediaries: self-serve and managed. The latter type follow the tra-
ditional ad network business model, whereby the intermediary agrees in advance
with the advertiser on a budget to be spent on purchasing a specied number of
qualied impressions. Furthermore, these intermediaries take full responsibility for
managing the advertiser's campaign. In contrast, self-serve intermediaries, known
as demand-side platforms, typically provide an application programming interface
along with additional useful data to their advertisers who are now responsible for
their bidding strategy and campaign management. Given that there is usually
more than one interested advertiser for each impression in an intermediary's plat-
form, the latter implements a mechanism, predominantly an auction, that decides
which of the advertisers' bids to submit at the center and how much to ask for its
services.
 A number of buyers. These are the advertisers that have some predened demand
for ad placement on web pages and for user types of their choice. The vast majority
of buyers have a budget and have to decide how much to bid2. In addition, they
have to decide which advertisement to show for each available impression at the ad
exchange, if called out. Buyers connect to the ad exchange via some intermediary,
hence it is crucial for buyers to select an intermediary that maximizes their surplus.
In what follows, a buyer's utility will be called her surplus, an intermediary's utility will
be called his prot and the center's utility will be called its revenue3.
Now that the main participant roles considered have been illustrated, in the following
section, we present the assumptions that were taken in our model to make it amenable
to theoretical analysis.
2Bid amounts are usually much smaller compared to a buyer's budget.
3For the remainder of this thesis, we follow the convention that buyers are female and intermediaries
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3.2 Assumptions
Before presenting our model formally, we rst simplify the complexity of the real-world
ad exchange area by making the following assumptions:
 All agents are self-interested.
 There is a single slot available for ad placement that is auctioned at the center4.
 There is a single center implementing a second-price sealed-bid auction with a
reserve price and a fair tie-breaking rule. This mechanism is chosen since it is used
in all major ad exchanges. Moreover, this mechanism is incentive compatible and
is revenue-optimal when participants are symmetric (Myerson, 1981), which is a
reasonable assumption for fair, open platforms like ad exchanges.
 The pricing model implemented is CPM, i.e. advertisements are traded on a per
impression basis, as is the case in the vast majority of the current ad exchanges.
Moreover, this pricing scheme alleviates problems related to the bias inherent in
the estimation of the click-through rate of the advertisements (see Section 2.2).
 Buyers can only participate in the center's auction via demand-side intermediaries.
This naturally arises in the complex online display advertising marketplace, as ad-
vertisers usually lack the required expertise and technical infrastructure, or are not
allowed to bid directly in the ad exchange (e.g. Microsoft's advertising exchange).
 Buyers single-home, i.e. each buyer can select at most one intermediary. This is a
rst step towards understanding the interactions of buyers. Also, in practice ad-
vertisers typically select one demand-side intermediary for each type of campaigns;
this is to avoid campaign management costs as well as the possibility of bidding
against themselves5.
Having laid out the assumptions, we now continue by detailing the ad exchange model,
presenting our setting along with the timing and actions available to the center, the
intermediaries and the buyers.
4In practice, a page has often several ads. However, currently these ads are mostly sold independently,
even though there are often interactions (so-called externalities) between ads (e.g. if the same ad is
shown multiple times, or if competing brands are shown). Finding good mechanisms to deal with such
interactions is still an open problem.
5For the PRE mechanism, bidding against one's self is not possible, however we can assume that there
is a cost for entering in an intermediary's auction related to the cost of managing a campaign, identical
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3.3 Model
Our model extends that of Feldman et al. (2010) (see Section 2.2.2) by letting the buyers
optionally strategically select an intermediary. Specically, suppose that the center is
auctioning an indivisible good to K 2 N+ ex-ante symmetric, surplus-maximizing buyers
via a number, n 2 N+, of intermediary auctioneers sj, j = 1;:::;n. We assume that the
center and the intermediaries have no valuation for the good6 and that the preferences
of the buyers and auctioneers are described by von Neumann and Morgenstern utility
functions. Buyers have independent valuations, i, i = 1;:::;K, i.i.d. drawn from a
commonly-known distribution F with a continuous, positive, dierentiable density f,
and a compact support V = [0;1]. The center runs a second-price sealed-bid auction
with a reserve price,  2 V , and a fair tie-breaking rule, and each intermediary is allowed
to submit a single bid7. Hence, the center's revenue equals the maximum of the second-
highest submitted bid and , if there is at least a bid above , and is otherwise zero.
Each intermediary, sj;j = f1;:::;ng, runs a contingent auction among its set of kj  1
buyers (where
Pn
j=1 kj = K). This auction determines the winning bid, the price to
be paid by the winning buyer as well as the bidding amount to be submitted at the
center. The intermediary's prot is the dierence between the payment he receives from
his winning buyer and the price he pays at the center, whereas the surplus of a buyer is
the dierence between her valuation and the price paid at the intermediary. Specically,
contingent on the intermediary winning at the central auction, the expected surplus for
a buyer i with valuation i is j(i) = j(i)(i   pj), where j : V 7! [0;1] is the
probability of obtaining the item in intermediary sj's local auction, and pj 2 [0;1] the
price to be paid to the intermediary. In more detail, the game proceeds as follows:
1. The center announces its reserve price, , to the intermediaries.
2. Intermediaries announce their reserve prices, rj  , j = f1;:::;ng, to the popula-
tion of buyers.
3. Buyers learn their valuations for the good.
4. Buyers (optionally) simultaneously select their preferred (single) intermediary, sj,
and submit a bid to that intermediary.
5. Intermediaries run auctions among their buyers and submit their (single) bids (if
any) to the center.
6. The center runs its auction with the intermediaries' bids, transfers the good to the
winning intermediary (if any) and receives payment from that intermediary.
7. The winning intermediary (if any) transfers the good to his winning buyer and
receives payment from that buyer.
6The center can have a valuation for the good that is normalized to zero.
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This formulation is general enough and so can be used in other settings, such as auctions
for real estate or treasury bills, procurement auctions with subcontracting or resale, auc-
tions with bidding rings, auctions for network resources allocation or any other auctions
involving intermediaries.
Some of the implications of the introduction of intermediaries' auctions will be more clear
in the examples of the following section where we present the intermediary auctions that
we will study throughout the remainder of this thesis.
3.4 Auction Mechanisms for the Demand-Side Intermedi-
aries
Due to the limitations inherent in the analysis of competing auctioneers, i.e. the lack of
an analog to the revelation principle and the innite regression resulting from auction-
eers' best responses (see Section 2.5), in the following chapters, we x the mechanisms of
intermediaries. Specically, we focus our analysis on three dierent widely-used auction
mechanisms for the intermediaries, where they make a prot by pocketing the dierence
between the received payments from their buyers and the payment to the center, given
that they win in the latter's auction. In more detail, we consider two variations of the
Vickrey auction that we call PRE and POST based on the time of the determination of the
intermediary's exact contingent payment, i.e. before or after the center's auction, as well
as FPSB auctions. The three auction types are described in the following subsections.
3.4.1 Pre-Award Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction (PRE)
In the rst mechanism, named pre-award SPSB or PRE auction, the intermediary runs
a local SPSB auction and determines the exact payment before the center's auction.
Specically, contingent on the intermediary winning the good at the central auction,
the local highest bidder wins and pays the maximum of the local second-highest bid
and the intermediary's announced reserve price given that her bid is higher than the
latter price. Since this maximum is the intermediary's payment in case he wins at
the central auction, it corresponds to his (private to other intermediaries) \valuation".
As the center's auction is DSIC8 this is also the amount that the intermediary bids
at the central auction (given that there is at least one bid above the intermediary's
reserve price, otherwise the intermediary does not submit a bid). The PRE auction is
the mechanism studied by Feldman et al. (2010) and is also DSIC for the buyers as the
following proposition illustrates.
8For an exposition of all the bidding equilibria of the SPSB auction, we refer the reader to the work
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Proposition 3.1. Truthful bidding is a dominant-strategy equilibrium for the buyers in
a PRE intermediary auction.
Proof. Assume buyer i with private valuation i participating in intermediary j's PRE
auction submits a bid bi. The highest opponent local bid in j's auction is bj and the
highest opponent intermediary q 6= j's bid submitted at the center is bq. W.l.o.g. we
assume that the intermediaries and the center do not impose any reserve prices. We
proceed by case analysis.
 i > bj. If bj  bq, then intermediary j wins (with probability 1
2 if the two bids
are equal), since he submits bj, and hence buyer i best responds with a bid bi > bj
that yields positive surplus i  bj. If bj < bq, then intermediary j loses and buyer
i is indierent across all bids. Hence, in both cases, bi = i is a weakly-dominant
strategy.
 i = bj. In this case, buyer i is indierent across all bids since her surplus is always
0, so bidding i is a weakly-dominant strategy.
 i < bj. If bj  bq, then intermediary j wins and buyer i best responds with
bidding bi < bj, since otherwise she gets a negative surplus. If bj < bq, then buyer
i is indierent across all bids. Hence, in both cases, bi = i is a weakly-dominant
strategy.
Having shown that the PRE auction is DSIC, in the following examples we aim to illus-
trate some of the eects of the competition between homogeneous intermediaries. More
specically, consider a setting with two intermediaries, s1;s2, and a population of K = 4
buyers with discrete valuations 1 > 2 > 3 > 4 which are assumed to be common
knowledge among all parties and who submit bids b1;b2;b3;b4. This means that, if the
intermediaries were not present, the center's revenue would be maxf;2g.
In our rst example, we assume that the center and the intermediaries do not set any
reserve prices and that the allocation of the buyers to the intermediaries is exogenously
determined.
Example 3.1. Consider the following possible scenarios:
 Buyers 1 and 2 have been allocated to intermediary s1 whereas the other buyers to
intermediary s2. If both intermediaries implement PRE mechanisms, then bi = i
for i = f1;2;3;4g, hence intermediaries submit their local second-highest bids,
2;4, at the center. This means that the center's revenue is 4, intermediary s1
wins at the central auction and obtains a prot of 2   4 and buyer 1 wins for a
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 Buyers 1 and 3 have been allocated to intermediary s1 whereas the other buyers to
intermediary s2. Then, PRE intermediaries submit 3;4 at the center. Hence, the
center again receives 4, intermediary s1 wins at the central auction and obtains
a prot of 3   4 and buyer 1 wins for a surplus of 1   3.
 Buyers 1 and 4 have been allocated to intermediary s1 whereas the other buyers to
intermediary s2. Then, PRE intermediaries submit 4;3 at the center. Hence, the
center again receives 4, intermediary s2 in this case wins at the central auction
and obtains a prot of 3   4 and buyer 2 wins for a surplus of 2   3.
In this example, it can be seen that the outcome is not always ecient since, in the third
case, buyer 2 who is not the buyer with the highest valuation obtains the item. Moreover,
the center's revenue is invariant to the buyers' allocation to intermediaries when no
reserve prices are present but it decreases compared to the case without intermediaries.
In the previous example, we assumed that buyers are exogenously allocated to interme-
diaries. In the following example, we remove this limitation (see (Stavrogiannis et al.,
2013a) for a complete analysis).
Example 3.2. Suppose that the center does not impose a reserve price but intermediaries
s1;s2 set reserve prices r1;r2 respectively such that r1  r2. If buyers strategically select
one of the intermediaries based on the announced reserve prices, it is interesting to
see what their decision will be in equilibrium, since this will determine the equilibrium
reserve prices of the intermediaries. For PRE intermediary auctioneers, the intermediary
selection is a 3-player game, that of the buyers with the three highest valuations, since
the payment will be at least 3 and both buyers 1 and 2 can obtain the good. More
specically, if r1  r2 < 3, buyer 1 tries to select the same intermediary as buyer 3,
and dierent intermediary than buyer 2, since this will maximize her surplus. Also,
there is a pressure for the intermediaries to increase their reserve prices, since these can
be their payments contingent on winning at the center and, at the same time, will try
not to set these too high so as to attract buyer 1. In equilibrium, both intermediaries set
reserve prices r1 = r2 = 2.
This example shows the complexity of the buyers' intermediary selection problem for PRE
intermediaries and the inherent pressure for increasing their reserve prices. In the next
subsection, we present the other variation of the Vickrey auction for the intermediaries.
3.4.2 Post-Award Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction (POST)
Similar to the previous mechanism, in the post-award SPSB or POST mechanism, the
intermediary runs a local SPSB auction. However, he forwards the local highest bid to
the center (given that this is higher than his reserve price), increasing his probability of62 Chapter 3 The Problem of Competing Intermediary Auctioneers
winning compared to the PRE mechanism. Moreover, his payment is determined after
the central auction as the maximum of the local second-highest bid, the center's reserve
price and the second-highest bid submitted at the center, contingent on the intermediary
winning the good at the center. This mechanism is inspired by the operation of second-
price PAKT found in the literature on bidding rings (see Section 2.4); the intermediary's
prot is the collusive surplus, i.e. the dierence between the local second-highest bid
and the opponent intermediaries' highest submitted bid, only when this is positive, i.e.
when the intermediary has both the highest and second-highest bids in total submitted
in his local auction, otherwise the intermediary receives zero prot. Hence, compared to
the PRE auction, this mechanism balances a higher probability of winning at the center
(since the highest bid is submitted) with the possibility of receiving zero prot (when the
second-highest bid among all buyers' population is submitted in another intermediary).
The POST auction is also DSIC for the buyers as proved in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Truthful bidding is a dominant-strategy equilibrium for the buyers in
a POST intermediary auction.
Proof. Assume buyer i with private valuation i participating in intermediary j's POST
auction submits a bid bi. The highest opponent local bid in j's auction is bj and the
highest opponent intermediary q 6= j's bid submitted at the center is bq. W.l.o.g. we
assume that the intermediaries and the center do not impose any reserve prices. We
proceed by case analysis.
 i > maxfbj;bqg. Buyer i best responds by bidding above this maximum to obtain
a positive surplus of i   maxfbj;bqg. Bidding anything lower than this leads to
either losing the local auction (when bi < bj) or winning that auction but then
losing at the central auction (when bj < bi < bq). So, bidding bi = i is a weakly-
dominant strategy.
 i = maxfbj;bqg. In this case, buyer i is indierent across all bids since her surplus
is always 0. More specically, when i = bj > bq, then bidding (i) any amount
above i guarantees the good but at a price of bj = i, (ii) any amount lower than
i leads to not winning at the local auction, and (iii) bidding exactly i gives her
the good with probability 1
2. In all these cases, her surplus is zero. Similarly, when
i = bq > bj, bidding (i) any amount below bq leads to either not winning at the
local auction or winning the local auction but losing at the central auction, (ii) any
amount above bq leads to a negative surplus, i  bq, and (iii) an amount equal to
bq gives i the item with probability 1
2. In all cases, her surplus is also zero. Hence,
bidding bi = i is a weakly-dominant strategy.
 i < maxfbj;bqg. Buyer i's best response is to bid bi < maxfbj;bqg, for zero
surplus, irrespective of the bid, since otherwise she obtains a negative surplus. So,
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As we have shown, the POST auction is also DSIC for the buyers. We now illustrate
some of the implications of the intermediaries using this mechanism compared to the
case of PRE, using the same example as Example 3.1. More specically, we consider a
setting with two intermediaries, s1;s2, now implementing POST auctions, and a popula-
tion of K = 4 buyers with discrete valuations 1 > 2 > 3 > 4 and who submit bids
b1;b2;b3;b4. We also assume that both the center and the intermediaries do not any
reserve prices and that buyers are exogenously allocated to the intermediaries.
Example 3.3. Consider the following possible scenarios:
 Buyers 1 and 2 have been allocated to intermediary s1 whereas the other buyers to
intermediary s2. If both intermediaries implement POST mechanisms, then bi = i
for i = 1;2;3;4, hence intermediaries submit their local highest bids, 1;3, at the
center. This means that the center's revenue is 3, intermediary s1 wins at the
central auction and obtains a prot of 2   3 and buyer 1 wins for a surplus of
1   2.
 Buyers 1 and 3 have been allocated to intermediary s1 whereas the other buyers to
intermediary s2. Then, POST intermediaries submit 1;2 at the center. Hence,
the center receives 2, intermediary s1 wins at the central auction but obtains a
prot of 0 and buyer 1 wins for a surplus of 1   2.
 Buyers 1 and 4 have been allocated to intermediary s1 whereas the other buyers to
intermediary s2. Then, POST intermediaries submit 1;2 at the center. Hence,
the center again receives 2, intermediary s1 wins at the central auction but also
obtains a prot of 0 and buyer 1 wins for a surplus of 1   2.
In this example, we can see that the outcome is always ecient (i.e. the highest bidder
obtains the item), the center's revenue is higher than that of Example 3.1 for PRE
intermediaries, and is equal to that of a setting without intermediaries. Nevertheless,
there are settings where the winning intermediary obtains zero prot even though he
wins at the center (second and third case above).
We now move to present the third intermediary mechanism, FPSB.
3.4.3 First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction (FPSB)
In this FPSB mechanism, the intermediary uses an FPSB auction for his local buyers.
Hence an intermediary's local winner obtains the good for a price equal to her bid only
if her selected intermediary wins at the center. Since the payment of the intermediary is
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is DSIC, intermediaries submit their local winning bids at the center (given that there
is at least one bid above their reserve price, otherwise they do not submit a bid), as was
the case with the PRE mechanisms. For this reason, the prot of a winning intermediary
is the dierence between his local winning bid and the maximum of the second-highest
intermediaries' bid and the center's reserve price. As we will show, this mechanism is
also more ecient than the PRE auction; however, buyers in this mechanism follow BNE
bidding strategies.
We now illustrate some of the implications of the intermediaries using this mechanism
compared to PRE and POST auctions, using the same example as examples 3.1 and 3.3.
More specically, we consider a setting with two intermediaries, s1;s2, now implementing
FPSB auctions, and a population of K = 4 buyers with discrete valuations 1 > 2 >
3 > 4 and who submit bids b1;b2;b3;b4. Since FPSB auctions are not DSIC, bi < i
in general for i = f1;2;3;4g. We assume, as before, that both the center and the
intermediaries do not any reserve prices and that buyers are exogenously allocated to
the intermediaries.
Example 3.4. Consider the following possible scenarios:
 Buyers 1 and 2 have been allocated to intermediary s1 whereas the other buyers to
intermediary s2. If both intermediaries implement FPSB mechanisms, then inter-
mediaries submit their local highest bids, b1;b3, at the center. This means that the
center's revenue is b3, intermediary s1 wins at the central auction and obtains a
prot of b1   b3 and buyer 1 wins for a surplus of 1   b1.
 Buyers 1 and 3 have been allocated to intermediary s1 whereas the other buyers
to intermediary s2. Then, FPSB intermediaries submit b1;b2 at the center. Hence,
the center receives b2, intermediary s1 wins at the central auction and obtains a
prot of b1   b2 and buyer 1 wins for a surplus of 1   b1.
 Buyers 1 and 4 have been allocated to intermediary s1 whereas the other buyers
to intermediary s2. Then, FPSB intermediaries submit b1;b2 at the center. Hence,
the center again receives b2, intermediary s1 wins at the central auction and also
obtains a prot of b1   b2 and buyer 1 wins for a surplus of 1   b1.
In this example, and under the assumption about the ordering of the bids9, the outcome
is always ecient as was the case with POST intermediaries. What's more, the winning
intermediary always makes a positive prot, as was the case with PRE intermediaries.
Hence, FPSB combine the benets of both Vickrey variations but are not DSIC, so buyers
must strategize about their bidding amounts. Finally, in all cases, the center's revenue
is lower than that for POST intermediaries.
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3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced a generic model for the ad exchange ecosystem. Within
this model, we made several simplifying assumptions that are necessary for tractability
reasons. However, our model is a qualitatively reasonable abstraction of this complex
marketplace. Having presented our assumptions, we then described the details of our
model, including the timing and available actions of all the participants. In contrast
to other models (AdX model of Muthukrishnan (2009) and Feldman et al. (2010)), we
allow buyers to strategically select one of the two intermediaries, in the same manner
that Burguet and S akovics (1999) do for independent auctioneers. Following this, we
presented three auction mechanisms for the intermediaries that form the basis of our
analysis. Finally, we provided a number of examples that depict the resulting issues
from the competition of intermediaries and their choice of mechanism for the center, the
buyers and the intermediaries themselves.
In what follows, we analyze the competition between intermediaries in a Bayesian setting
with captive buyers, where we consider intermediaries both without (Chapter 4) and
with reserve prices (Chapter 5). We then remove the captivity assumption in Chapter
6 where we study the case with buyers strategically selecting one of the intermediaries,
albeit in a simpler duopoly intermediary setting.Chapter 4
Intermediaries with Captive
Buyers: No Intermediary Reserve
Prices
We study the model for ad exchanges presented in the previous chapter under an
incomplete-information or Bayesian setting, where each buyer knows her private val-
uation, but has only probabilistic information about the private valuations of her op-
ponents. More specically, we consider a single-good setting with intermediaries whose
buyers are captive, i.e. we ignore the issue of strategic selection of intermediaries from
the buyers and assume that, after this exogenously determined allocation to the inter-
mediaries, buyers cannot move between them. We assume that the center sets a reserve
price but the intermediaries do not. Furthermore, we focus our analysis on the case
where each intermediary has the same number of buyers with the same distribution of
private valuations (i.e. the intermediary mechanisms are symmetric) and when all inter-
mediaries implement the same auction (i.e. homogeneous population of intermediaries).
Given this setting, we analyze the eect of the introduction of the intermediaries as well
as their competition on the center's revenue, the intermediaries' prot and the buyers'
surplus as well as on the social welfare (i.e. the sum of all agents' utilities).
In accordance to the model described in Section 3.3, in what follows, we assume that
both the center and the intermediaries have selected their mechanism in advance and, in
the setting studied within this chapter, that buyers are allocated to the intermediaries
such that each intermediary has exactly the same number of buyers. Then, the center
announces a reserve price for the good to be auctioned to the intermediaries who then
forward this to their buyers. Buyers learn their private valuations for the good and
submit a bid for the good to their allocated intermediary. Intermediaries then run local
auctions with their buyers' bids to determine a winner, if any, and a payment contingent
on winning the item at the central auction, and then submit a single bid (if there is some
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qualied bid above the center's reserve price) to the center. The center then runs its
auction with the intermediaries' bids, determines a winning intermediary, if any, and a
payment and allocates the good to this intermediary who then allocates the good to his
winning local buyer for the determined price.
To this end, we start our analysis in Section 4.1 with a simple case for a single intermedi-
ary and then move to the competing intermediaries case in Section 4.2. We then proceed
to analyze the incentives of an intermediary to switch to a dierent mechanism in ho-
mogeneous intermediary settings for PRE and POST mechanisms in Section 4.3. Finally,
Section 4.4 concludes.
4.1 Special Case: Single Intermediary
We start by showing that, even when only one intermediary is introduced, the center's
optimal reserve price increases as the number of buyers increases and the social welfare1
is smaller than that of a setting without intermediaries. Thus, these changes occur due
to the very presence of the intermediaries, and not only due to their competition.
Feldman et al. (2010) have shown that, for single-buyer intermediaries with reserve
prices, the center's optimal reserve price decreases with the number of intermediaries.
Since each intermediary in their setting has exactly one buyer, this means that the
optimal reserve price decreases with the number of buyers as well. However, it is not
clear whether this is due to the number of intermediaries and/or number of buyers per
intermediary. Regardless of this, as the authors notice, this is in contrast with the results
by Myerson (1981) for a classical setting with no intermediaries, who has shown that
the optimal reserve price, 
OPT, satises the equation:

OPT =
1   F(
OPT)
f(
OPT)
(4.1)
As can be seen, the optimal reserve price is independent of the number of buyers. In
this case, the auctioneer's ex-ante expected revenue is:
revenueOPT() = K
Z 1

[xf(x) + F(x)   1]FK 1(x)dx (4.2)
and a buyer's ex-interim expected surplus (with a valuation   ) is:
OPT(;) =
Z 

FK 1(y)dy (4.3)
1In accordance with Denition 2.32, the social welfare equals the sum of the center's expected revenue,
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and her ex-ante expected surplus is:
E[OPT()] =
Z 1

[1   F(y)]FK 1(y)dy (4.4)
In our setting, we illustrate that, when there is no competition between intermediaries,
the optimal reserve price increases as the number of buyers increases. This is in line
with the results of the literature on bidding rings (cf. Lemma 1 of Graham and Marshall
(1987) and McAfee and McMillan (1992)).
In more detail, since there is only one intermediary, the center's second-price sealed-bid
auction with a reserve price is equivalent to the center oering a take-it-or-leave-it price,
, to the intermediary representing all the buyers' population (i.e. K buyers). Given
the lack of competition between intermediaries, when allocated, the good is given to the
highest bidder in all standard intermediary auctions, including the ones we study here.
What's more, as equation (4.5) below expresses, the center in all three cases receives
the take-it-or-leave-it price only if there is a single buyer in the intermediary's auction
whose private valuation is above this price. This means that the center's optimal take-
it-or-leave-it price is the same for the three mechanisms. Hence, as Riley and Samuelson
(1981) have shown for auctions with the same minimum payment, all standard auctions
yield the same expected center's expected revenue and intermediary's prot, and, since
the allocation is identical, the same buyers' expected surplus. W.l.o.g., we assume that
the intermediary runs a PRE auction. Then, the center's expected revenue equals  times
the probability that there is at least one buyer that is willing to accept it:
revenueSINGLE() = [1   FK()] (4.5)
which is maximized by setting an optimal 
SINGLE as:

SINGLE =
1   FK(
SINGLE)
KFK 1(
SINGLE)f(
SINGLE)
(4.6)
This is essentially the same as equation (2.20) for K = m, i.e. the intermediary acts
as an all-inclusive bidding ring with size K for the center. For this reason, we get the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. (Lemma 1 from (Graham and Marshall, 1987)). The reserve price,

SINGLE, that would maximize the expected revenue of the center for a single interme-
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The intermediary's ex-ante expected prot is the expected dierence of the second-
highest bid and the reserve price, :
profitSINGLE() =
Z 1

(y   )f
(K)
2 (y)dy = 1     
Z 1

F
(K)
2 (y)dy (4.7)
where f
(K)
2 ;F
(K)
2 are the probability density function (p.d.f.) and cumulative distribu-
tion function (c.d.f.), respectively, of the second-highest-order statistic among K samples
i.i.d. drawn from f;F. Finally, a buyer's ex-interim expected surplus for the same re-
serve price can be expressed in the same way as in equation (4.3).
Example 4.1. To illustrate these observations, we consider an example with buyers
whose valuations are drawn from the uniform distribution U(0;1). Then, equation (4.6)
yields:

SINGLE =
1
(K + 1)
1
K
(4.8)
which increases with the number of buyers2. In this case, equations (4.1) - (4.3) and
(4.7) yield:

OPT =
1
2
(4.9)
revenueOPT(
OPT) =
1
K + 1
[(
1
2
)K + K   1] (4.10)
E[OPT(
OPT)] =
2K+1   K   2
K(K + 1)2K+1 (4.11)
revenueSINGLE(
SINGLE) =
K
(K + 1)
K+1
K
(4.12)
E[SINGLE(
SINGLE)] =
1
(K + 1)
2K+1
K
(4.13)
profitSINGLE(
SINGLE) =
K
K + 1
 
1
(K + 1)
1
K
[1 +
K   1
(K + 1)2] (4.14)
Given this, Figure 4.1 illustrates the center's ex-ante expected revenue and the social wel-
fare with and without the intermediary, when the center sets the optimal reserve price,
, as the number of buyers increases. We can see that the social welfare decreases
compared to the classical setting without the intermediary. This is due to the double
2It is easy to see that limK!1 (K + 1)
  1
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marginalization eect from the presence of the intermediary. In more detail, the inter-
mediary obtains some of the center's revenue, so, in response, the center increases its
reserve price and that reduces the demand of the buyers (Tirole, 1993). Finally, it can
be seen that the intermediary's expected prot decreases with the number of buyers, as
 also increases.
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Figure 4.1: Center's ex-ante expected revenue and social welfare with and without
a single intermediary and the latter's expected prot as a function of the number of
buyers whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
In the following section, we extend our analysis to the case where there is a homogeneous
population of multiple intermediaries who compete in a central auction.
4.2 Homogeneous Symmetric Intermediaries
We now consider a scenario with a homogeneous population of n > 1 symmetric in-
termediaries3 (i.e. where all intermediaries implement the same mechanism and have
exactly the same number of buyers each, with their private valuations drawn from the
same distribution function). In line with Feldman et al. (2010), we assume that buyers
are allocated to the intermediaries, such that each intermediary has exactly k buyers in
his market, i.e. kj = k for all j = 1;:::;n and K = nk, and that buyers cannot move
between intermediaries (i.e. they are captive) but, as before, intermediaries do not set
any reserve prices.
We study three mechanisms for the intermediaries, as described in Section 3.4, where
we show that they yield dierent intermediaries' expected prots and center's expected
3Typical numbers of bids submitted at an ad exchange vary considerably, ranging from 2 bids per
auction for mobile advertising to a couple of dozens for the more well-established display advertising
area.72 Chapter 4 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: No Intermediary Reserve Prices
revenue, although it is not possible to provide a complete ranking of the three. Finally,
we show that the social welfare is the smallest for intermediaries using PRE auctions
compared to the other two mechanisms; this is due to the ineciency resulting from
misallocations.
In what follows, we rst characterize the expected ex-interim surplus, ex-ante prot and
revenue for each buyer, intermediary and the center, respectively, under each mechanism
for the more general case when k  2. This will allow us to compare, both theoretically
and numerically, the three mechanisms studied in Section 4.2.4.
4.2.1 Pre-Award Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
We rst study a setting with PRE intermediary auctions, i.e. auctions where the inter-
mediaries run second-price sealed-bid auctions with their payments determined before
the center's auction and hence submit the maximum of their second-highest bid and the
center's reserve price. The center's ex-ante expected revenue in this case can be written
as:
revenuePRE() = [Gn() + n(1   G())Gn 1()   Fnk()] +
Z 1

yg
(n)
2 (y)dy =
= 1   Fnk()  
Z 1

G
(n)
2 (y)dy = 1   Hn()  
Z 1

G
(n)
2 (y)dy (4.15)
where G = F
(k)
2 is the c.d.f. of the second-highest-order statistic among k bids; G
(n)
2 ;g
(n)
2
are, respectively, the c.d.f. and the p.d.f. of the second-highest-order statistic among
the n submitted bids of the intermediaries; H
(n)
1 = Hn is the c.d.f. of the highest-order
statistic among n bids i.i.d. drawn from H = Fk (i.e. the c.d.f. of the highest-order
statistic among k bids). In more detail, the center expects to be paid its reserve price, ,
with probability that either there is none or only one intermediary whose second-highest
bid is greater than  (rst and second terms), but when there is at least one bid higher
than  (third term). In any other case, the center receives the expected second-highest
among the intermediaries' submitted bids (fourth term). This means that, by taking the
rst-order condition on equation (4.15), the optimal center's reserve price will satisfy:

PRE =
G
(n)
2 (
PRE)   Hn(
PRE)
h
(n)
1 (
PRE)
(4.16)
where h
(n)
1 is the p.d.f. of the highest-order statistic among n bids i.i.d. drawn from
H = Fk. Hence, we can see that the center's optimal reserve price not only depends
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intermediaries. An intermediary's ex-ante expected prot in this case equals:
profitPRE() =
Z 1

f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y

(F
(k)
2 (x))n 1dxdy =
Z 1

Gn 1(y)[1   G(y)]dy (4.17)
which is the expectation over the distribution of the second-highest-order statistic of
the probability of winning against n   1 bids. The c.d.f. of each such bid corresponds
to that of the second-highest-order statistic over k samples i.i.d. drawn from F since
intermediaries submit their local second-highest bids. Finally, a buyer with private
valuation  2 [;1] expects surplus:
PRE() =
Z 

(   y)f
(k 1)
1 (y)Gn 1(y)dy+
+ (   )Fk 1()
n 1 X
i=0
 n 1
i

i + 1
F(n 1 i)k()[kFk 1()(1   F())]i (4.18)
Thus, a buyer expects positive surplus if her bid is the highest in the intermediary's
auction and, at the same time, the second-highest bid is higher than the bids submitted
at the center and the reserve price (rst term). Finally, the buyer wins the good at the
center's reserve price when all other intermediaries' submitted bids are less than  or
when i other intermediaries also submit their reserve prices, winning with a probability
of 1
i+1 (second term)4.
This mechanism guarantees positive prot for the intermediary that wins at the center
when there are at least two bids above the center's reserve price. However, besides
the ineciency due to the center's reserve price, this auction induces an additional
(misallocation) ineciency when more than one intermediary is present. To see this,
consider a setting with two intermediaries, s1;s2, a population of four buyers so that
1 > 2 > 3 > 4 where buyers 1 and 4 are bidding in intermediary s1's local auction
and buyers 2 and 3 in s2's local auction. Given that s1, s2 submit bids equal to 4;3
respectively, intermediary s2 wins and the good is allocated to buyer 2, although buyer
1's valuation is higher. In the next subsection, we present an alternative mechanism for
the intermediaries, which keeps the incentive compatibility property and does not suer
from this type of ineciency.
4.2.2 Post-Award Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
POST intermediary auctioneers run second-price sealed-bid auctions where the payment
is determined after the center's auction and submit their highest local bid. Given this,
it is straightforward to see that the highest overall bidder always wins in homogeneous
settings. Hence, there are no misallocation ineciencies. However, compared to the
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previous second-price sealed-bid auction, there is an apparent trade-o: intermediaries
increase their probability of winning by submitting higher bids, but also decrease the
number of times they make a positive prot (they make zero prot even if they win but
their local second-highest bid is smaller than their payment at the center). In this case,
an intermediary's expected payment to the center will be:
paymentPOST() =
Z 1

f
(k)
1 (y)[Hn 1() +
Z y

xh
(n 1)
1 (x)dx]dy =
= Hn 1()[1   H()] +
Z 1

xh
(n 1)
1 (x)[1   H(x)]dx (4.19)
which is the expectation over the distribution of the intermediary's highest submitted
bid of the payment for any submitted bid y. Then, the center's ex-ante expected revenue
can be expressed as:
revenuePOST() = n  paymentPOST() = 1   Hn()  
Z 1

H
(n)
2 (y)dy (4.20)
where H
(n)
2 ;h
(n)
2 are, respectively, the c.d.f. and the p.d.f. of the second-highest-order
statistic among the n intermediaries' bids. Hence, the optimal center's reserve price will
satisfy:

POST =
1   H(
POST)
h(
POST)
(4.21)
From this, we can see that the optimal reserve price for the center only depends on the
number of buyers per intermediary and is independent of the number of intermediaries.
Then, each intermediary's ex-ante expected prot can be written as:
profitPOST() = F(n 1)k()
Z 1

(y   )f
(k)
2 (y)dy+
+
Z 1

Z y2

(y2   x1)f
(n 1)k
1 (x1)f
(k)
2 (y2)dx1dy2 =
=
Z 1

F(n 1)k(y)[1   F
(k)
2 (y)]dy =
Z 1

Hn 1(y)[1   G(y)]dy (4.22)
That is, an intermediary expects to receive the dierence between his local second-
highest bid and the center's reserve price, , only when there are at least two buyers
with bids above  and all other opponent bids are less than  (rst term). The second
term is the expected prot in the other case where the highest opponent of (n 1)k bids
is lower than the second-highest among the winning intermediary's k bids. Finally, the
ex-interim expected surplus of a buyer whose private valuation is 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as with a second-price sealed-bid auction with nk buyers and a reserve price of :
POST() = (   )Fnk 1() +
Z 

(   y)f
(nk 1)
1 (y)dy =
Z 

Fnk 1(y)dy (4.23)
In the next subsection, we present the corresponding buyers' expected surplus, interme-
diaries' expected prot and center's expected revenue for the third mechanism.
4.2.3 First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
Intermediaries often employ an FPSB auction, usually for reasons of transparency. This
mechanism also avoids the misallocation ineciency of the rst mechanism, but the
strategies of buyers are no longer DSIC. Moreover, given that the allocation is the
same as with the POST auction, the total revenue generated is the same, but, as will
be shown (Theorem 4.8), the prot share of the intermediaries will be dierent. When
intermediaries implement FPSB auctions, a buyer i with private valuation  wins only
if his bid, bi, is the highest submitted bid among all buyers' bids, i.e. if only bi 
maxj=f1;:::;nkg;j6=ibj. Hence, if buyers use the symmetric, increasing bidding strategy
() : [;1] ! [b;b], buyer i wins if bi  (Y
(nk 1)
1 ), where Y
(nk 1)
1 is the highest-order
statistic among the other nk   1 valuations. We assume that a buyer whose private
valuation is less than  bids b. Using standard equilibrium analysis (see Krishna (2010)),
in the next theorem we show that buyers' symmetric BNE strategy is the same as in an
FPSB auction without intermediaries, a reserve price  and nk = K buyers.
Theorem 4.2. The symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy of K = nk buyers par-
ticipating in a homogeneous population of n intermediaries that implement FPSB auctions
without reserve prices so that each intermediary has exactly k buyers when the center
implements a SPSB auction with reserve price  is given by:
() =   
R 
 Fnk 1(x)dx
Fnk 1()
;   (4.24)
Proof. (Sketch) Without loss of generality, we take the perspective of buyer 1 in inter-
mediary 1 whose private valuation is . Then, let us assume that all other buyers use the
symmetric, strictly increasing and dierentiable bidding strategy () with range [b;b].
Also, we assume that buyers 2;:::;k with private valuations 2;:::;k, respectively, are
in intermediary 1, buyers k + 1;:::;2k with private valuations k+1;:::;2k are in inter-
mediary 2, and so on. Also, let y1 = maxf2;:::;kg, yj = maxf(j 1)k+1;:::;jkg,
j = 2;:::;n. We also assume for the moment that the center's reserve price  = 0.
Then, if buyer 1 bids b1, she wins (for simplicity, we assume that the buyer loses in
case of a draw) the intermediary's local auction only if b1 > 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the bid that will be sent at the center, conditional on this event, it should also be that
b1 > maxf(y2);:::;(yn)g for her to obtain the good. The buyer will never bid outside
[b;b], so there is a value y 2 [0;1] such that (y) = b1 and that will be chosen by buyer
1 to maximize her expected surplus:
(;y) = [   (y)]Pr((y) > (y1))Pr((y) > maxf(y2);:::;(yn)gj(y) > (y1)) =
= [   (y)]Pr(y > y1)Pr(y > maxfy2;:::;yngjy > y1) =
= [   (y)]Pr(y > maxfy1;:::;yng) =
= [   (y)]Pr(y > y
(nk 1)
1 ) = [   (y)]Fnk 1(y) (4.25)
where y
(nk 1)
1 is the highest-order statistic among all opponent buyers' private valuations
and where we have used the fact that () is strictly increasing. For the existence of a
symmetric BNE, we take the rst-order condition at y = , i.e. 0(;) = 0 that yields:
0(;) = [   ()](nk   1)F()nk 2f()   0()Fnk 1() = 0 =)
[()Fnk 1()]0 = (nk   1)Fnk 2()f() (4.26)
Using the fundamental theorem of Calculus:
()Fnk 1() =
Z 
0
x(nk   1)Fnk 2(x)f(x)dx + c (4.27)
where c = 0 since (0) = 0. Using integration by parts yields:
() =   
R 
0 Fnk 1(x)dx
Fnk 1()
(4.28)
When the center sets a reserve price  > 0, this does not aect the rst-order condition
of equation (4.26) but only the boundary condition which now becomes () = , that
results in equation (4.24). The proof is standard and can be found e.g. in Menezes and
Monteiro (2005).
Since the buyer with the highest overall private valuation, only if this is not less than
, obtains the good, FPSB homogeneous intermediary auctions have the same allocation
as homogeneous POST mechanisms for the same center's reserve price.
Then, if F() = F( 1()) is the c.d.f. of the submitted bids in each intermediary,
and H = Fk
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expected payment of an intermediary to the center is:
paymentFPSB() =
Z (1)

f
(k)
1 (u)[Hn 1
 () +
Z u

yh
(n 1)
1 (y)dy]du =
= Hn 1
 ()[1   H()] +
Z (1)

yh
(n 1)
1 (y)[1   H(y)]dy (4.29)
Hence the ex-ante expected revenue for the center is:
revenueFPSB() = nHn 1
 ()[1   H()] +
Z (1)

yh
(n)
2 (y)dy =
= 1   Hn()  
Z 1

Fnk 1(x)dx  
Z 1

H
(n)
2 (x)0(x)dx (4.30)
where, if y = (x) =) dy = 0(x)dx, and H((x)) = Fk
((x)) = Fk(x). Then, using
the facts that:
0(x) =
(nk   1)f(x)
R x
 Fnk 1(y)dy
Fnk(x)
(4.31)
and:
H
(n)
2 (x) = nHn 1(x)   (n   1)Hn(x) = nF(n 1)k(x)   (n   1)Fnk(x) (4.32)
equation (4.30) can be written as:
revenueFPSB() = 1   Fnk()  
Z 1

Fnk 1(y)dy  
Z 1

n(nk   1)f(x)
Fk(x)
Z x

Fnk 1(y)dy

dx+
+
Z 1

(n   1)(nk   1)f(x)
Z x

Fnk 1(y)dy

dx = 1   Fnk()  
Z 1

Fnk 1(y)dy 
  n(nk   1)
Z 1

Fnk 1(y)
Z 1
y
f(x)
Fk(x)
dx

dy + (n   1)(nk   1)
Z 1

Fnk 1(y)(1   F(y))dy
(4.33)
Then, for k > 1, letting u = F(x) =) du = f(x)dx, then
R 1
y
f(x)
Fk(x)dx =
R 1
F(y)
du
uk =
1 Fk 1(y)
(k 1)Fk 1(y) and the above equation becomes:
revenueFPSB() = 1   Fnk()  
Z 1

Fnk 1(y)dy 
 
n(nk   1)
k   1
Z 1

F(n 1)k(y)(1   Fk 1(y))dy + (n   1)(nk   1)
Z 1

Fnk 1(y)(1   F(y))dy
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Taking rst-order condition w.r.t.  for the center's optimal reserve price, 
FPSB, for
k > 1 yields:

FPSB =
(nk   1)[1   Fk 1(
FPSB)]   [(n   1)k   1](k   1)Fk 1(
FPSB)[1   F(
FPSB)]
k(k   1)Fk 1(
FPSB)f(
FPSB)
(4.35)
When k = 1,
R 1
y
f(x)
Fk(x)dx =
R 1
F(y)
du
u =  lnF(y), so equation (4.33) becomes:
revenueFPSB() = 1   Fn()  
Z 1

Fn 1(y)dy+
+ n(n   1)
Z 1

Fn 1(y)lnF(y)dy + (n   1)2
Z 1

Fn 1(y)(1   F(y))dy (4.36)
Taking rst-order condition in this case, i.e. k = 1, yields the following equation for the
center's optimal reserve price, 
FPSB:

FPSB =  
(n   1)lnF(
FPSB) + (n   2)[1   F(
FPSB)]
f(
FPSB)
(4.37)
The ex-ante expected prot of an intermediary is:
profitFPSB() =
Z (1)

f
(k)
1 (y)
Z y

Hn 1
 (u)dudy =
=
Z (1)

Hn 1
 (u)[1   H(u)]du =
Z 1

Hn 1(y)[1   H(y)]0(y)dy (4.38)
Finally, a buyer expects the same surplus as with a POST auction for the same center's
reserve price, given that the allocation in both mechanisms is the same for that reserve
price, i.e. FPSB() = POST() for all  2 [0;1] when FPSB = POST.
In what follows, we provide a comparison of the aforementioned intermediary mecha-
nisms, combining our theoretical insights with numerical results.
4.2.4 Comparison of the Three Intermediary Mechanisms
Having expressed the expected utilities for all scenarios, in this subsection, we compare,
both theoretically and numerically, the resulting intermediaries' expected prots, cen-
ter's expected revenue and social welfare under the three mechanisms for homogeneous
populations of intermediaries.
We start with Lemma 4.3 below, comparing the optimal reserve prices of the center
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Lemma 4.3. When all intermediaries implement PRE auctions, the center's optimal
reserve price, 
PRE, is always not less than the optimal reserve price when all interme-
diaries implement POST auctions, 
POST.
Proof. Let 
PRE, 
POST be the optimal reserve prices for equations (4.16) and (4.21),
respectively. Taking the rst-order derivative with respect to  in equation (4.15) yields:
drevenuePRE()
d
=  Hn()   nHn 1()h() + G
(n)
2 () (4.39)
Now, applying the condition of (4.21) in the equation above, we get:
drevenuePRE()
d
j=
POST =  Hn(
POST)   n
1   H(
POST)
h(
POST)
Hn 1(
POST)h(
POST)+
+ G
(n)
2 (
POST) = (n   1)Hn(
POST)   nHn 1(
POST) + G
(n)
2 (
POST) =
= G
(n)
2 (
POST)   H
(n)
2 (
POST) =
= nGn 1(
POST)   (n   1)Gn(
POST)   [nHn 1(
POST)   (n   1)Hn(
POST)]  0
(4.40)
since G(y)   H(y) = kFk 1(y)   (k   1)Fk(y)   Fk(y) = (k   1)Fk 1(y)[1   F(y)] 
0 =) G(y)  H(y) for any y 2 [0;1], and the function nxn 1   (n   1)xn is an
increasing function of x. The above inequality is strict for k > 1 and 
POST 2 (0;1).
Hence, since for the existence of an optimal reserve price, the function revenuePRE()
should be concave, the above equation means that 
POST  
PRE.
This result allows us to compare the center's expected revenue for the two SPSB auctions
as follows:
Theorem 4.4. When all intermediaries implement POST auctions, the center's optimal
expected revenue is at least the expected revenue when all intermediaries implement PRE
auctions.
Proof. Taking the dierence of (4.15) and (4.20), for the same reserve price, , we obtain
that:
revenuePOST()   revenuePRE() =
Z 1

[G
(n)
2 (y)   H
(n)
2 (y)]dy  0 (4.41)
where G
(n)
2 = nGn 1 (n 1)Gn, H
(n)
2 = nHn 1 (n 1)Hn. This is since G(y)  H(y)
and the function nxn 1 (n 1)xn is a strictly increasing function of x. We should also
notice that the inequality is strict for any reasonable reserve,  2 [0;1).80 Chapter 4 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: No Intermediary Reserve Prices
If 
PRE, 
POST are the optimal reserve prices for (4.16) and (4.21), from the previous re-
sult, we have that revenuePOST(
POST)  revenuePOST(
PRE)  revenuePRE(
PRE).
This, combined with the result of Lemma 4.3, concludes the proof.
Proposition 4.5 below compares the intermediaries' expected prots for the same SPSB
variations.
Proposition 4.5. For any reserve price, , of the center, the expected prots of PRE
intermediary auctions, profitPRE(), are always not less than the corresponding prots
of POST intermediary auctions, profitPOST(), when all intermediaries implement the
same mechanism.
Proof. This happens if Gn 1(y)  Hn 1(y) from equations (4.17) and (4.22), which is
true (see proof of Lemma 4.3).
We now compare the corresponding values for POST and FPSB intermediaries. We start
with our result for the center's optimal reserve price for homogeneous intermediaries of
these two kinds.
Lemma 4.6. When all intermediaries implement FPSB auctions, the center's optimal
reserve price, 
FPSB, is always not less than the optimal reserve price when all inter-
mediaries implement POST auctions, 
POST.
Proof. Let 
FPSB, 
POST be the optimal reserve prices for the center when all interme-
diaries implement FPSB and POST auctions respectively.
We start with the case of k > 1 buyers per intermediary.Taking the rst-order derivative
with respect to  in equation (4.34) yields:
drevenueFPSB()
d
= nF(n 1)k()

nk   1
k   1
[1   Fk 1()] 
  [(n   1)k   1]Fk 1()[1   F()]   kFk 1()f()

(4.42)
Then, replacing  = 
POST from equation (4.21), gives:
drevenueFPSB()
d
j=
POST = nF(n 1)k(
POST)

nk   1
k   1
[1   Fk 1(
POST)] 
  [(n   1)k   1]Fk 1(
POST)[1   F(
POST)]   [1   Fk(
POST)]

=
= nF(n 1)k(
POST)

nk   1   (k   1)
k   1
 
nk   1   (k   1)
k   1
Fk 1(
POST) 
  (n   1)k[Fk 1(
POST)   Fk(
POST)]

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= nF(n 1)k(
POST)

(n   1)k
k   1
[1   Fk 1(
POST)]   (n   1)kFk 1(
POST)[1   F(
POST)]

=
=
n(n   1)k
k   1
F(n 1)k(
POST)

1   Fk 1(
POST)   (k   1)Fk 1(
POST)[1   F(
POST)]

=
=
n(n   1)k
k   1
F(n 1)k(
POST)[1   G(
POST)]  0 (4.43)
since G(
POST) = kFk 1(
POST) (k 1)Fk(
POST)  1. Hence, since for the existence
of an optimal reserve price, the function revenueFPSB() should be concave, the above
equation means that 
POST  
FPSB.
Similarly, for k = 1, taking the rst-order derivative of equation (4.36) w.r.t.  yields:
drevenueFPSB()
d
=  nFn 1()

(n   2)[1   F()] + f() + (n   1)lnF()

(4.44)
Hence, taking this derivative at 
POST from equation (4.21) gives:
drevenueFPSB()
d
j=
POST =  nFn 1(
POST)

(n   2)[1   F(
POST)]+
+ 1   F(
POST) + (n   1)lnF(
POST)

=
=  n(n   1)Fn 1(
POST)[1   F(
POST) + lnF(
POST)]  0 (4.45)
since the function 1   x + lnx  0 for x 2 [0;1]. For the same reason, this means that

POST  
FPSB.
Given this last result, we are now able to compare the center's ex-ante expected revenue
for these two types of intermediaries.
Theorem 4.7. The expected revenue of the center when intermediaries implement POST
auctions, revenuePOST, is always at least the expected revenue when the latter implement
FPSB auctions, revenueFPSB.
Proof. Let us for the moment assume that the buyers' private valuations, i, are known,
that i > j when i < j, and that  = 0. If all intermediaries implement POST auc-
tions, then the center receives 2 when buyers 1 and 2 are in dierent intermediaries.
It receives 3 when buyers 1 and 2 are in the same intermediary but buyer 3 is not,
4 when buyers 1;2 and 3 are in the same intermediary and buyer 4 is not and so on,
until the case where buyers 1;:::;k are in the same intermediary and buyer k + 1 is
not when the center obtains k+1. For the same allocation of buyers to FPSB inter-
mediaries, the center receives (2);(3);(4);:::;(k+1) respectively. When the
private valuations are not known, in BNE (equation (4.24)), () <  for all  2 (;1],
hence revenueFPSB < revenuePOST. Also, since the allocation of the good is the82 Chapter 4 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: No Intermediary Reserve Prices
same for both types of intermediary auctions and the same center's reserve price ,
then, for  > 0, revenueFPSB() = E[maxf((Y
(k)
1 )
(n)
2 );g]  E[maxf(Y
(k)
1 )
(n)
2 );g] =
revenuePOST(), where (Y
(k)
1 )
(n)
2 is a random variable that corresponds to the second-
highest-order statistic among n samples, each of which is the highest-order statistic
among k samples. So, revenueFPSB(
FPSB)  revenuePOST(
FPSB) < revenuePOST(
POST).
The above theorem along with the fact that the allocation is the same for both FPSB
and POST intermediaries when the center's reserve price is the same lead to the opposite
direction for the intermediaries' ex-ante expected prots, as shown in the next corollary.
Corollary 4.8. The expected prots of intermediaries implementing FPSB auctions,
profitFPSB(), are always at least the corresponding prots for POST auctions, profitPOST(),
for the same center's reserve price, .
Proof. The total revenue obtained by the center and the intermediaries for POST auc-
tioneers (equations (4.20) and (4.22) respectively) can be written as follows:
revenuePOST() + n  profitPOST() = 1   Hn()  
Z 1

H
(n)
2 (y)dy+
+ n
Z 1

Hn 1(y)[1   G(y)]dy = 1   Hn()   n
Z 1

Hn 1(y)dy+
+ (n   1)
Z 1

Hn(y)dy + n
Z 1

Hn 1(y)dy   n
Z 1

Hn 1(y)G(y)dy =
= 1   Fnk() + (n   1)
Z 1

Fnk(y)dy   n
Z 1

F(n 1)k(y)[kFk 1(y)   (k   1)Fk(y)]dy =
= 1   Fnk() + (nk   1)
Z 1

Fnk(y)dy   nk
Z 1

Fnk 1(y)dy =
= 1   FK()  
Z 1

F
(K)
2 (y)dy (4.46)
Similarly, using equations (4.30), (4.38) and (4.31), the total revenue obtained by the
center and the FPSB intermediaries can be written as:
revenueFPSB() + n  profitFPSB() = 1   Hn()  
Z 1

Fnk 1(x)dx 
 
Z 1

H
(n)
2 (x)0(x)dx + n
Z 1

Hn 1(x)[1   H(x)]0(x)dx =Chapter 4 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: No Intermediary Reserve Prices 83
= 1   Hn()  
Z 1

Fnk 1(x)dx   n
Z 1

Hn 1(x)0(x)dx+
+ (n   1)
Z 1

Hn(x)0(x)dx + n
Z 1

Hn 1(x)0(x)dx   n
Z 1

Hn(x)0(x)dx =
= 1   Fnk()  
Z 1

Fnk 1(x)dx  
Z 1

Fnk(x)0(x)dx =
= 1   Fnk()  
Z 1

Fnk 1(x)dx  
Z 1

Fnk(x)(nk   1)
f(x)
Fnk(x)
Z x

Fnk 1(y)dydx =
= 1   Fnk()  
Z 1

Fnk 1(x)dx   (nk   1)
Z 1

Fnk 1(y)[1   F(y)]dy =
= 1   Fnk()   nk
Z 1

Fnk 1(x)dx + (nk   1)
Z 1

Fnk(x)dx =
= 1   FK()  
Z 1

F
(K)
2 (x)dx (4.47)
So revenueFPSB() + n  profitFPSB() = revenuePOST() + n  profitPOST(). From
Theorem 4.7, revenueFPSB()  revenuePOST() =) profitFPSB()  profitPOST().
Our theoretical analysis above shows that the center prefers POST auctions for the in-
termediaries. However, no ranking between FPSB and PRE auctions has been provided.
Similarly, it is not clear which mechanism is better for the intermediaries. Corollary 4.8
is valid for the same center's reserve price, however 
FPSB  
POST from Lemma 4.6,
so the equilibrium prots are not generally comparable for all distributions. Moreover,
when each intermediary has a single buyer, we can see that the FPSB auction is the only
mechanism that yields positive prot, but for k > 1 buyers per intermediary, it is not
possible to obtain a general ranking of the expected prots for the intermediaries. We
show this and other results using a numerical evaluation.
In more detail, we consider a setting where buyers have private valuations that are i.i.d.
drawn from the uniform distribution U(0;1). Furthermore, we rst consider a population
of K = 100 buyers and vary the number of intermediaries (n = 2;4;5;10;20;25;50),
keeping the total number of buyers xed. Figure 4.2 shows the resulting expected
prots for the intermediaries. It is clear that intermediaries' expected prots are very
small, in the order of 10 3, ranging from approximately 0:1% up to 0:5% of the center's
revenue in total, signicantly decreasing as the number of intermediaries increases. As
shown, in this example, PRE auctions yield higher expected prots for a small number
of intermediaries, whereas FPSB auctions yield higher expected prots in the remaining
cases. POST auctions seem to perform worse in terms of prot than their PRE counterpart,
but one can verify that for n = 2, k = 2, the opposite happens5, so a general ranking of
5For n = 2, k = 2, 

POST =
p
3
3 , 

PRE =
2
3 and profitPOST(

POST) =
4
45  
2
15
p
3  0:0119 >
profitPRE(

PRE) =
14
1215  0:011584 Chapter 4 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: No Intermediary Reserve Prices
the two is not possible. Nevertheless, POST auctioneers receive a smaller expected prot
in all cases shown than FPSB intermediaries.
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Figure 4.2: Intermediaries' ex-ante expected prots for the three dierent mechanisms
with increasing number of opponents for a xed number of K = 100 buyers whose
private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
Next, Figure 4.3 shows the buyers' ex-ante expected surplus for the three mechanisms
where it is clear that a population of PRE intermediaries yields the highest surplus to
the buyers among all three mechanisms, and the expected surplus for POST interme-
diaries is marginally higher than that for FPSB auctioneers. Figure 4.4 illustrates the
center's expected revenue and corresponding social welfare for the mechanisms for the
same example. As can be seen, the social welfare for the more ecient FPSB and POST
auctions slightly increases with the number of intermediaries (getting very close to the
social welfare of 0:9901 for the setting without intermediaries), whereas the opposite
eect happens for the PRE mechanism. The latter is due to the fact that, as the num-
ber of buyers per intermediary decreases, the misallocation ineciency increases, thus
further decreasing the corresponding social welfare. Also POST intermediaries are the
most ecient among the three mechanisms given that the center's optimal reserve price
is lower than that for FPSB intermediary auctioneers. As for the revenue of the cen-
ter, this slightly increases with the number of intermediaries for the more ecient FPSB
and POST mechanisms, whereas the opposite eect happens for the setting of PRE mecha-
nisms. However, in all cases, the center's expected revenue is higher for FPSB auctioneers
compared to PRE intermediaries. Finally, Figure 4.5 depicts the optimal reserve price of
the center for the three mechanisms. As shown, for POST and FPSB intermediaries, it
decreases with the number of intermediaries. For POST auctioneers this is due to the fact
that the corresponding number of buyers per intermediary decreases, and the optimalChapter 4 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: No Intermediary Reserve Prices 85
reserve price in these cases is only a function of the latter number. The correspond-
ing decrease for FPSB mechanisms is less apparent. In contrast, the center's optimal
reserve price for PRE intermediaries remains almost constant and is always higher than
the corresponding price for POST and FPSB intermediaries.
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Figure 4.3: Buyers' ex-ante expected surplus for the three dierent mechanisms with
increasing number of intermediaries for a xed number of K = 100 buyers whose private
valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
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Figure 4.4: Center's ex-ante expected revenue and social welfare for the three dierent
mechanisms with an increasing population of intermediaries and a xed number of
K = 100 buyers whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
As was previously shown, the generated revenue, prot and surplus for the center, the
intermediaries and the buyers depends, in general, both on the number of intermediaries86 Chapter 4 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: No Intermediary Reserve Prices
0 2 5 10 20 25 50
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Number of intermediaries (n)
C
e
n
t
e
r
’
s
 
o
p
t
i
m
a
l
 
r
e
s
e
r
v
e
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
 
PRE
POST
FPSB
Figure 4.5: Center's optimal reserve price for the three dierent mechanisms with an
increasing population of intermediaries and a xed number of K = 100 buyers whose
private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
and the size of their local markets (i.e. number of buyers per intermediary). We complete
our numerical evaluation by removing the limitation of xed K, considering the full set
of n = 2;:::;50 intermediaries, each with a number of k = 2;:::;50 local buyers. Figures
4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 illustrate the intermediaries' expected prots, buyers' expected
surplus, the center's expected revenue, the social welfare and the center's optimal re-
serve price, respectively, for the three mechanisms. As can be seen, FPSB intermediary
auctions yield higher prot for a large number of intermediaries with a small number of
buyers each, whereas PRE intermediaries are more protable in the opposite case, with
fewer intermediaries having more buyers each. Also, the ordering of the mechanisms for
the center seems consistent, with the center having higher expected revenue for POST,
followed by FPSB and PRE mechanisms, and as the number of intermediaries and buyers
increase, this revenue approaches the expected revenue without intermediaries (OPT).
Buyers' expected surplus is more dicult to compare due to the very small absolute
dierences, however PRE mechanisms seem to be better in sum, followed by POST and
FPSB auctions. What's more, the social welfare is higher for FPSB intermediaries, fol-
lowed by their POST and then PRE counterparts. Finally, the center's optimal reserve
price increases both with the number of buyers and intermediaries for PRE and FPSB
intermediaries and is always higher for the former type of intermediaries compared to
the latter. Both reserve prices are also higher than the corresponding reserve price for
POST intermediary mechanisms.
In the next section, we continue our analysis for heterogeneous intermediaries where
we look at the incentives of intermediaries to switch to another mechanism from a
homogeneous population of other intermediaries.Chapter 4 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: No Intermediary Reserve Prices 87
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Figure 4.6: Intermediaries' ex-ante expected prots for the three dierent mechanisms
with increasing number of opponents and buyers whose private valuations are i.i.d.
drawn from U(0;1).
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Figure 4.7: Buyers' ex-ante expected surplus for the three dierent mechanisms with
increasing number of intermediaries and buyers whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn
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Figure 4.8: Center's ex-ante expected revenue for the three dierent mechanisms with
an increasing population of intermediaries and buyers whose private valuations are i.i.d.
drawn from U(0;1).
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Figure 4.10: Center's optimal reserve price for the three dierent mechanisms with
increasing number of intermediaries and buyers whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn
from U(0;1).
4.3 Heterogeneous Symmetric Intermediaries
In the previous section, we have assumed intermediaries are homogeneous, i.e. that all
intermediaries implement the same mechanism. In this section, we remove this lim-
itation, considering the pairwise competition between the three auction mechanisms.
Specically, for tractability reasons, we consider a homogeneous population of n   1 in-
termediaries implementing one mechanism and one intermediary switching to a dierent
mechanism. As will be seen, the complexity of the equilibrium bidding strategies for
FPSB auctions makes it dicult to draw conclusions. Hence, our results are only for the
competition in the two Vickrey variations. In more detail, for the competition between
PRE and POST mechanisms, in the next subsection, we show that intermediaries do not
have a unilateral incentive to deviate from the majority mechanism to the other, albeit
only when keeping the center's reserve price xed.
4.3.1 Pre- versus Post-Award Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
Assume that there are n   1 intermediaries that implement PRE (POST) auctions and
one intermediary that switches to a POST (PRE) auction, and that each intermediary, si,
has, as before, exactly k buyers in his local market. Then, keeping the reserve price of
the center xed6, we show that no intermediary has a strict incentive to deviate from
homogeneous PRE (POST) to POST (PRE) auctions.
6In equilibrium this might not happen since the center's optimal reserve price with asymmetric
intermediaries might be dierent for the two cases.90 Chapter 4 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: No Intermediary Reserve Prices
Proposition 4.9. For any reserve price, , of the center, an intermediary has no strict
incentive to switch from a PRE (POST) to a POST (PRE) auction when all other interme-
diaries implement PRE (POST) auctions.
Proof. First, assume that n   1 intermediaries implement PRE auctions, and one inter-
mediary switches to a POST auction. Then the deviator's expected prot will be:
profitdev:POST() = G()n 1
Z 1

(y   )g(y)dy+
+
Z 1

Z y2

(y2   x1)g
(n 1)
1 (x1)g2(y2)dx1dy2 =
Z 1

Gn 1(x)(1   G(x))dx (4.48)
which is the same as when implementing pre-award payments. In contrast, if n   1
intermediaries use POST auctions, then a deviating intermediary's expected prot when
implementing a PRE auction will be:
profitdev:PRE() =
Z 1

g(y)
Z y

Hn 1(x)dxdy =
Z 1

Hn 1(x)(1   G(x))dx (4.49)
which is again the same as with POST.
We now continue with a preliminary discussion on the competition between rst-price
sealed-bid and our two Vickrey variations.
4.3.2 Pre- and Post-Award Second-Price Sealed-Bid versus First-Price
Sealed-Bid Auctions
In this subsection, we characterize the condition for the FPSB equilibrium bidding func-
tion when an intermediary implements an FPSB auction against n   1 PRE or POST
mechanisms respectively. Ignoring for the moment the center's reserve price, let us as-
sume that buyers in this intermediary follow a symmetric, increasing bidding strategy
`(), for ` = fPRE;POSTg when bidding against n   1 PRE or POST intermediaries
respectively. Then, a buyer with private valuation  who bids s expects surplus that
can be written as:
FPSB `(;s) = (   s)Fk 1( 1
` (s))Mn 1(s) (4.50)
where M(s) = Fk(s) for POST and M(s) = F
(k)
2 (s) for PRE opponent intermediaries
respectively. More specically, the winning FPSB local bid must be higher than the bids
of the two Vickrey variations, which in this case will also equal their private valuations.Chapter 4 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: No Intermediary Reserve Prices 91
Taking the rst-order condition and assuming that in equilibrium s = `(), the above
equation yields:
@FPSB `(;s)
@s
= 0 =)
d
d
[Fk 1()Mn 1(`())`()] =
= 
d
d
[Fk 1()Mn 1(`())] (4.51)
Solving this, and taking the condition that `(`) = ` yields:
`() =   
R 
` Fk 1(y)Mn 1(`(y))dy
Fk 1()Mn 1(`())
(4.52)
Given that this is a non-linear dierential equation, a generic closed form solution
seems implausible. This is also true for the uniform distribution when reserve prices
are present7. This concludes our analysis for competing intermediaries with no reserve
prices and with captive buyers.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we analyzed the competition between three intermediary mechanisms,
focusing on the case of symmetric homogeneous intermediaries. Our analysis suggests
that FPSB performs well both in terms of prot and eciency. The advantages of FPSB
auctions are also veried in practice by the fact that this is the dominant intermediary
mechanism implemented, both in ad exchanges (Elmeleegy et al., 2013) and auctions
with subcontracting (Nakabayashi, 2010) that our model encompasses. This is true not
only from an economic point of view but also from a business perspective since FPSB
oer greater transparency to the nal buyers. However, the latter need to employ BNE
bidding strategies that might be dicult to derive and coordinate on. Moreover, FPSB
auctions are known for suering from stability issues in repeated settings, such as the
ones we observe in ad exchanges (Edelman and Ostrovsky, 2007). From the experiments
with uniform distribution, we see that, when buyers are captive, POST auctions generally
yield lower expected prot than their counterpart, and so are less likely to be adopted
in this scenario. Interestingly, next, we show that, when buyers strategically select their
intermediary, the opposite in general holds. Before we do this, in the following chapter,
we keep the captivity assumption but let intermediaries set reserve prices. As will be
shown, the problem becomes technically challenging and so we make use of learning
techniques to get an approximation of the resulting prots and social welfare.
7When the reserve price is zero, and there are n 1 other POST intermediaries, the equilibrium bidding
function for the uniform distribution U(0;1) is `() =
nk 1
nk , i.e. the same as in an FPSB auction with
nk bidders.Chapter 5
Intermediaries with Captive
Buyers: The Eects of Reserve
Prices
So far, we have assumed that intermediaries do not impose reserve prices. In this chap-
ter, we relax this restriction, as a reserve price is known to increase an auctioneer's
revenue. However, given that the reserve-price-setting problem for competing auction-
eers is technically challenging, we restrict our analysis to a duopoly intermediary setting.
Specically, in accordance to the model described in Section 3.3, in what follows, we
assume that both the center and the intermediaries have selected their mechanism in
advance and, in the setting studied within this chapter, that buyers are allocated to
the intermediaries such that each intermediary has exactly the same number of buyers.
Then, the center announces a reserve price for the good to be auctioned to the inter-
mediaries who then, based on this information, strategically select and announce their
local reserve prices to their buyers. Buyers learn their private valuations for the good
and submit a bid for the good to their allocated intermediary. Intermediaries then run
local auctions with their buyers' bids subject to the constraint imposed by the reserve
price to determine a winner, if any, and a payment contingent on winning the good at
the central auction, and then submit a single bid (if there was some qualied bid) to the
center. The center then runs its auction with intermediaries' bids, determines a winning
intermediary, if any, and payment and allocates the good to this intermediary, if there is
a winner, who then allocates the good to his winning local buyer for the pre-determined
price.
To this end, we start with the motivating scenario of a single intermediary in Section
5.1. We then extend our analysis for the case of competing intermediaries in Section
5.2 where we characterize all players' expected utilities and present our theoretical and
numerical results for homogeneous intermediaries and heterogeneous PRE versus POST
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intermediary mechanisms. Then, in Section 5.3 we compare the prots and eciency of
the previous settings in equilibrium and contrast with the results of the previous chapter.
Finally, Section 5.4 summarizes our ndings.
5.1 Special Case: Single Intermediary
Let us again consider the case where the center oers a take-it-or-leave-it price, , to
one intermediary representing all the buyers' population (i.e. K buyers). Given the lack
of intermediary competition, no misallocation ineciencies arise in this setting. For this
reason, since in addition the center's ex-ante expected revenue is the same for the three
mechanisms, as in the case of no intermediary's reserve price (Section 4.1), the center's
and intermediary's expected revenue and prot are the same for all standard auctions
(Riley and Samuelson, 1981), so we can assume, without loss of generality, that the
intermediary runs a PRE auction. Hence, the center proposes  to the intermediary, who
runs a sealed-bid second-price auction with reserve price, r  . We will now derive the
intermediary's and center's ex-ante expected prot and revenue respectively and then
use these to calculate the optimal reserve prices for both. In this case, the distribution
of the second price in the intermediary's auction, y, is given by:
 y = 0 with probability FK(r).
 y = r with probability K(1   F(r))FK 1(r) (i.e. the probability that K   1 bids
are less than r and one above r).
 y > r with density K(K   1)(1   F(y))f(y)FK 2(y) (i.e. the density of the
second-highest-order statistic, Y
(K)
2 ).
Hence his expected prot is:
profitSINGLE(r;) =
Z 1
r
f
(K)
2 (y)
Z y
0
(b)dbdy+
+ K(1   F(r))FK 1(r)
Z r
0
(b)db (5.1)
Since the center oers the unique intermediary a take-it-or-leave-it price, the allocation
probability of the item, (y), is: (y) = 1 if y   and (y) = 0 otherwise. So, we can
write the previous equation as:
profitSINGLE(r;) =
Z 1
r
(y   )f
(K)
2 (y)dy + (r   )[F
(K)
2 (r)   F
(K)
1 (r)] =
= 1     
Z 1
r
F
(K)
2 (y)dy   (r   )F
(K)
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Taking its rst-order derivative to nd the optimal prot yields:
profit0(r) = F
(K)
2 (r)   F
(K)
1 (r)   (r   )f
(K)
1 (r) =
= KFK 1(r)[1   F(r)]   K(r   )FK 1(r)f(r) =
= KFK 1(r)[1   F(r)   f(r)(r   )] (5.3)
The rst-order condition yields F(r
SINGLE) = 0 or r
SINGLE = +
1 F(r
SINGLE)
f(r
SINGLE) for the
intermediary's optimal reserve price, r
SINGLE.
As before, the center wants to maximize its revenue, which is  times the probability
that the second-highest-order statistic is higher or equal to the intermediary's reserve
price:
revenueSINGLE(;r) = [1   FK(r)] (5.4)
Hence, for the optimal intermediary's reserve, r
SINGLE, the center's ex-ante expected
revenue given the optimal response of the intermediary is:
revenueSINGLE(;r
SINGLE) = [1   FK(r
SINGLE)] =
= [r
SINGLE  
1   F(r
SINGLE)
f(r
SINGLE)
][1   FK(r
SINGLE)] (5.5)
This is maximized by setting drevenueSINGLE
dr
SINGLE = 0:
drevenueSINGLE
dr
SINGLE
= [2 +
(1   F(r
SINGLE))f0(r
SINGLE)
f2(r
SINGLE)
][1   FK(r
SINGLE)] 
  [r
SINGLE  
1   F(r
SINGLE)
f(r
SINGLE)
]Kf(r
SINGLE)FK 1(r
SINGLE) = 0
(5.6)
Also, the ex-ante expected surplus for a buyer is:
E[SINGLE(r)] =
Z 1
r
Z x
r
FK 1(y)dyf(x)dx =
Z 1
r
FK 1(y)(1   F(y))dy (5.7)
For illustration, we continue with the following example.
Example 5.1. Let us again consider the example with buyers whose valuations are drawn
from a uniform distribution U(0;1). Then, equations (5.2), (5.4) and (5.7) become:
profitSINGLE(r;) =  
2K
K + 1
rK+1 + (1 + )rK +
K   1
K + 1
   (5.8)
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E[SINGLE(r)] =
1   rK(K + 1   Kr)
K(K + 1)
(5.10)
The rst-order condition for the intermediary's expected prot yields r
SINGLE = 0 or
r
SINGLE =
1+
2 . However,
d2profit
dr2 = KrK 2[(K   1)(1 + )   2Kr]. The function
is increasing for r 2 [0;
1+
2 ], decreasing otherwise, and is convex for r 2 [0; K 1
K
1+
2 ],
concave otherwise. Since K 1
K
1+
2 <
1+
2 , the maximum occurs at r
SINGLE =
1+
2 .
Also, taking the rst-order condition for the revenue gives
drevenueSINGLE(r
SINGLE)
dr
SINGLE =
 2(K+1)r
SINGLE
K+Kr
SINGLE
K 1+2 = 0. The second-order derivative of the revenue
yields
d2revenueSINGLE(r
SINGLE)
d(r
SINGLE)2 = Kr
SINGLE
K 2[K   1   2(K + 1)r
SINGLE], so the
revenue function is concave as long as1 r
SINGLE  K 1
2(K+1). Given this, we can write the
conditions for the intermediary's and center's optimal reserve prices, 
SINGLE;r
SINGLE:
  2(K + 1)r
SINGLE
K + Kr
SINGLE
K 1 + 2 = 0 (5.11)

SINGLE = 2r
SINGLE   1 (5.12)
Then, the intermediary's ex-ante expected prot can be expressed as:
profitSINGLE(r
SINGLE) =
2
K + 1
r
SINGLE
K+1   2r
SINGLE +
2K
K + 1
(5.13)
The center's ex-ante expected revenue will be:
revenueSINGLE(r
SINGLE) = (2r
SINGLE   1)(1   r
SINGLE
K) (5.14)
Finally, a buyer's ex-ante expected surplus will be:
E[SINGLE(r)] =
1
K(K + 1)
[1   (K + 1   Kr
SINGLE)(r
SINGLE)K)] (5.15)
Figures 5.1 - 5.4 illustrate the intermediary's ex-ante expected prot, buyers' ex-ante
expected surplus, center's ex-ante expected revenue and the social welfare with and with-
out the intermediary, who may or may not set an optimal reserve price, r
SINGLE, when
the center sets its optimal reserve price, 
SINGLE, as the number of buyers increases.
Again, we can see that the social welfare is lower when the intermediary is present and
that the latter's expected prot decreases as the number of buyers increases. However,
compared to the setting without an intermediary's reserve price in Figure 4.1, we can
see that the incorporation of the intermediary's reserve price increases his expected prot
and further decreases social welfare. The latter eect is due to the ineciency caused
by the increase in the reserve price for the buyers, as Figure 5.5 shows. As can be seen,
1 K 1
2(K+1) <
1
2, so this should hold for sure as long as the intermediary's optimal price in equilibrium
is greater than or equal to half.Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The E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the center's optimal reserve price increases both with the intermediary setting a reserve
price and not, however the intermediary's reserve price is always higher than the cen-
ter's reserve price in the latter scenario. Also, reserve prices are always higher than the
center's optimal reserve price when the intermediary is not present.
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Figure 5.1: Intermediary's ex-ante expected prot with and without a reserve price
as a function of the number of buyers whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from
U(0;1).
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Figure 5.2: Buyers' ex-ante expected surplus with and without a single intermediary
who sets or does not set a reserve price as a function of the number of buyers whose
private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
Although this example is only valid for one distribution, some of the results generalize
to other distributions. Specically, the center's optimal reserve price is expected to98 Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The E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Figure 5.3: Center's ex-ante expected revenue with and without a single intermediary
who sets or does not set a reserve price as a function of the number of buyers whose
private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
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Figure 5.4: Social welfare with and without a single intermediary who sets or does
not set a reserve price as a function of the number of buyers whose private valuations
are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The E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Figure 5.5: Center's optimal reserve price with and without an intermediary along
with the intermediary's optimal reserve price as a function of the number of buyers
whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
increase with the number of buyers, as was the case without an intermediary's reserve
price in Section 4.1, since the latter price is a constant markup on the center's reserve
price; so the results from the bidding rings literature (cf. Theorem 4.1) will also hold in
this setting. For the same reason, this will also be true for the intermediary's optimal
reserve price. The center's optimal reserve price will be lower (higher) for positively
(negatively respectively) skewed distributions compared to symmetric distributions of
private valuations such as a truncated Gaussian or symmetric Beta distribution and
the same ordering will hold for the center's expected revenue. Finally, regarding the
intermediary's expected prot, this should also exhibit a similar pattern to that of
Figure 5.1, increasing up to a critical point where the number of buyers is large enough
for his reserve price to have a smaller impact and the dierence between their expected
highest valuation and the center's (high) reserve price gradually decreasing with an
increasing population of buyers.
5.2 Multiple Intermediaries
Having analyzed the impact of a reserve price for the intermediary in a monopoly setting,
we now move to the more interesting case of competition between intermediaries. It
has been previously observed (Feldman et al., 2010) that nding equilibrium reserve-
price setting strategies in this setting is nontrivial. Hence, in what follows, we limit
our analysis to a duopoly homogeneous intermediary setting, i.e. an environment with
two intermediaries. Specically, we assume that each intermediary imposes the same
mechanism with a reserve price, keeping the assumption of symmetry for the number100 Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The Eects of Reserve Prices
and distribution of buyers' private valuations in each intermediary's market. We also
analyze a duopoly heterogeneous setting with one PRE and one POST intermediary, but do
not compare FPSB auctions with their other counterparts, given that one needs to derive
the resulting equilibrium bidding functions which is technically challenging. As it will be
shown, even in this simple scenario, intermediaries, in general, follow mixed-equilibrium
reserve-price-setting strategies. The intuition behind this is that intermediaries have an
incentive to increase their reserve price, since this increases their chance of obtaining
the good, but at the same time decreases the probability of having a buyer that is able
to pay that high. Hence, in contrast to classical models of competition, where prices
are driven downwards, in this setting, the opposite happens: reserve prices being driven
upwards up to a critical point, where competition from other intermediaries and buyers'
strategies drive reserve prices to the other direction, leading to cycles which in turn
lead to mixed-equilibrium strategies. For this reason, we employ numerical techniques
to nd the resulting reserve-price-setting Nash equilibria in specic instances. This
will shed some light in the reserve-price-setting problem of the intermediaries and its
impact in their prot, the center's revenue and the buyers' surplus. In more detail,
we run the ctitious play algorithm for k = 1, 2 and 5 buyers per intermediary whose
private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from the uniform distribution U(0;1). We begin our
discussion by describing the ctitious play setup we have used for our experiments.
5.2.1 Fictitious Play Setup
In this subsection, we describe the setup of the ctitious play (see Section 2.1.2) ex-
periments that were used to calculate -NE for the intermediaries' reserve-price-setting
strategies. Other techniques can be used to solve for Nash equilibria (McKelvey and
McLennan, 1996), such as the Lemke-Howson algorithm, which might take exponential
time to converge. We have tried the latter algorithm using the well-known game theory
software called Gambit2, but it failed to nd NE. Another reason that such techniques
might not work is that in some cases, such as the case with competing FPSB auctioneers
(Section 5.2.4) or non-captive buyers (Chapter 6), the payo matrix consists of sample
averages that are only approximations of the actual expected utilities, so only what are
known as empirical game-theoretic techniques can be used in such cases (Jordan et al.,
2008). However, it is required for consistency reasons to use the same technique for all
experiments and ctitious play is a natural technique to use in two-player games.
More specically, in all cases, we have constructed, for each (discretized) center's reserve
price, , an jrj  jrj payo matrix with the intermediaries' expected prots (or average
prots when these cannot be expressed in a closed form) for each combination of (dis-
cretized) intermediary reserve prices (of size jrj2) in [;1]. This is a natural range since
prot-maximizing intermediaries are expected to set a reserve price that is at least . For
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FPSB intermediaries or settings with non-captive buyers (next chapter), where, as will
be seen, closed-form formulas are not available for the intermediaries' expected prots,
the numerical averages of their prots for 500;000 repetitions and for each combination
of intermediary reserve prices at each  were used instead.
In the ctitious play experiments, we have discretized the intermediaries' reserve prices
using a step of 0:01 and the center's reserve price using a step of 0:1 at [0;1). Using
a higher discretization step (i.e. 0:01) for the center led to variations in the obtained
expected revenues that made the results more prone to numerical errors. Also, a higher
discretization step for the intermediaries would make the number of simulations and
corresponding time needed to obtain good estimates of the average prots prohibitive.
We ran one ctitious play experiment for each center's reserve price , each combination
of intermediary mechanisms and for each of three populations of k = 1;2;5 buyers per
intermediary respectively whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from the uniform
distribution U(0;1). These values for k allow for utility comparisons of the three mech-
anisms as the number of buyers increases and are close to actual numbers of buyers per
intermediary that might be interested at a specic impression. Moreover, these were
deemed appropriate for comparison with the results of Chapter 6 taking into account
issues of computational tractability that arise there. Each ctitious play experiment was
conducted once for 500;000 rounds in total where we have used a random tie-breaking
rule and we have also assumed uniform initial beliefs over [;1].
In accordance with Denition 2.19, we consider an additive approximation for -NE
where the value for  at each round is calculated as the dierence between the utility
produced by each player's best response (pure strategy) and the utility of the current
mixed strategy produced by the ctitious play algorithm given the player's current be-
liefs. Figures 5.6(a) - 5.6(c) illustrate the values for  per round for all the cases consid-
ered with varying number of buyers at the optimal center's reserve price, as these will
be illustrated in the following subsections. As can be seen, in all cases the algorithm
converges to very small values for . For this reason, Figures 5.6(a) - 5.6(c) depict these
values only for the rst 50;000 rounds.
As will be shown in the next section, we compared our ctitious play results with the
only available theoretical results of Feldman et al. (2010) for two PRE intermediaries
and k = 1 buyer each, where we have shown the convergence of the intermediaries'
ctitious beliefs to the expected distributions of actions. This is a good evidence of the
eectiveness of the technique and its conguration used.
In what follows, we start with the competition between two PRE intermediaries where
we validate ctitious play results for k = 1 and then extend these for the cases of k = 2
and k = 5 buyers per intermediary.102 Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The Eects of Reserve Prices
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(a) k = 1 buyer per intermediary.
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(c) k = 5 buyers per intermediary.
Figure 5.6:  values of the ctitious play experiments for duopoly PRE, POST, FPSB
and PRE-POST settings with intermediary reserve prices, where each intermediary has
k = 1 (left), k = 2 (right) or k = 5 (bottom) buyers whose private valuations are i.i.d.
drawn from U(0;1) and the center impose its optimal reserve price.
5.2.2 Pre-Award Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
We begin our analysis with a duopoly setting with PRE intermediaries that dier in their
reserve prices. We will call the intermediary with the higher (lower respectively) reserve
price, the high- (low- respectively) intermediary. Following this, we consider the same
setting for POST and FPSB intermediary auctioneers, and then study a setting with a
PRE and a POST intermediary auctioneer. We rst characterize the expected utilities for
all the above-mentioned cases and then present our theoretical analysis along with our
numerical results for these four settings.
For the remainder of this thesis, we will denote the high- and low-reserve intermediaries
as sL
` ;sH
` and their reserve prices as rL
`  rH
` respectively, where ` = fPRE;POST;FPSBg.
Assume two intermediaries, sL
PRE, sH
PRE, each implementing a PRE mechanism with
reserve price rL
PRE, rH
PRE respectively and with an equal number of buyers, k = K
2 , in
their market. Feldman et al. (2010) have analyzed this problem and have analytically
derived the (mixed-) equilibrium reserve-price-setting strategies of the intermediaries in
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only a single buyer in his market. They have shown that a similar equilibrium will arise
in the general case where each intermediary has k > 1 buyers, providing the conditions
that should hold. However, they have not managed to explicitly characterize such an
equilibrium for issues of analytical tractability.
In this section, we characterize the center's ex-ante expected revenue along with the
intermediaries' ex-ante expected prots and the buyers' expected surplus. We then
look at the intermediaries' best responses in three examples with buyers whose private
valuations are i.i.d. drawn from the uniform distribution U(0;1). Finally, we employ
the ctitious play algorithm to nd the resulting -NE reserve prices, rst validating its
good approximation for the case of k = 1 where the exact Nash equilibria are known.
We begin with the derivation of intermediaries' expected prots.
The ex-ante expected prots of the low- and the high-reserve intermediary respectively
can be expressed as:
profitL
PRE(rL
PRE) = Fk(rH
PRE)[kFk 1(rL
PRE)(1   F(rL
PRE))(rL
PRE   )+
+
Z 1
rL
PRE
(y   )f
(k)
2 (y)dy] + kFk 1(rH
PRE)(1   F(rH
PRE))
Z 1
rH
PRE
(y   rH
PRE)f
(k)
2 (y)dy+
+
Z 1
rH
PRE
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rH
PRE
(y   x)f
(k)
2 (x)dxdy (5.16)
and
profitH
PRE(rH
PRE) = Fk(rL
PRE)[kFk 1(rH
PRE)(1   F(rH
PRE))(rH
PRE   ) +
Z 1
rH
PRE
(y   )f
(k)
2 (y)dy]+
+ kFk 1(rL
PRE)(1   F(rL
PRE))[kFk 1(rH
PRE)(1   F(rH
PRE))(rH
PRE   rL
PRE)+
+
Z 1
rH
PRE
(y   rL
PRE)f
(k)
2 (y)dy] + kFk 1(rH
PRE)(1   F(rH
PRE))
Z rH
PRE
rL
PRE
(rH
PRE   y)f
(k)
2 (y)dy+
+
Z 1
rH
PRE
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rL
PRE
(y   x)f
(k)
2 (x)dxdy (5.17)
That is, the low-reserve intermediary either receives the dierence between the maximum
of his reserve price and his buyers' second-highest bid, and the center's reserve price, if all
opponent bids are above the high reserve (rst term in (5.16)), or he gets the dierence
between his local second-highest bid and the high reserve price if only one opponent
local bid is above the latter (second term in (5.16)). Otherwise, he receives the dierence
between his buyers' second-highest bid and the opponent intermediary buyers' second-
highest bid (third term in (5.16)). Similarly, the high-reserve intermediary receives the
dierence between the maximum of his reserve price and his buyers' second-highest bid,
and the center's reserve price, if all opponent bids are below his opponent's low reserve
price (rst term in (5.17)), or the dierence between his reserve price and the opponent
intermediary's reserve price, if there is only one valid bid submitted in the latter and, at104 Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The E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the same time, there is at least one bid above his reserve price (second term in (5.17)).
He also receives the dierence between his reserve price and the local second-highest
opponent bid, if the latter is below his reserve price (third term in (5.17)), as well as the
dierence between his buyers' second-highest bid and the opponent intermediary buyers'
second-highest bid (fourth term in (5.17)). After some manipulation (see Section A.1 in
the Appendix), these equations simplify to the following:
profitL
PRE(rL
PRE) = Fk(rH
PRE)[rH
PRE      Fk(rL
PRE)(rL
PRE   )  
Z rH
PRE
rL
PRE
F
(k)
2 (y)dy]+
+
Z 1
rH
PRE
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rH
PRE
F
(k)
2 (x)dxdy (5.18)
profitH
PRE(rH
PRE) = Fk(rL
PRE)(1   Fk(rH
PRE))(rL
PRE   )+
+ kFk 1(rH
PRE)(1   F(rH
PRE))
Z rH
PRE
rL
PRE
F
(k)
2 (y)dy +
Z 1
rH
PRE
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rL
PRE
F
(k)
2 (x)dxdy
(5.19)
The center's ex-ante expected revenue can be expressed as:
revenuePRE() = [Fk(rL
PRE)(1   Fk(rH
PRE)) + Fk(rH
PRE)(1   Fk(rL
PRE)]+
+ rL
PREkFk 1(rL
PRE)(1   F(rL
PRE))(1   Fk(rH
PRE))+
+ rH
PREkFk 1(rH
PRE)(1   F(rH
PRE))(1   F
(k)
2 (rH
PRE))+
+
Z 1
rH
PRE
2y(1   F
(k)
2 (y))f
(k)
2 (y)dy + (1   Fk(rH
PRE))
Z rH
PRE
rL
PRE
yf
(k)
2 (y)dy (5.20)
That is, the center receives its reserve price if there is at least one bid above one in-
termediary's reserve price but no eligible bids in the other intermediary's market (rst
term in (5.20)). It also receives the low reserve price if there is only a single eligible bid
submitted in the low-reserve intermediary, and at least one eligible bid submitted in the
high-reserve intermediary (second term in (5.20)). The center similarly receives the high
reserve price if there is only a single bid above the high reserve price submitted in the
high-reserve intermediary auction and, at the same time, the second-highest local bid
in the low-reserve intermediary is above the high reserve price (third term in (5.20)).
If none of the above holds, then the center receives the second-highest submitted bid
(fourth and 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Finally, a buyer with valuation  expects the following surplus from the low- and high-
reserve intermediaries, when rL
PRE < rH
PRE:
L
PRE() =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 if  2 [0;rL
PRE)
Fk(rH
PRE)
R 
rL
PRE
Fk 1(y)dy if  2 [rL
PRE;rH
PRE)
Fk(rH
PRE)[(   rL
PRE)Fk 1(rL
PRE) +
R rH
PRE
rL
PRE
(   y)f
(k 1)
1 (y)dy]+
+
R 
rH
PRE
(   y)f
(k 1)
1 (y)F
(k)
2 (y)dy if  2 [rH
PRE;1]
(5.21)
H
PRE() =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 if  2 [0;rH
PRE)
(   rH
PRE)Fk 1(rH
PRE)F
(k)
2 (rH
PRE)+
+
R 
rH
PRE
(   y)f
(k 1)
1 (y)F
(k)
2 (y)dy if  2 [rH
PRE;1]
(5.22)
In more detail, a buyer with valuation  2 [rH
PRE;1] in the low-reserve intermediary wins
and pays him his reserve price, rL
PRE, or the second-highest local bid if there is no eligible
bid submitted in the other intermediary (rst and second terms in (5.21)). Otherwise,
the buyer pays the local second-highest bid, if this is above the high reserve price and,
at the same time, the local second-highest bid in the high-reserve intermediary is below
it (third term in (5.21)). Similarly, such a buyer in the high-reserve intermediary wins
and pays the high reserve price, rH
PRE, if all other bids in this intermediary are below
this reserve price and, at the same time, the local second-highest bid in the low-reserve
intermediary is below rH
PRE (rst term in (5.22)). Finally, she wins and pays the local
second-highest bid in the high-reserve intermediary if this is lower than her bid and,
simultaneously, the opponent intermediary submitted bid at the center is also below her
bid (second term in (5.22)).
For the special case where both intermediaries set the same reserve price, i.e. rL
PRE =
rH
PRE = rPRE, a buyer's ex-interim expected surplus will be:

eq
PRE() =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 if  2 [0;rPRE)
(   rPRE)Fk 1(rPRE)[Fk(rPRE) + 1
2kFk 1(rPRE)(1   F(rPRE))]+
+
R 
rPRE (   y)f
(k 1)
1 (y)F
(k)
2 (y)dy if  2 [rPRE;1]
(5.23)
The only essential dierence compared to the non-equal reserve prices situation is that,
when both intermediaries submit their reserve prices, a random tie-breaking rule yields
a probability of 1
2 of winning (second term in (5.23)).
In what follows, we depict the resulting equilibrium for our duopoly setting with k = 1
buyer for each intermediary, assuming a uniform distribution, U(0;1), for buyers' private
valuations and compare this with a numerical approximation that we derive by using106 Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The Eects of Reserve Prices
the ctitious play algorithm. We then repeat the same technique for the two examples
of k = 2 and k = 5 (i.e. greater than one) buyers.
To see why intermediaries in this case (k = 1) follow mixed-equilibrium strategies, let
us illustrate the best response function for our duopoly setting. In this case, the low-
reserve intermediary's expected prot is the dierence between his reserve price, rL
PRE
and the center's reserve price, , given that his buyer's private valuation is higher than
his reserve price and, at the same time, the other buyer's private valuation is lower than
the high-reserve intermediary's reserve price, rH
PRE, i.e.
profitL
PRE(rL
PRE) = (1   F(rL
PRE)F(rH
PRE)(rL
PRE   ) (5.24)
whereas the high-reserve intermediary additionally expects positive prot even if his
opponent submits his reserve price:
profitH
PRE(rH
PRE) = (1 F(rH
PRE))[F(rL
PRE)(rH
PRE  )+(1 F(rL
PRE))(rH
PRE  rL
PRE)]
(5.25)
The best-response function for U(0;1) and  = 0 is shown in Figure 5.7. As can be seen,
this function does not cross the 45  line, meaning that it is unlikely that there is a sym-
metric pure-strategy equilibrium3, which would naturally arise since both intermediaries
are ex-ante identical. What's more, for low reserve prices, the opponent intermediary
best responds by setting a higher reserve price up to a point where it is best to set a
lower reserve price, creating a vicious cycle, leading to a mixed-equilibrium behavior for
the intermediaries' reserve-price-setting strategies.
As Feldman et al. have shown, the resulting mixed-equilibrium reserve-price-setting
strategies of n intermediaries with k = 1 buyer each, involve each intermediary oering
a random take-it-or-leave-it price, r, in an interval [rmin;rmax] with density r(r), where
rmin;rmax;r() are found by solving the following system of equations (Feldman et al.,
2010):
rmin =  +
1   F(rmin)
f(rmin)
(5.26)
Z rmax
rmin
0()
(n   1)
n 2
n 1()(1   F())
d = ((rmax))
1
n 1 (5.27)
r(r) = (
1
(rmax)
)
1
n 1 0(r)
(n   1)
n 2
n 1(r)(1   F(r))
(5.28)
3This happens regardless of the reserve price of the center and the granularity of the discretization.Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The E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Figure 5.7: Best-response reserve price function for a duopoly PRE intermediary set-
ting with intermediary reserve prices, where each intermediary has exactly k = 1 buyer
whose private valuation is i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1) and the center does not impose a
reserve price.
where (r) =
f(r)
(1 F(r))2. Then the center's reserve-price optimization problem is given
by (Feldman et al., 2010):

PRE = argmax

frmax  
1   F(rmax)
f(rmax)
  (
(rmin)
(rmax)
)
n
n 1  
n   1
(rmax)
g (5.29)
subject to equations (5.26) - (5.28). For n = 2 intermediaries and buyers whose private
valuations are i.i.d. drawn from the uniform distribution U(0;1), equations (5.26) -
(5.29) become:
rmin =
1 + 
2
(5.30)
1
(1   rmax)3  
8
(1   )3 =
3
2(1   rmax)2 (5.31)
r(r) =
2(1   rmax)2
(1   r)4 (5.32)

PRE = argmax

f4rmax   (rmax)2   16(
1   rmax
1   
)4   2g (5.33)
For the uniform distribution, U(0;1), the equations above yield 
PRE = 0:5, rmin = 0:75,
rmax = 0:78.
We have used ctitious play in this setting to compare our results with the only available
theoretical results of Feldman et al.. Given the technical diculties in characterizing
the exact equilibrium distribution for settings with more than one buyer per interme-
diary, we use these theoretical results as a benchmark for ctitious play. Specically,108 Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The Eects of Reserve Prices
the convergence of the intermediaries' utilities to the theoretically derived ones in our
ctitious play experiments is good evidence of the eectiveness of ctitious play in the
remaining cases studied within this thesis, where there are no theoretical guarantees.
Figure 5.8 illustrates the intermediaries' utilities for each round. The acquired utili-
ties are very close to the theoretical expected prots of 0:0479 in equilibrium that are
achieved according to the results of Feldman et al.. Moreover, Figure 5.9 illustrates the
resulting c.d.f. (black line) of the intermediaries' reserve-price-setting strategies in our
approximate equilibrium compared to the theoretical c.d.f. (gray line). As can be seen,
the two functions are quite close, illustrating the eectiveness of our experiments in this
setting.
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Figure 5.8: Intermediary ctitious play utilities per round for a duopoly PRE inter-
mediary setting, where each intermediary has k = 1 buyer whose private valuation is
i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1) and the center imposes its optimal reserve price (0:5).
Having shown the eectiveness of ctitious play in the k = 1 intermediary duopoly
setting, we now move to the more general case of k > 1 buyers per intermediary in the
same scenario with i.i.d. uniform U(0;1) buyers' private valuations. Feldman et al. have
shown that intermediaries in this case also implement mixed-strategy equilibrium reserve
prices but did not manage to analytically characterize the resulting equilibrium. The
best-response functions for two examples with k = 2, 5 buyers for each intermediary and
 = 0 in Figure 5.10 imply the same. As can be seen, the low best-response reserve price
remains xed whereas the high best-response reserve price increases with the number of
buyers per intermediary.
We now depict the results of the ctitious play experiments for k = 2 and 5 buyers per
intermediary, where we vary the center's reserve price. Figure 5.11 illustrates the center's
ex-ante expected revenue for k = 2 (left) and k = 5 (right). As can be seen from these
examples, the center's optimal reserve price increases with the number of buyers per
intermediary. Feldman et al. have shown that, for a single buyer per intermediary, theChapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The Eects of Reserve Prices 109
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Figure 5.9: C.d.f. of the intermediaries' equilibrium reserve-price-setting strategies
(gray) along with the corresponding empirical c.d.f. of the ctitious play run (black)
for a duopoly PRE intermediary setting, where each intermediary has k = 1 buyer whose
private valuation is i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1) and the center imposes its optimal reserve
price (0:5).
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(a) k = 2 buyers per intermediary.
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(b) k = 5 buyers per intermediary.
Figure 5.10: Best-response reserve price functions for a duopoly PRE intermediary
setting with intermediary reserve prices, where each intermediary has k = 2 (left) or
k = 5 (right) buyers whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1) and the
center does not impose a reserve price.
latter optimal reserve price decreases with the number of intermediaries. Our example
depicts that their result is due to the increased competition of the intermediaries. Hence,
these two factors (number of intermediaries, number of buyers per intermediary) drive
the optimal reserve price for the center in opposite directions.
Figure 5.12 illustrates the c.d.f. of the resulting -NE reserve-price-setting strategies
from our experiments when the center implements its optimal reserve price (0:5 for
k = 2, 0:6 for k = 5). As shown, -NE reserve prices tend to increase with increasing
number of buyers and the support of this equilibrium increases as well.
We now move to the setting with two intermediaries both implementing POST mecha-
nisms.110 Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The Eects of Reserve Prices
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(a) k = 2 buyers per intermediary.
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(b) k = 5 buyers per intermediary.
Figure 5.11: Center's ex-ante expected revenue when intermediaries follow the cti-
tious play -NE reserve-price-setting strategies for a duopoly PRE intermediary setting,
where each intermediary has k = 2 (left) or k = 5 (right) buyers whose private valua-
tions are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1) and the center does not impose a reserve price.
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(a) k = 2 buyers per intermediary.
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Figure 5.12: Empirical c.d.f. of the ctitious play intermediaries' -NE reserve-price-
setting strategies for a duopoly PRE intermediary setting, where each intermediary has
k = 2 (left) and k = 5 (right) buyers whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from
U(0;1) and the center imposes its optimal reserve price.
5.2.3 Post-Award Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
Let us consider the duopoly competition between two intermediaries implementing POST
mechanisms where both set a reserve price to increase their prot, so that a buyer wins
and pays the maximum of the local second-highest bid, the center's second-highest bid
or its reserve price, and the intermediary's reserve price. In this section, as before,
we rst characterize the expected utilities for all agents and then analyze the resulting
equilibrium reserve-price-setting behavior of the intermediaries. In this setting, we show
the existence of a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in the intermediaries' strategies
under some conditions. As will be seen, these conditions are met for our example with
the uniform distribution U(0;1) for k = 1 and 2 buyers per intermediary. For this
reason, we will present our ctitious play results only for the case of k = 5 buyers per
intermediary.Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The Eects of Reserve Prices 111
We assume that intermediaries set reserve prices rL
POST;rH
POST such that rL
POST 
rH
POST. In this case, the low- and high-reserve intermediary expected prots can be
expressed as follows:
profitL
POST(rL
POST) = Fk(rH
POST)[kFk 1(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))(rL
POST   )+
+
Z 1
rL
POST
(y   )f
(k)
2 (y)dy] +
Z 1
rH
POST
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rH
POST
(y   x)f
(k)
1 (x)dxdy (5.34)
and
profitH
POST(rH
POST) = Fk(rL
POST)[kFk 1(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))(rH
POST   )+
+
Z 1
rH
POST
(y   )f
(k)
2 (y)dy] + kFk 1(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))
Z rH
POST
rL
POST
(rH
POST   y)f
(k)
1 (y)dy+
+
Z 1
rH
POST
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rL
POST
(y   x)f
(k)
1 (x)dxdy (5.35)
In more detail, the low-reserve intermediary receives the dierence between the maxi-
mum of his buyers' local second-highest bid and the center's reserve price, if there is
at least one bid above his reserve price and, at the same time, all opponent bids are
below the high reserve price (rst term in (5.34)). Otherwise, he receives the dierence
between his local second-highest bid and the center's second-highest bid if the former
is higher than the latter (second term in (5.34)). The high-reserve intermediary corre-
spondingly receives the dierence between the maximum of his local second-highest bid
and his reserve price, and the center's reserve price or the dierence between his local
second-highest bid and the center's second-highest bid in the same cases (rst and third
terms in (5.35)), and additionally obtains the dierence between his reserve price and
the opponent highest bid, if the latter is higher than the low reserve price but lower
than the high reserve price (second term in (5.35)). The above equations simplify to the
following:
profitL
POST(rL
POST) = Fk(rH
POST)[rH
POST      Fk(rL
POST)(rL
POST   ) 
 
Z rH
POST
rL
POST
F
(k)
2 (y)dy] +
Z 1
rH
POST
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rH
POST
Fk(x)dxdy (5.36)
profitH
POST(rH
POST) = Fk(rL
POST)(1   Fk(rH
POST))(rL
POST   )+
+ kFk 1(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))
Z rH
POST
rL
POST
Fk(y)dy +
Z 1
rH
POST
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rL
POST
Fk(x)dxdy
(5.37)
Having expressed the intermediaries' expected prots, we now characterize the center's
ex-ante expected revenue; the center receives its reserve price, , whenever there is at112 Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The Eects of Reserve Prices
least one bid above this reserve in one intermediary but no such eligible bid in the other
intermediary's local auction. Additionally, it receives the second-highest intermediaries'
bid if both intermediaries' bids are above the high reserve price, rH
POST, or when the
high-reserve intermediary's bid is above rH
POST and the low-reserve intermediary's bid
is higher than rL
POST but lower than rH
POST. Hence, the center's expected revenue can
be expressed as follows:
revenuePOST() = [Fk(rH
POST)(1   Fk(rL
POST)) + Fk(rL
POST)(1   Fk(rH
POST))]+
+
Z 1
rH
POST
2y(1   Fk(y))f
(k)
1 (y)dy + (1   Fk(rH
POST))
Z rH
POST
rL
POST
yf
(k)
1 (y)dy (5.38)
Finally, a buyer with valuation  expects surplus from the low- and high-reserve inter-
mediaries that can be expressed as follows:
L
POST() =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 if  2 [0;rL
POST)
Fk(rH
POST)
R 
rL
POST
Fk 1(y)dy if  2 [rL
POST;rH
POST)
Fk(rH
POST)[(   rL
POST)Fk 1(rL
POST) +
R rH
POST
rL
POST
(   y)f
(k 1)
1 (y)dy]+
+
R 
rH
POST
(   y)f
(2k 1)
1 (y)dy if  2 [rH
POST;1]
(5.39)
and
H
POST() =
8
<
:
0 if  2 [0;rH
POST)
(   rH
POST)F2k 1(rH
POST) +
R 
rH
POST
(   y)f
(2k 1)
1 (y)dy if  2 [rH
POST;1]
(5.40)
Thus, a buyer with valuation   rH
POST in the low-reserve intermediary wins and pays
the low reserve price, rL
POST, or the highest opponent local bid in this intermediary's
auction if no other eligible bid is submitted in the high-reserve intermediary (rst and
second terms in (5.39)). Otherwise, she pays the second-highest opponent bid overall
(third term in (5.39)). On the other hand, if the buyer is in the high-reserve intermediary,
she pays the high reserve price, rH
POST, if all other bids are less than this reserve price
(rst term in (5.40)). Otherwise, she wins and pays the highest opponent bid overall,
given that the latter is higher than rH
POST but lower than her bid (second term in (5.40)).
Again, we start with the motivating scenario where each intermediary has only one buyer
participating in his auction. In this case, the expected prots of the two intermediaries
can be expressed as:
profitL
POST(rL
POST) = (1   F(rL
POST))F(rH
POST)(rL
POST   ) (5.41)Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The E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profitH
POST(rH
POST) = (1   F(rH
POST))[(rH
POST   )F(rL
POST) +
Z rH
POST
rL
POST
(rH
POST   y)f(y)dy] =
= (1   F(rH
POST))[
Z rH
POST
rL
POST
F(x)dx + (rL
POST   )F(rL
POST)] (5.42)
Looking at the intermediaries' reserve-price-setting strategies in this setting, surpris-
ingly, in this case we nd that, under some conditions on the distribution of buyers'
private valuations, there is a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium where both
intermediaries set the same reserve price as in the monopoly intermediary setting.
Specically, the low-reserve intermediary's optimal reserve price solves the rst-order
condition of (5.41):
@profitL
POST(rL
POST)
@rL
POST
=  f(rL
POST)(rL
POST   ) + 1   F(rL
POST) = 0 (5.43)
that gives:
r
POST =  +
1   F(r
POST)
f(r
POST)
(5.44)
Then, taking rst-order condition for the high-reserve intermediary yields:
@profitH
POST(rH
POST)
@rH
POST
=  f(rH
POST)[
Z rH
POST
rL
POST
F(y)dy + F(rL
POST)(rL
POST   )]+
+ (1   F(rH
POST))F(rH
POST) = 0 (5.45)
which is satised for rL
POST = rH
POST = r
POST. For this to be a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium, the second-order derivative at r
POST has to be negative. Taking the second-
order derivative yields:
@2profitH
POST(rH
POST)
@(rH
POST)2 =  f0(rH
POST)[
Z rH
POST
rL
POST
F(y)dy + F(rL
POST)(rL
POST   )]+
+ f(rH
POST)[1   3F(rH
POST)] (5.46)
which at rL
POST = rH
POST = r
POST yields:
@2profitH
POST(rH
POST)
@(rH
POST)2 jr
POST =  f0(r
POST)
F(r
POST)(1   F(r
POST))
f(r
POST)
+
+ f(r
POST)[1   3F(r
POST)] (5.47)
Setting
@2profitH
POST(rH
POST)
@(rH
POST)2 jr
POST < 0 yields the necessary condition for the existence of
a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.114 Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The Eects of Reserve Prices
It is easy to see that such a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium will always exist
for the example of the uniform distribution U(0;1), with each intermediary setting a
reserve price equal to
1+
2 .
Given this equilibrium behavior of the intermediaries, the center's ex-ante expected
revenue will be:
revenuePOST() =
Z 1
r
POST
yf
(2)
2 (y)dy + 2F(r
POST)(1   F(r
POST)) (5.48)
Substituting the intermediaries' equilibrium reserve prices in the equation above yields:
revenuePOST(r
POST) =
Z 1
rPOST
yf
(2)
2 (y)dy+2F(r
POST)(1 F(r
POST))[r
POST 
1   F(r
POST
f(r
POST
]
(5.49)
Taking the rst-order derivative of this w.r.t. r
POST yields:
2fF(r
POST)[3(1 F(r
POST)) r
POSTf(r
POST)] (1 F(r
POST))2[1 F(r
POST)
f0(r
POST)
f2(r
POST)
]g
(5.50)
Setting this equal to zero then yields the optimal reserve price of the center. For the
case of the uniform distribution, we obtain r
POST = 0:7236 and the optimal center's
reserve then will be 
POST = 2r
POST   1 = 0:4472.
We now show that the above-mentioned result for the existence of a symmetric pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium in the duopoly POST intermediary reserve-price-setting prob-
lem generalizes to settings with more than one buyer per intermediary.
Theorem 5.1. There exists a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the duopoly
POST - POST intermediary reserve-price-setting game with intermediaries having k 2 N+
captive buyers each, where each intermediary sets a reserve price, r
POST, that solves:
r
POST =  +
1   F(r
POST)
f(r
POST)
(5.51)
if
f0(r
POST) >
[k   (k + 2)F(r
POST)]f2(r
POST)
kF(r
POST)(1   F(r
POST)
(5.52)
Proof. Taking the rst- and second-order derivatives of the high-reserve intermediary
expected prot (equation (5.37)) w.r.t. rH
POST yields:
@profitH
POST(rH
POST)
@rH
POST
=  kFk 1(rH
POST)f(rH
POST)[Fk(rL
POST)(rL
POST   )+
+
Z rH
POST
rL
POST
Fk(y)dy] + kF2k 1(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST)) (5.53)Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The E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@2profitH
POST(rH
POST)
@(rH
POST)2 = k(2k   1)F2k 2(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))f(rH
POST) 
  2kF2k 1(rH
POST)f(rH
POST)   [k(k   1)Fk 2(rH
POST)f2(rH
POST)+
+ kFk 1(rH
POST)f0(rH
POST)][Fk(rL
POST)(rL
POST   ) +
Z rH
POST
rL
POST
Fk(y)dy] 
  kFk 1(rH
POST)f(rH
POST)Fk(rH
POST) (5.54)
It is easy to see that setting rH
POST as in (5.51) satises the rst-order condition of (5.53).
However, it still remains to be shown whether this maximizes the expected prot of the
high-reserve intermediary. For this to happen, the second-order derivative of this prot
expression should be negative:
@2profitH
POST(rH
POST)
@(rH
POST)2 jrPOST
L =rH
POST=r
POST = kF2k 2(r
POST)[k(1   F(r
POST))f(r
POST) 
  2F(r
POST)f(r
POST)   kF(r
POST)f0(r
POST)
1   F(r
POST)
f(r
POST)
] (5.55)
yielding the condition of (5.52).
For the uniform distribution U(0;1) the condition for the existence of such a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium becomes r
POST > k
k+1 or, equivalently for the center's reserve
price, ,  > k 2
k+1, since r
POST =
1+
2 . This will be always satised for k  2 when  > 0,
however for the remaining cases we need to derive the center's optimal reserve price under
this equilibrium and study the feasibility of such an optimal reserve price.
If both intermediaries set the same reserve price, r
POST, the center's expected revenue
(equation (5.38)) becomes:
revenue(r
POST) = 2Fk(r
POST)(1   Fk(r
POST))[r
POST  
1   F(r
POST)
f(r
POST)
]+
+
Z 1
r
POST
2y(1   Fk(y))kFk 1(y)f(y)dy (5.56)
Taking the rst-order derivative w.r.t. r
POST then yields:
@revenue(r
POST)
@r
POST
= 2Fk 1(r
POST)fkFk(r
POST)[1   F(r
POST)   r
POSTf(r
POST)] 
  (1   Fk(r
POST))[k   (k + 2)F(r
POST)   F(r
POST)(1   F(r
POST))
f0(r
POST)
f2(r
POST)
]g
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The optimal reserve price for the intermediaries, 
POST, solves the rst-order condition
of this equation subject to the constraint of (5.52). For the case of the uniform distribu-
tion U(0;1), such an equilibrium exists only for the case of k = 2, where r
POST = 0:7071
and hence 
POST = 0:4142.
For k > 2 buyers per intermediary, intermediaries are likely to follow mixed equilib-
rium reserve-price setting strategies, as the example for the best response function of
Figure 5.13 illustrates for k = 5 and  = 0. For this reason, we run the ctitious play
algorithm for this setting, varying as before the center's reserve price from 0 to 1 with
a step of 0:1.
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Figure 5.13: Best-response reserve price function for a duopoly POST intermediary
setting with intermediary reserve prices, where each intermediary has k = 5 buyers
whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1) and the center does not impose
a reserve price.
Figure 5.14 (left) illustrates the center's expected revenue in the -NE of the ctitious
play experiments, as a function of the reserve price. As can be seen, the optimal reserve
price is 0:3, further decreasing compared to the cases of k = 1; and k = 2 analyzed
above. This is due to the fact that, since intermediaries submit their highest-local bid,
as the number of buyers increases, the impact of a higher reserve price is oset by the
probability of setting these too high and hence missing a trade. This drives the center's
optimal reserve price downwards. Figure 5.14 (right) shows the resulting -NE reserve-
price-setting strategy. As can be seen, equilibrium reserve prices are concentrated on
[0:65;0:71], hence are generally smaller compared to the cases of k = 1 and k = 2.
Next, we analyze an FPSB duopoly intermediary setting. As will be seen, the BNE bid-
ding functions are complex, so the derivation of the expected utilities for all stakeholders
becomes technically challenging.Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The Eects of Reserve Prices 117
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(a) Center's expected revenue.
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(b) Intermediaries' empirical c.d.f. of reserve prices
in -NE.
Figure 5.14: Center's ex-ante expected revenue (left) and empirical c.d.f. at the
center's optimal reserve price (right) of the ctitious play intermediaries' -NE reserve-
price-setting strategies for a duopoly POST intermediary setting, where each intermedi-
ary has k = 5 buyers whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
5.2.4 First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
When intermediaries implement FPSB auctions, the analytical derivations of the expected
utilities for all parties become more cumbersome, since one has to derive the equilib-
rium bidding functions of the buyers. Kotowski (2014) has considered such equilibrium
functions for a dierent problem that perfectly ts our setting. This is the problem of
an auctioneer who separates bidders in two groups and discriminates in favor of one of
the groups by setting dierent reserve prices for each group. Among others, the author
shows that, when the auctioneer uses a rst-price sealed-bid auction with dierent re-
serve prices for each group, the bidders' equilibrium bidding functions are nontrivial to
derive and might depict discontinuities. We make use of the author's results to numeri-
cally calculate the center's average revenue and intermediaries' average prots so as to
compare those with the other two auction mechanisms studied. We now illustrate the
author's results for the equilibrium bidding functions of the bidders.
Kotowski shows that, when the reserve prices are not very dierent, bidders' equilib-
rium strategies are identical for some interval in the support of the valuations, and the
bids' prole is called semi-separating. Otherwise, the bids of the two groups are disjoint
sets and their prole is called separating. In the limiting case where both reserve prices
are the same, the bids' prole is called pooling and coincides with the equilibrium bid-
ding function of buyers when intermediaries do not impose any reserve prices (equation
(4.24)). In our terminology, for the existence of a corresponding semi-separating equilib-
rium, the reserve prices of the two groups (i.e. intermediaries), rL
FPSB  rH
FPSB, should
satisfy the following condition:
Fk(rH
FPSB)
Z 1
rL
FPSB
Fk 1(y)dy 
Z 1
rH
FPSB
Fk 1(y)dy (5.58)118 Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The Eects of Reserve Prices
In this case, there is a cut-o point, ^ , in the support of the valuations where the
equilibrium bidding function changes. This cut-o point is the unique solution of:
Fk(rH
FPSB)
Z ^ 
rL
FPSB
Fk 1(y)dy = Fk(^ )
Z ^ 
rH
FPSB
Fk 1(y)dy (5.59)
Then, if:
b`() =   
R 
r`
FPSB
Fk 1(y)dy
Fk 1()
(5.60)
^ b() =   
Fk(^ )
R ^ 
rH
FPSB
Fk 1(y)dy
F2k 1()
 
R 
^  F2k 1(y)dy
F2k 1()
(5.61)
for ` = fL;Hg, the semi-separating equilibrium bidding strategies of the buyers in the
low- and high-reserve intermediaries, L();H() respectively will be:
`() =
8
<
:
b`() if  2 [r`
FPSB; ^ ]
^ b() if  2 (^ ;1]
(5.62)
On the other hand, when the reserve prices are very dierent, i.e. when
Fk(rH
FPSB)
Z 1
rL
FPSB
Fk 1(y)dy >
Z 1
rH
FPSB
Fk 1(y)dy (5.63)
then buyers follow the following separating equilibrium bidding strategies:
s
`() =   
R 
r`
FPSB
Fk 1(y)dy
Fk 1()
(5.64)
Finally, if both intermediaries set the same reserve price, rFPSB, then all buyers follow
the same equilibrium bidding strategy:
L() = H() = () =   
R 
rFPSB F2k 1(y)dy
F2k 1()
(5.65)
An example of the equilibrium bidding functions when the reserve prices are dierent
are shown in Figure 5.15 where each intermediary has 2 buyers whose private valuations
are i.i.d. drawn from the uniform distribution U(0;1). Given the complexity of the
resulting equilibrium function, we do not provide any closed form expressions for the
expected revenue and prots for the center and the intermediary.
We now analyze the equilibrium reserve-price-setting strategies of the two FPSB inter-
mediaries for the examples of k = 1, 2 and 5 buyers per intermediary whose private
valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1). Our ctitious play results are shown in FiguresChapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The Eects of Reserve Prices 119
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Figure 5.15: Two examples of semi-separating (left) and separating (right) equi-
librium rst-price sealed-bid bidding strategies when there are k = 2 buyers in each
intermediary whose valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1). The bidding functions of
buyers in the low-and high-reserve intermediaries are shown with red and blue colour
respectively.
5.16 - 5.18. As can be seen, the center's optimal reserve price increases with the number
of buyers per intermediary and that also leads to an increase of the reserve prices of
the intermediaries. Moreover, this reserve price is also higher compared to all previous
scenarios. In all cases, intermediaries in our approximate equilibria follow strictly mixed
strategies.
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(a) Center's average revenue.
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(b) Intermediaries' empirical c.d.f. of reserve prices
in -NE.
Figure 5.16: Center's average revenue (left) and empirical c.d.f. at the center's opti-
mal reserve price (right) of the ctitious play intermediaries' -NE reserve-price-setting
strategies for a duopoly FPSB intermediary setting, where each intermediary has k = 1
buyer whose private valuation is i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
In what follows, we study a heterogeneous Vickrey setting, where one intermediary
implements a PRE and the other a POST mechanism.
5.2.5 Pre- versus Post-Award Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
Let us now assume that intermediaries select dierent Vickrey mechanisms. We start
with the case where the low-reserve intermediary implements a POST mechanism with a120 Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The Eects of Reserve Prices
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(a) Center's average revenue.
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(b) Intermediaries' empirical c.d.f. of reserve prices
in -NE.
Figure 5.17: Center's average revenue (left) and empirical c.d.f. at the center's opti-
mal reserve price (right) of the ctitious play intermediaries' -NE reserve-price-setting
strategies for a duopoly FPSB intermediary setting, where each intermediary has k = 2
buyers whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
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(a) Center's average revenue.
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(b) Intermediaries' empirical c.d.f. of reserve prices
in -NE.
Figure 5.18: Center's average revenue (left) and empirical c.d.f. at the center's opti-
mal reserve price (right) of the ctitious play intermediaries' -NE reserve-price-setting
strategies for a duopoly FPSB intermediary setting, where each intermediary has k = 5
buyers whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
reserve price rL
POST whereas the high-reserve intermediary implements a PRE mechanism
with a reserve price rH
PRE  rL
POST. Then the intermediaries' ex-ante expected prots
can be expressed as:
profitL
POST(rL
POST) = Fk(rH
PRE)[kFk 1(rL
POST)(1   F(rL
POST))(rL
POST   )+
+
Z 1
rL
POST
(y   )f
(k)
2 (y)dy] + kFk 1(rH
PRE)(1   F(rH
PRE))
Z 1
rH
PRE
(y   rH
PRE)f
(k)
2 (y)dy+
+
Z 1
rH
PRE
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rH
PRE
(y   x)f
(k)
2 (x)dxdy (5.66)Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The E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profitH
PRE(rH
PRE) = Fk(rL
POST)[kFk 1(rH
PRE)(1   F(rH
PRE))(rH
PRE   )+
+
Z 1
rH
PRE
(y   )f
(k)
2 (y)dy] + kFk 1(rH
PRE)(1   F(rH
PRE))
Z rH
PRE
rL
POST
(rH
PRE   y)f
(k)
1 (y)dy+
+
Z 1
rH
PRE
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rL
POST
(y   x)f
(k)
1 (x)dxdy (5.67)
In more detail, the low-reserve POST intermediary receives the dierence between his
reserve price or his local second-highest bid and the center's reserve price, if the other
intermediary has no eligible bid and, at the same time, there is at least one bid above
his reserve price, rL
POST (rst and second term in (5.66)). He also receives the dierence
between his local second-highest bid and rH
PRE, if there is only a single eligible bid
submitted in the other intermediary's auction and, simultaneously, his local second-
highest bid is above his reserve price (third term in (5.66)). Finally, he obtains the
dierence between his local second-highest bid and the other intermediary's submitted
bid, if the latter is below the former and both are above the high reserve price (fourth
term in (5.66)).
Similarly, the high-reserve PRE intermediary obtains the dierence between his reserve
price or his local second-highest bid and the center's reserve price when there is at least
one bid above rH
PRE and, at the same time, all bids in the other intermediary are below
the low reserve price (rst and second terms in (5.67) respectively). He also obtains the
dierence between his reserve price and the opponent's highest local bid, if the latter is
above rL
POST but below rH
PRE (third term in (5.67)). Finally, if the highest local bid in
the high-reserve intermediary is below his second-highest bid but above the low reserve
price, and his second-highest local bid is above rH
PRE, then the intermediary receives the
dierence between these two bids (fourth term in (5.67)).
The above equations simplify to the following:
profitL
POST(rL
POST) = Fk(rH
PRE)[rH
PRE      Fk(rL
POST)(rL
POST   ) 
 
Z rH
PRE
rL
POST
F
(k)
2 (y)dy] +
Z 1
rH
PRE
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rH
PRE
F
(k)
2 (x)dxdy (5.68)
profitH
PRE(rH
PRE) = Fk(rL
POST)(1   Fk(rH
PRE))(rL
POST   )+
+ kFk 1(rH
PRE)(1   F(rH
PRE))
Z rH
PRE
rL
POST
Fk(y)dy +
Z 1
rH
PRE
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rL
POST
Fk(x)dxdy
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Then the center's ex-ante expected revenue will be:
revenuePOST PRE() = [Fk(rL
POST)(1   Fk(rH
PRE)+
+ Fk(rH
PRE)(1   Fk(rL
POST)] + krH
PREFk 1(rH
PRE)(1   F(rH
PRE))(1   Fk(rH
PRE)+
+
Z 1
rH
PRE
f
(k)
1 (y)
Z y
rH
PRE
xf
(k)
2 (x)dxdy + (1   Fk(rH
PRE))
Z rH
PRE
rL
POST
yf
(k)
1 (y)dy+
+
Z 1
rH
PRE
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rH
PRE
xf
(k)
1 (x)dxdy (5.70)
Finally, a buyer with valuation  expects surplus from the low- and high-reserve inter-
mediaries that can be expressed as follows:
L
POST() =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > :
0 if  2 [0;rL
POST)
Fk(rH
PRE)
R 
rL
POST
Fk 1(y)dy if  2 [rL
POST;rH
PRE)
Fk(rH
PRE)[(   rL
POST)Fk 1(rL
POST) +
R rH
PRE
rL
POST
(   y)f
(k 1)
1 (y)dy]+
+Fk 1(rH
PRE)kFk 1(rH
PRE)(1   F(rH
PRE))(   rH
PRE)+
+
R 
rH
PRE
(   y)f
(k 1)
1 (y)F
(k)
2 (y)dy+
+
R 
rH
PRE
(   y)f
(k)
2 (y)Fk 1(y)dy if  2 [rH
PRE;1]
(5.71)
H
PRE() =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 if  2 [0;rH
PRE)
(   rH
PRE)F2k 1(rH
PRE) +
R 
rH
PRE
(   y)f
(k 1)
1 (y)Fk(y)dy
if  2 [rH
PRE;1]
(5.72)
Specically, a buyer with private valuation   rH
PRE in the low-reserve POST intermedi-
ary pays the low reserve price or the highest local bid in this intermediary if all bids in
the other intermediary are less than his reserve price and, at the same time, no eligible
bid is submitted in her intermediary or the highest local bid in her intermediary is also
below his reserve price (rst and second terms in (5.71)). She also pays the high reserve
price if all bids in the same intermediary are less than his reserve price and there is
only a single eligible bid in the opponent intermediary (third term in (5.71)). She also
pays the highest local bid in her selected intermediary if this is above rH
PRE, below her
valuation, and, at the same time, the highest opponent bid is below this bid (fourth
term in (5.71)). Otherwise, she pays the second-highest opponent intermediary's local
bid if this is higher than rH
PRE, below her bid, and, at the same time, the highest local
opponent bid in her intermediary's auction is less than the former bid (fth term in
(5.71)).
A buyer with private valuation   rH
PRE in the high-reserve PRE intermediary pays the
high reserve price if there is no other eligible bid in both intermediary auctions (rst
term in (5.72)), otherwise she pays the highest opponent local bid in her intermediary'sChapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The E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auction if this is higher than rH
PRE, lower than her valuation, and, at the same time, the
highest bid of the other intermediary is less than the former bid (second term in (5.72)).
On the other hand, when the low-reserve intermediary implements a PRE mechanism with
reserve price rL
PRE and the high-reserve intermediary implements a POST mechanism with
reserve price rH
POST  rL
PRE, the intermediaries' ex-ante expected prots will be:
profitL
PRE(rL
PRE) = Fk(rH
POST)[kFk 1(rL
PRE)(1   F(rL
PRE))(rL
PRE   )+
+
Z 1
rL
PRE
(y   )f
(k)
2 (y)dy] +
Z 1
rH
POST
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rH
POST
(y   x)f
(k)
1 (x)dxdy (5.73)
profitH
POST(rH
POST) = Fk(rL
PRE)[kFk 1(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))(rH
POST   )+
+
Z 1
rH
POST
(y   )f
(k)
2 (y)dy] + kFk 1(rL
PRE)(1   F(rL
PRE))[kFk 1(rH
POST)
(1   F(rH
POST))(rH
POST   rL
PRE) +
Z 1
rH
POST
(y   rL
PRE)f
(k)
2 (y)dy]+
+ kFk 1(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))
Z rH
POST
rL
PRE
(rH
POST   y)f
(k)
2 (y)dy+
+
Z 1
rH
POST
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rL
PRE
(y   x)f
(k)
2 (x)dxdy (5.74)
That is, the low-reserve PRE intermediary receives the dierence between his reserve
price or his second-highest local bid and  when all opponent intermediary's submitted
bids are below rH
POST and there is at least one bid in his auction that is higher than rL
PRE
(rst and second terms in (5.73)). Otherwise, this intermediary obtains the dierence
between his local second-highest bid and the opponent intermediary's highest submitted
bid if both are above the high reserve price, rH
POST (third term in (5.73)).
Similarly, the high-reserve POST intermediary receives the dierence between his local
second-highest bid or his reserve price and , if there is no bid submitted by the other
intermediary and, simultaneously, there is at least one eligible bid in his auction (rst
and second terms in (5.74)). He also receives the dierence between his local second-
highest bid or his reserve price and the low reserve price, rL
PRE, if there is only a single
eligible bid in the opponent intermediary and, at the same time, there is at least one
eligible bid in his local auction (third and fourth terms in (5.74)). The intermediary
receives the dierence between his reserve price and the opponent local highest bid
when the latter is in [rL
PRE;rH
POST] and there is only a single eligible bid in his local
auction (fth term in (5.74)). Finally, the intermediary receives the dierence between
his local second-highest bid and the opponent second-highest bid locally if the former
is above rH
POST whereas the latter is above rL
PRE but below the former (last term in
(5.74)).124 Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The E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The equations above simplify to the following:
profitL
PRE(rL
PRE) = Fk(rH
POST)[rH
POST      Fk(rL
PRE)(rL
PRE   ) 
 
Z rH
POST
rL
PRE
F
(k)
2 (y)dy] +
Z 1
rH
POST
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rH
POST
Fk(x)dxdy (5.75)
profitH
POST(rH
POST) = Fk(rL
PRE)(1   Fk(rH
POST))(rL
PRE   )+
+ kFk 1(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))
Z rH
POST
rL
PRE
F
(k)
2 (y)dy +
Z 1
rH
POST
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rL
PRE
F
(k)
2 (x)dxdy
(5.76)
In this case, the center's ex-ante expected revenue will then be:
revenuePRE POST() = [Fk(rL
PRE)(1   Fk(rH
POST))+
+ Fk(rH
POST)(1   Fk(rL
PRE)] + krL
PREFk 1(rL
PRE)(1   F(rL
PRE))(1   Fk(rH
POST)+
+
Z 1
rH
POST
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rH
POST
xf
(k)
1 (x)dxdy +
Z 1
rH
POST
f
(k)
1 (y)
Z y
rL
PRE
xf
(k)
2 (x)dxdy (5.77)
Finally, a buyer with valuation  expects surplus from the low- and high-reserve inter-
mediaries that can be expressed as follows:
L
PRE() =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 if  2 [0;rL
PRE)
Fk(rH
POST)
R 
rL
PRE
Fk 1(y)dy if  2 [rL
PRE;rH
POST)
Fk(rH
POST)[(   rL
PRE)Fk 1(rL
PRE) +
R rH
POST
rL
PRE
(   y)f
(k 1)
1 (y)dy]+
+
R 
rH
POST
(   y)f
(k 1)
1 (y)Fk(y)dy if  2 [rH
POST;1]
(5.78)
H
POST() =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 if  2 [0;rH
POST)
(   rH
POST)Fk 1(rH
POST)F
(k)
2 (rH
POST) +
R 
rH
POST
(   y)f
(k 1)
1 (y)F
(k)
2 (y)dy+
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POST
(   y)f
(k)
2 (y)Fk 1(y)dy if  2 [rH
POST;1]
(5.79)
Specically, a buyer with private valuation   rH
POST in the low-reserve PRE interme-
diary pays the low reserve price or the highest local bid in this intermediary if all bids
in the other intermediary are less than his reserve price and, at the same time, no eligi-
ble bid is submitted in her intermediary or the highest local bid in her intermediary is
also below his reserve price (rst and second terms in (5.78)). Otherwise, she pays the
highest local bid in her intermediary if this is above rH
POST, below her valuation, and,
at the same time, the highest local bid in the other intermediary is less than this former
bid (third term in (5.78)).Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The Eects of Reserve Prices 125
A buyer with private valuation   rH
POST in the high-reserve POST intermediary pays
the high reserve price if there is no other eligible bid in her local auction and the second-
highest local bid in the high-reserve intermediary is also less than the high reserve
price (rst term in (5.79)). Otherwise she pays the highest opponent local bid in her
intermediary's auction if this is higher than rH
POST, lower than her valuation, and, at
the same time, the second-highest bid of the other intermediary is less than the former
bid (second term in (5.79)). Finally, she pays the second-highest opponent local bid if
this is higher than rH
POST, lower than her valuation, and, at the same time, the highest
opponent intermediary's local bid is lower than the former bid (third term in (5.79)).
We now present our ctitious play results. In accordance with the previous cases, we
consider intermediaries with k = 1, 2 and 5 buyers each whose private valuations are
i.i.d. drawn from the uniform distribution U(0;1). Our results for the center's expected
revenue and the resulting intermediary -NE reserve-price-setting strategies when the
former sets its optimal reserve price are shown in Figures 5.19 - 5.21. With k = 1 buyer
per intermediary, ctitious play strategies converge to a single reserve price. However,
that does not necessarily mean that intermediaries should follow pure strategies if we
increase the level of discretization. The support of the mixed strategies followed by the
intermediaries also evidently increases with increasing number of buyers per intermedi-
ary.
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Figure 5.19: Center's ex-ante expected revenue (left) and empirical c.d.f. at the
center's optimal reserve price (right) of the ctitious play intermediaries' -NE reserve-
price-setting strategies for a duopoly PRE-POST intermediary setting, where each inter-
mediary has k = 1 buyer whose private valuation is i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
In the following section, we compare the eciency and revenue attained in all the afore-
mentioned settings for the numerical examples provided.
5.3 Comparison of the Three Intermediary Mechanisms
Having analyzed the (approximate) equilibrium behavior of the three mechanisms along
with the PRE - POST heterogeneous duopoly competition, in this section, we compare their126 Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The Eects of Reserve Prices
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(a) Center's expected revenue.
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Figure 5.20: Center's ex-ante expected revenue (left) and empirical c.d.f. at the
center's optimal reserve price (right) of the ctitious play intermediaries' -NE reserve-
price-setting strategies for a duopoly PRE-POST intermediary setting, where each inter-
mediary has k = 2 buyers whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
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(a) Center's expected revenue.
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Figure 5.21: Center's ex-ante expected revenue (left) and empirical c.d.f. at the
center's optimal reserve price (right) of the ctitious play intermediaries' -NE reserve-
price-setting strategies for a duopoly PRE-POST intermediary setting, where each inter-
mediary has k = 5 buyers whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
revenue and eciency. Specically, we combine the theoretical and numerical results for
the uniform distribution U(0;1) and compare the center's average revenue, intermediary
prots and the social welfare for these mechanisms as well as against the corresponding
results for the setting of Chapter 4 with no reserve prices.
Figure 5.22 (left) illustrates intermediaries' prots for k = 1, 2 and 5 buyers per inter-
mediary. As can be seen, for k = 1 buyer per intermediary, all intermediaries obtain
similar prot on average, although FPSB and PRE auctions seem to perform slightly bet-
ter. For more buyers per intermediary, PRE auctioneers perform best with the notable
exception of the POST auction that seems to yield higher expected prot in homogeneous
settings with 2 buyers per intermediary. We contrast these with the results of Chapter 4
(Figure 5.22 (right)). As can be seen, reserve prices signicantly benet intermediaries
in all cases. It is important to note that the reserve prices change the ranking of the
mechanisms in terms of prots: when reserve prices are absent, FPSB seem to performChapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The Eects of Reserve Prices 127
better, whereas, for the same examples, PRE intermediaries are superior when imposing
reserve prices. Finally, we see that the heterogeneous competition between the Vickrey
variations benets the POST mechanism against its PRE counterpart.
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Figure 5.22: Intermediaries' ex-ante expected/average prots with (left) and without
(right) intermediary reserve prices for the three intermediary mechanisms for varying
number of buyers per intermediary whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from
U(0;1).
Regarding the buyers' expected surplus, as Figure 5.23 depicts, this is higher for POST
intermediaries (both in homogeneous settings and, especially, against a PRE auctioneer),
followed by that for homogeneous FPSB mechanisms. In all cases, intermediaries' reserve
prices signicantly decrease the surplus of buyers as expected.
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Figure 5.23: Buyers' ex-ante expected/average surplus with (left) and without (right)
intermediary reserve prices for the three intermediary mechanisms for varying number
of buyers per intermediary whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
Figure 5.24 illustrates the revenue eects of the intermediaries for the center. As can
be seen, the center, similar to the results of Chapter 4, benets from intermediaries
adopting the POST mechanism. As illustrated, the center's revenue is signicantly smaller
compared to the setting with intermediaries that do not impose reserve prices. This is
more apparent as the number of buyers decreases.128 Chapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The Eects of Reserve Prices
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Figure 5.24: Center's ex-ante expected/average revenue with intermediaries imposing
reserve prices (left) or not (right) for the three intermediary mechanisms for varying
number of buyers per intermediary whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from
U(0;1).
Finally, Figure 5.25 shows our results for the social welfare. Homogeneous POST mech-
anisms are not only benecent to the center but to the system as a whole since setting
symmetric reserve prices as a xed markup on the center's reserve price lead to a smaller
center's reserve price compared to the other settings. At this point we should note that
numerical and discretization errors in ctitious play against the theoretically derived
results for POST auctioneers with k = 1;2 buyers might increase the observed dier-
ences. However, the higher social welfare is also apparent in the PRE - POST duopoly
setting where the introduction of the POST auction increases the social welfare compared
to a homogeneous PRE duopoly. On the other hand, in contrast to the setting with no
reserve prices, FPSB appear to be less ecient. This is because of the higher reserve
prices that the center imposes that increases the number of lost trades. Also, the so-
cial welfare of FPSB is now comparable to that of PRE auctioneers for k = 2;5. This
is probably due to the fact that the lower center's reserve prices for PRE intermediaries
partially compensates for the increased ineciency due to misallocation against their
FPSB counterpart.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we studied the eects of the intermediary reserve prices for the center's
revenue, the intermediaries' prots and the buyers' surplus. We have limited our anal-
ysis to settings with two intermediaries given the technical challenges that arise in the
imperfect competition between auctioneers (Section 2.5).
Specically, we started with the case of a single intermediary where we depicted the
benets of setting a reserve price for the intermediary. We then studied the duopoly
competition between homogeneous PRE, POST and FPSB intermediaries and also lookedChapter 5 Intermediaries with Captive Buyers: The Eects of Reserve Prices 129
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Figure 5.25: Social welfare with intermediaries imposing reserve prices (left) or not
(right) for the three intermediary mechanisms for varying number of buyers per inter-
mediary whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
at the heterogeneous competition between the two Vickrey variations. Following this, we
characterized the expected utilities of all agents where this was possible. We also proved
the existence of a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the reserve-price-setting
problem of two POST intermediaries where they both set the monopolistic intermediary
reserve price, under some conditions on the distribution of private valuations and the
number of buyers.
Nevertheless, as the best-response functions for the example of the uniform distribu-
tion U(0;1) depict, intermediaries, in general follow mixed-strategy equilibrium reserve
prices. The latter strategies are dicult to derive. For this reason, we turned our at-
tention to learning techniques to obtain -NE of these strategies. In more detail, we
used the ctitious play algorithm to derive approximate equilibria for three examples
of k = 1, 2 and 5 buyers per intermediary in all the remaining cases. To do this, we
rst compared our numerical solution to the theoretical one, as was derived by Feldman
et al. (2010) for the case of k = 1 buyer per intermediary and PRE intermediaries.
Our numerical results show that PRE auctioneers are indeed prot-superior to the other
counterparts, at least in the examples studied. Nevertheless, they are less ecient than
their POST opponents, in agreement with the results of the previous chapter. Surprisingly,
FPSB intermediary auctions are also less ecient compared to the POST mechanisms as
well as to the setting without reserve prices. This is probably due to the higher optimal
reserve price for the center that increases the probability of non-allocation.
Up to now, we have assumed that buyers are non-strategic in their selection of inter-
mediary, being exogenously allocated to the available intermediaries. In the following
chapter, we remove this captivity assumption and let the intermediaries compete to
attract them by setting appropriate reserve prices.Chapter 6
Intermediaries with Non-Captive
Buyers
In the previous chapter, we studied the revenue and eciency eects of the competition
between intermediaries with captive buyers. In this chapter, we remove this limitation
and let the buyers simultaneously and strategically select one of the intermediaries,
albeit in a restrictive duopoly setting. Given the issues related to competition between
auctioneers, described in Section 2.5, as well as the analytical tractability problems of
calculating BNE bidding strategies in FPSB auctions (Kotowski, 2014), we only consider
PRE and POST intermediaries.
Specically, in accordance to the model described in Section 3.3, in what follows, we
assume that both the center and the intermediaries have selected their mechanism in
advance and, in the setting studied within this chapter, that buyers strategically select
one of the intermediaries. First, the center announces a reserve price for the good to
be auctioned to the intermediaries who then, based on this information, strategically
select and announce their reserve prices to the population of buyers. Buyers then learn
their private valuations for the good and strategically choose one of the intermediaries
to submit a bid for the good. Intermediaries then run local auctions with their selected
buyers' bids subject to the constraint imposed by their reserve price to determine a
winner, if any, and a payment contingent on winning the good at the central auction,
and then submit a single bid (if there was some qualied bid) to the center. The center
then runs its auction with intermediaries' bids, determines a winning intermediary, if
any, and payment and allocates the good to this intermediary, if there is a winner, who
then allocates the good to his winning local buyer for the pre-determined price.
To this end, in Section 6.1, we study the intermediary selection problem that the buyers
face in a duopoly setting with homogeneous PRE and POST mechanisms and then extend
our analysis for a heterogeneous setting with one PRE and one POST mechanism. Then,
in Section 6.2, we study the intermediaries' and center's best responses given the buyers'
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selection of intermediary. However, for the last problem, we are only able to provide
numerical results for the case of buyers with private valuations i.i.d. drawn from the
uniform distribution U(0;1). Finally, Section 6.3 concludes.
6.1 Buyers' Duopoly Intermediary Selection Problem with
Vickrey Auctioneers
We begin our analysis with the buyers' problem of selecting one of n = 2 intermediaries.
We assume that buyers single-home, i.e. can only select one intermediary. This is for
a variety of reasons. First, in the case of POST mechanisms, bidding in both auctions
means that the winner is likely to pay her bid, creating a number of complications for
the bidding strategies of the buyers. Second, in practice, advertisers tend to select one
intermediary for each type of campaign, since there is an underlying cost of managing
each campaign that we normalize to be zero here. Third, our aim is to study the
competition between intermediaries in nite markets where more than one intermediaries
are present and, advertisers cannot fully multi-home (i.e. select all intermediaries).
We begin our analysis for homogeneous intermediaries, starting with the case of two PRE
intermediaries and then moving to POST intermediaries. We then extend our analysis to
heterogeneous mechanisms, comparing PRE versus POST competition.
6.1.1 Pre-Award Second-Price Sealed-Bid Intermediary Auctions
In accordance with our model description in Chapter 3, we consider a setting with a
unique indivisible good and assume a population of K > n, buyers that compete for this
good, but are allowed to participate only via two qualied intermediaries, sL
PRE;sH
PRE,
that both implement PRE mechanisms with reserve prices rL
PRE  rH
PRE. In this subsec-
tion, we characterize the resulting Bayes-Nash equilibria of the intermediary selection
problem that the buyers face.
Since we are in a probabilistic environment, our equilibrium concept is symmetric Bayes-
Nash, assuming that buyers cannot coordinate, and act anonymously. Keeping the
notation of Chapter 3, we denote by  : V 7! [0;1] the selection strategy of the buyers1,
which is a mapping from a buyer's private valuation to the probability of selecting the
low-reserve intermediary, sL
PRE. Thus, 1   () is the probability that a buyer with
private valuation  selects intermediary sH
PRE. In what follows, we start by providing a
closed-form expression for the surplus from each intermediary that the buyers expect.
1Since we consider symmetric selection strategies, we drop the index from the selection function for
notational convenience, i.e. (i)() = () for all i 2 f1; ;Kg.Chapter 6 Intermediaries with Non-Captive Buyers 133
The expected ex-interim surplus for a buyer with private valuation  from selecting
the low- and high-reserve intermediary, L
PRE();H
PRE() respectively, when rL
PRE <
rH
PRE, can be written as:
L
PRE() =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > :
0 if  2 [0;rL
PRE)
R 
rL
PRE
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy if  2 [rL
PRE;rH
PRE)
(   rL
PRE)F
(K 1)
1 (rL
PRE) +
R rH
PRE
rL
PRE
(   y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+
R 
rH
PRE
(   y)(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+
R 
y2=rH
PRE
R 1
y1=y2 (   y2)(1   (y1))(y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2
if  2 [rH
PRE;1]
(6.1)
H
PRE() =
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
0 if  2 [0;rH
PRE)
(   rH
PRE)F
(K 1)
1 (rH
PRE) +
R 
rH
PRE
(   y)(1   (y))f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+(   rH
PRE)
R rH
PRE
y2=0
R 1
y1=rH
PRE
(y1)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
R 
y2=rH
PRE
R 1
y1=y2 (   y2)(y1)(1   (y2))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2
if  2 [rH
PRE;1]
(6.2)
where F
(K 1)
1 (y) = FK 1(y), f
(K 1)
1 (y) = (K   1)FK 2(y)f(y) are the cumulative
distribution and density functions of the rst-order statistic, and f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2) = (K  
1)(K 2)f(y1)f(y2)FK 3(y2) is the joint density of the rst- and second-order statistics
among K   1 bids.
In more detail, a buyer with valuation in [rH
PRE;1] expects positive surplus from the
low-reserve intermediary auction, sL
PRE, when all opponent bids are less than or equal
to rL
PRE (rst term in (6.1)), or when the expected highest opponent bid over the pop-
ulation of buyers is higher than rL
PRE, lower than her valuation, and is submitted in
the same auction (second and third terms in (6.1)), as this bid will always win at the
center. Finally, she expects positive surplus from sL
PRE when the expected second high-
est opponent bid over the population of buyers is higher than rH
PRE, lower than her
valuation, and is submitted in the same auction, and, at the same time, the expected
highest opponent bid is submitted in the high-reserve intermediary, sH
PRE (fourth term
in (6.1)). This is because the local second-highest bids compete at the center, and hence
her local second-highest bid (which will be the third-highest global bid) is guaranteed
to win against the local second-highest bid in the other auction (which will be at most
the fourth-highest global bid or rH
PRE).
Similarly, a buyer with valuation in [rH
PRE;1] expects positive surplus from the high-
reserve intermediary auction, sH
PRE, when all opponent bids are less than or equal to
rH
PRE (rst term in (6.2)), or when the expected highest opponent bid over the population
of buyers is higher than rH
PRE, lower than her valuation, and is submitted in the same134 Chapter 6 Intermediaries with Non-Captive Buyers
auction (second term in (6.2)). She also expects positive surplus from sH
PRE when the
expected second-highest opponent bid over the population of buyers is higher than rH
PRE,
lower than her valuation, and is submitted in the same auction, and, at the same time,
the expected highest opponent bid is submitted in the low-reserve intermediary auction,
sL
PRE (fourth term in (6.2)). Finally, the third term in (6.2) corresponds to the case
where the expected highest opponent bid is higher than rH
PRE and submitted in sL
PRE,
and, at the same time, the expected second-highest opponent bid is less than rH
PRE.
Then, the buyer's expected payment is rH
PRE, as the forwarded bid by sL
PRE (which will
be at most the third-highest global bid or rL
PRE) will always be less than rH
PRE in this
case.
In the special case where rL
PRE = rH
PRE = rPRE, assuming a fair tie-breaking rule by
the center, the expected ex-interim surplus for a buyer with valuation  from the low-
and high-reserve intermediary, 
Leq
PRE();
Heq
PRE() respectively, can be written as:

Leq
PRE() =
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> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
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+
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(6.3)
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y2=0
R 1
y1=rPRE (y1)f
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   y2)(y1)(1   (y2))f
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(6.4)
The third term in both equations above represents the expected surplus of a buyer when
the highest opponent bid is submitted in the other intermediary, whereas all remaining
bids are less than the reserve price set by the intermediaries. In this case, both inter-
mediaries will submit rPRE at the center, where a fair tie breaking rule yields the same
probability of winning the auction.
In the next theorem, we show that buyers in this case select each intermediary with
equal probability in equilibrium unless both reserve prices are 0 or 1. In the former,
more interesting case, if a buyer selects a dierent intermediary than all other opponent
buyers, he obtains zero surplus. This is because the intermediary submits zero at the
center that can never win against the other intermediary. Formally:
Theorem 6.1. Whenever rL
PRE = rH
PRE = rPRE, randomizing with equal probability is
a mixed-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium for the buyers in the buyer PRE - PRE duopolyChapter 6 Intermediaries with Non-Captive Buyers 135
intermediary selection problem. Moreover, whenever the reserve prices are such that
F(rPRE) = 0 or F(rPRE) = 1, there exists a pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium where
all buyers select either the low-reserve intermediary or the high-reserve intermediary
auction.
Proof. It is easy to see that the only mixed equilibrium strategy () 2 (0;1) equals 1
2
for all  2 [rPRE;1], due to the symmetry of (6.3) and (6.4). For the pure-strategy BNE,
suppose without loss of generality that all (other) buyers select intermediary sL
PRE, i.e.
() = 1 for all  2 [rPRE;1]. Then, the surplus dierence that a buyer with valuation
 2 [rPRE;1] expects will be:

Leq
PRE()   
Heq
PRE() =
Z 
rPRE
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy   (   rPRE)[
K   1
2
FK 2(rPRE) 
 
K   3
2
FK 1(rPRE)] (6.5)
The second partial derivative of this function w.r.t.  is:
@2
@2(
eq
1 ()   
eq
2 ()) = (K   1)FK 2()f()  0 (6.6)
This means that the function is convex, so its global minimum at a valuation we denote
c will satisfy the FOC:
FK 1(c) =
K   1
2
FK 2(rPRE)  
K   3
2
FK 1(rPRE) (6.7)
For the existence of a pure-strategy BNE, we need to show that 
eq
1 (c)   
eq
2 (c)  0.
Using (6.7), this means that
R c
rPRE FK 1(y)dy  FK 1(c)(c   rPRE). However, from
the rst mean value theorem for integration,
R c
rPRE FK 1(y)dy = FK 1(!)(c   rPRE),
where rPRE < ! < c. So, we would have that FK 1(!)(c   rPRE)  FK 1(c)(c  
rPRE), which can only happen for c = rPRE, since f > 0 ) F(!) < F(c). Using this
last fact in (6.7) yields:
FK 1(rPRE) =
K   1
2
FK 2(rPRE)  
K   3
2
FK 1(rPRE) =)
=) F(rPRE) = 0 or F(rPRE) = 1 (6.8)
Similarly, when all (other) buyers select intermediary sH
PRE, i.e. () = 0 for all  2
[rPRE;1], we reach at the same conclusion due to the symmetry in (6.3) and (6.4).
In what follows, we will consider the most interesting cases where rL
PRE is strictly lower
than rH
PRE. In more detail, in the next section we will show that, when the reserve prices
are suciently dierent, a unique pure-strategy BNE arises where all buyers select the
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6.1.1.1 Pure-Strategy Bayes-Nash Equilibria
We start by proving the existence of a pure-strategy BNE in the PRE - PRE intermediary
selection problem where all buyers select sL
PRE:
Theorem 6.2. There exists a pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the buyer PRE
- PRE duopoly intermediary selection problem where all buyers select the low-reserve
auction if the reserve price of the low-reserve intermediary, rL
PRE, is lower or equal than
a critical value rc (rL
PRE  rc < rH
PRE) satisfying:
Z c
rc
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy = F
(K 1)
1 (c)(c   rH
PRE) (6.9)
where c is such that:
F
(K 1)
1 (c) = FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))] (6.10)
Proof. Consider the case that all (other) buyers select the low-reserve intermediary auc-
tion, that is () = 1 for all  2 [rL
PRE;1]. Then, using equations (6.1) and (6.2), we
can write the dierence in surplus that a buyer with valuation  2 [rH
PRE;1] expects as:
L
PRE()   H
PRE() =
Z 
rL
PRE
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy 
[F
(K 1)
1 (rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))F
(K 2)
1 (rH
PRE)](   rH
PRE) (6.11)
We can derive the rst- and second-order partial derivatives of this function with respect
to :
@
@
(L
PRE()   H
PRE()) = F
(K 1)
1 ()   [F
(K 1)
1 (rH
PRE)+
+ (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))F
(K 2)
1 (rH
PRE)] (6.12)
@2
@2(L
PRE()   H
PRE()) = f
(K 1)
1 ()  0 (6.13)
This means that the function is convex, so its global minimum at a valuation we denote
c will satisfy the condition:
@
@
(L
PRE(c)   H
PRE(c)) = 0 =)
=) F
(K 1)
1 (c) = F
(K 1)
1 (rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))F
(K 2)
1 (rH
PRE) (6.14)
For this to be a pure-strategy BNE, we require that L
PRE(c)   H
PRE(c)  0. The
equality L
PRE(c)   H
PRE(c) = 0 gives us an upper bound for rL
PRE, which we call
the critical reserve price, rc. As can be seen from (6.14), 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rH
PRE. Additionally, L
PRE   H
PRE is a decreasing function of rL
PRE (see (6.11)). This
means that, for a given rH
PRE, setting rL
PRE = rc + , where  > 0 is a strictly positive
quantity, L
PRE(c)   H
PRE(c)  0. This bound is strict if F() is strictly increasing.
On the other hand, setting rL
PRE = rc    gives a non-negative surplus dierence, i.e.
L
PRE(c)   H
PRE(c)  0. So, a pure-strategy BNE exists for any rL
PRE  rc.
To illustrate the above theorem, Figure 6.1 depicts the reserve-price combinations for
which the pure-strategy BNE exists for a uniform distribution F = U(0;1), and for vary-
ing numbers of buyers, where equations (6.9) - (6.10) give us the following condition2:
(1   K)[rH
PRE
K 1
+ (K   1)(1   rH
PRE)rH
PRE
K 2
]
K
K 1 + KrH
PRE[rH
PRE
K 1
+
(K   1)(1   rH
PRE)rH
PRE
K 2
]   rK
c = 0 (6.15)
Here, the top frontier of each region corresponds to the critical reserve price, rc. As can
be seen, for the pure-strategy BNE where all buyers go to the low-reserve intermediary to
exist, the required dierence between the reserve prices has to be quite large when rH
PRE
is relatively low, but the required minimum dierence rapidly becomes smaller as rH
PRE
increases. Moreover, as the number of buyers increases, the minimum dierence between
the reserve prices signicantly increases, and the region where the pure-strategy BNE
exists shrinks. In what follows, we prove, through a number of steps, that the equilibria
of Theorem 6.2 are the only pure-strategy BNE of the intermediary selection problem.
First, we show that it is not a pure-strategy BNE for the buyers to always select the
high-reserve intermediary.
Theorem 6.3. There is no pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the buyer PRE - PRE
duopoly intermediary selection problem where all buyers always select the high-reserve
intermediary.
Proof. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 6.2, when other buyers select the high-reserve
intermediary auction, the dierence in expected surplus for a buyer with valuation  2
[rH
PRE;1] will be:
H
PRE() L
PRE() =
Z 
rH
PRE
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy 
Z rH
PRE
rL
PRE
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy ( rH
PRE)F
(K 1)
1 (rH
PRE)
(6.16)
By taking the rst- and second-order derivative, we get:
@
@
(H
PRE()   L
PRE()) = F
(K 1)
1 ()   F
(K 1)
1 (rH
PRE) (6.17)
2Solving (6.10) for c yields c = [r
H
PRE
K 1
+(K 1)(1 r
H
PRE)r
H
PRE
K 2
]
1
K 1. Then K(
L
PRE(c) 

H
PRE(c)) = 
K
c  r
K
c  K[r
H
PRE
K 1
+(K  1)(1 r
H
PRE)r
H
PRE
K 2
]c+Kr
H
PRE[r
H
PRE
K 1
+(K  1)(1 
r
H
PRE)r
H
PRE
K 2
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Proof. We prove this statement by contradiction. Specically, if such equilibrium strate-
gies existed, they should have the form () = +1 2 f0;1g, for  2 [w;w+1),
 = 1;:::;m + 1 such that L
PRE(w) = H
PRE(w) and  6= +1, so the w are points
where buyers change their selection strategies.
A buyer whose private valuation equals rH
PRE expects positive surplus from the low-
reserve intermediary and zero surplus from the high-reserve intermediary. This means
that (rH
PRE) = 1 = 1. Given that L
PRE;H
PRE are continuous functions of , it will be
true that 1 = 1 for all  2 [rH
PRE;w1). This means that +1 = 1 for even  and +1 = 0
for odd . For a pure-strategy BNE to exist, we require that L
PRE()   H
PRE()  0
when +1 = 1, and L
PRE() H
PRE()  0 otherwise. We have to consider two cases,
when m = 1 and m  2. This is because, as will be seen, for such equilibrium strategies
to exist, there should be discontinuities within the intervals dened by two successive
cut-o points. This cannot happen with only two cut-o points.
- Single cut-o point (m = 1).
Let us start with the case that m = 1, i.e. there exists a single cut-o point. Since
we are interested in pure-strategy BNE ( 2 f0;1g,  = 1;2), this means that 2 = 0.
For this to be a pure-strategy BNE, we need that (L
PRE   H
PRE)(rH
PRE   < w)  0
and (H
PRE   L
PRE)(w    1)  0. Then the dierence in expected surplus for
 2 [rH
PRE;w) and  2 [w;1] can be written as:
Dl = (L
PRE   H
PRE)(rH
PRE   < w) =
Z 
rL
PRE
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy   (   rH
PRE)F
(K 1)
1 (rH
PRE) 
  (K   1)(   rH
PRE)(1   F(rH
PRE))F
(K 2)
1 (rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(w))
Z 
rH
PRE
F
(K 2)
1 (y)dy
(6.19)
Dh = (H
PRE   L
PRE)(  w) =  
Z w
rL
PRE
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy +
Z 
w
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+ (   rH
PRE)F
(K 1)
1 (rH
PRE)   2(   w)F
(K 1)
1 (w)+
+ (K   1)(   rH
PRE)(F(w)   F(rH
PRE))F
(K 2)
1 (rH
PRE) 
  (K   1)(1   F(w))[(   w)F
(K 2)
1 (w)   (   rH
PRE)F
(K 2)
1 (rH
PRE) +
Z w
rH
PRE
F
(K 2)
1 (y)dy]
(6.20)
Let us take the rst- and second-order derivatives of equations (6.19) and (6.20) (the
second-order derivatives can only be dened for [r2;w) [ (w;1]):
@Dl
@
= F
(K 1)
1 ()   F
(K 1)
1 (rH
PRE)   (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))F
(K 2)
1 (rH
PRE)+
+ (K   1)(1   F(w))F
(K 2)
1 (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@2Dl
@2 = f
(K 1)
1 () + (K   1)(1   F(w))f
(K 2)
1 ()  0 (6.22)
@Dh
@
= F
(K 1)
1 () + F
(K 1)
1 (rH
PRE)   2F
(K 1)
1 (w) + (K   1)(F(w)   F(rH
PRE))F
(K 2)
1 (rH
PRE) 
  (K   1)(1   F(w))[F
(K 2)
1 (w)   F
(K 2)
1 (rH
PRE)] (6.23)
@2Dh
@2 = f
(K 1)
1 ()  0 (6.24)
Given that both Dl;Dh are convex, for the existence of pure-strategy BNE, it will
be that
@Dl
@  0;8 2 [rH
PRE;w) and
@Dh
@  0;8 2 [w;1]. Moreover, given that
@Dl
@ j=w =
@Dh
@ j=w, they should both be equal to zero. Since the surplus dierence at
w should be zero, w must solve the following system of equations;
@Dh
@
j=w = 0 =) F
(K 1)
1 (w)   F
(K 1)
1 (rH
PRE)   (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))F
(K 2)
1 (rH
PRE)+
+ (K   1)(1   F(w))F
(K 2)
1 (w) = 0 (6.25)
(L
PRE   H
PRE)(w) = 0 =)
Z w
rL
PRE
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy   (w   rH
PRE)F
(K 1)
1 (rH
PRE) 
  (K   1)(w   rH
PRE)(1   F(rH
PRE))F
(K 2)
1 (rH
PRE)+
+ (K   1)(1   F(w))
Z w
rH
PRE
F
(K 2)
1 (y)dy = 0 (6.26)
Equation (6.25) gives the following condition (w is a global minimum):
F
(K 1)
1 (w) + (K   1)(1   F(w))F
(K 2)
1 (w) = F
(K 1)
1 (rH
PRE)+
+ (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))F
(K 2)
1 (rH
PRE) (6.27)
However, the function xK 1 + (K   1)(1   x)xK 2 is strictly increasing for 0 < x < 1,
so the only valid case is when F(w) = F(rH
PRE), which means that w = rH
PRE where
one can easily show that the dierence is strictly positive for rL
PRE < rH
PRE. Hence, this
cannot constitute an equilibrium.
- Multiple cut-o points (m  2).
We now continue with the case of m  2 cut-o points. We can write again the dierence
in expected surplus L
PRE   H
PRE for valuations  2 [rH
PRE;w1),  2 [w;w+1), for
 = 1;:::;m   1, and  2 [wk;1], along with their rst- and second-order derivatives3
(see Section B.1.1 in Appendix B for the derivation). Then, the second-order derivative
3For all double integrals, the outer part refers to y2 and the inner part to y1.Chapter 6 Intermediaries with Non-Captive Buyers 141
of the expected surplus dierence in every interval is:
@2(L
PRE   H
PRE)(rH
PRE   < w)
@2 = f
(K 1)
1 ()+
+ (K   1)[
m 1 X
i=1

(1   i+1)(F(wi+1)   F(wi))

+ (1   m+1)(1   F(wk))]f
(K 2)
1 ()  0
(6.28)
@2(L
PRE   H
PRE)(w   < w+1)
@2 = (2+1   1)f
(K 1)
1 ()+
+ (K   1)[
m 1 X
i=+1

(+1   i+1)(F(wi+1)   F(wi))

+
+ (+1   m+1)(1   F(wk))]f
(K 2)
1 () (6.29)
@2(L
PRE   H
PRE)(wk    1)
@2 = (2m+1   1)f
(K 1)
1 () (6.30)
From equations (6.28), (6.29), (6.30), we can see that, when +1 = 1, the dierence in
expected surplus is a convex function, whereas when +1 = 0 a concave function of .
For this to be an equilibrium, we should have L
PRE H
PRE > 0 in the decreasing convex
interval [rH
PRE;w1) followed by the concave interval [w1;w2) where L
PRE   H
PRE < 0,
then by the convex interval [w2;w3) where L
PRE   H
PRE > 0 and so on, as shown
in a sketch of the prot dierence of Figure 6.2. For this to happen (i.e. concave
negative values followed by convex positive ones), given that we start from a positive
convex interval, the function should have discontinuities in the local optima in every
intermediate interval [w;w+1),  = 1;:::;m   1. However, one can easily see that
the function is dierentiable everywhere inside each interval, contradicting the initial
statement. This means that there cannot be a pure-strategy BNE with m  2 cut-o
points, which ends our proof.
From theorems 6.3 and 6.4, we derive the following corollary.
Corollary 6.5. The equilibrium of Theorem 6.2 is the unique pure-strategy Bayes-Nash
equilibrium of the buyer PRE - PRE duopoly intermediary selection problem subject to
the conditions of equations (6.9) and (6.10) that the intermediaries' reserve prices must
satisfy.
Proof. The nonexistence results of theorems 6.3 - 6.4 show the uniqueness of the pure-
strategy BNE attained by Theorem 6.2, where, additionally equations (6.9) and (6.10)
provide the necessary conditions for its existence.142 Chapter 6 Intermediaries with Non-Captive Buyers
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Figure 6.2: Figure showing the form of the dierence of expected surplus, L
PRE  
H
PRE, under pure-strategy BNE involving multiple (here m = 3) cut-o points. As
shown, in this sketch of the surplus dierence function, there should be discontinuities
at the local optima of this function.
This fact has serious implications for the buyers, who, in contrast to the complete-
information scenario (Stavrogiannis et al., 2013a), have an incentive to select the low-
reserve intermediary, given that the dierence between the reserve prices is large enough.
However, as Figure 6.1 shows, the pure-strategy BNE of Theorem 6.2 are not the only
BNE of the intermediary selection problem. Since no pure-strategy equilibrium exists
when the condition of Theorem 6.2 does not hold, buyers should follow mixed strategies
in equilibrium. Given this observation, in the next section we will identify the mixed-
strategy BNE of the problem in question.
6.1.1.2 Mixed-Strategy Bayes-Nash Equilibria
As has been discussed in the previous section, when the reserve prices do not satisfy
the conditions of Theorem 6.2, buyers will follow a mixed strategy m() 2 (0;1) at an
appropriate interval in equilibrium. Buyers whose valuations are slightly higher than
rH
PRE will always select the low-reserve intermediary where they expect strictly positive
surplus, in contrast to the high-reserve intermediary auction where their expected surplus
is arbitrarily close to zero. This means that there will be at least a single cut-o point,
w 2 (rH
PRE;1], so that buyers with valuations in [rH
PRE;w) always select sL
PRE. We will
now show that their strategy will include a second, higher cut-o point a 2 (w;1] so that
buyers with valuations  2 [w;a] randomize with a certain probability m() between
the intermediaries, whereas buyers with valuations  2 (a;1] follow pure strategies
() 2 f0;1g. The following lemma provides the conditions that the mixed strategy,
m(), should satisfy.
Lemma 6.6. Let  : V 7! [0;1] be a mixed-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium prole
involving an interval [w;a]  (rH
PRE;1], where (i) = m(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i = 1;:::;K. Then m() satises the condition:
[2F(i) + (K   2)(1   F(i))]m(i) = (K   2)[
Z a
i
m(y)f(y)dy +
Z 1
a
(y)dy] + F(i)
(6.31)
Proof. Suppose that buyers follow a pure strategy () = p() for all  2 [rH
PRE;w),
then follow a mixed strategy () = m() 2 (0;1) for all  2 [w;a] and then follow
again a pure strategy () = () for all  2 (a;1], i.e. the selection strategy involves an
interval [w;a] where buyers randomize between the two intermediary auctions. Then,
for the existence of a mixed-strategy BNE, L
PRE()   H
PRE() as well as all of its
higher-order derivatives should be zero4 for all  2 [w;a]. Under this assumption, the
second-order derivative of the surplus dierence for a buyer with valuation  in [w;a]
can be written as (see Section B.1.2 in Appendix B):
@2(L
PRE()   H
PRE())
@2 = (K   1)FK 3()f()

[2F() + (K   2)(1   F()]m() 
  F()   (K   2)[
Z a

m(y)f(y)dy +
Z 1
a
(y)dy]

(6.32)
where setting
@2(L
PRE() H
PRE())
@2 = 0 gives the condition of (6.31). We should note that
the form of (6.32) is independent of our assumptions on the form of the pure strategies
in [rH
PRE;w) and (a;1], i.e. as long as there is an interval where buyers will randomize,
(6.32) will always hold in this interval.
Equation (6.31) is a Volterra integral equation of the second kind (Corduneanu, 1991).
However, solving it requires, in general, knowledge of the distribution function. Hence,
the form of the selection function will depend on our assumption about the valuations,
parametrized by the values of a (and K). Nevertheless, when a = 1, (6.31) has a solution
() = 1
2 for all   w. This strategy is identical to the one proposed by Burguet and
S akovics for two independent auctions (Burguet and S akovics, 1999) (see Section 2.5).
Substituting the proposed (), L
PRE() H
PRE(), when   w, will have the following
form:
L
PRE()   H
PRE() =
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy +
K   1
2
(1   F(w))
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy+
+ rH
PRE[(K   1)FK 2(rH
PRE)   (K   2)FK 1(rH
PRE)] + w[
K   3
2
FK 1(w) 
 
K   1
2
FK 2(w)] + [(K   2)FK 1(rH
PRE)   (K   1)FK 2(rH
PRE) 
 
K   3
2
FK 1(w) +
K   1
2
FK 2(w)] (6.33)
4Setting all derivatives of the surplus dierence equal to zero yields necessary but not sucient
conditions for the existence of the equilibrium.144 Chapter 6 Intermediaries with Non-Captive Buyers
For this to be a BNE for all   w, w must make both the rst-order and zero-order
coecients of this polynomial zero. However, this cannot be true but for a single pair
of reserve prices at most: in the zero-order coecient, w is uniquely dened by both
rL
PRE;rH
PRE, whereas in the rst-order it only depends on rH
PRE. So, given that the
system of equations is under-dened, w cannot be the solution of both equations for all
valid pairs of rL
PRE;rH
PRE. This means that there should be at least one more cut-o
point, a  1.
We have shown that there should be at least two cut-o points, w, a, so that buyers with
valuations in [rH
PRE;w) and (a;1] follow pure strategies. We continue by showing that
there can only be a single cut-o point, w 2 (rH
PRE;1], before and at most a single cut-o
point, a 2 (w;1], after randomizing, where w, a are such that L
PRE(w) = H
PRE(w),
L
PRE(a) = H
PRE(a), and (rH
PRE   < w) = 1, (w    a) = m() 2 (0;1),
(a <   1) 2 f0;1g.
Lemma 6.7. The PRE - PRE duopoly intermediary selection strategy of a buyer in a
mixed-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium involves at most three intervals in the support of
the buyers' private valuations dened by two cut-o points, w 2 (rH
PRE;1], a 2 (w;1]:
buyers with private valuations in [rH
PRE;w) and (a;1] follow strictly pure Bayes-Nash
equilibrium strategies whereas buyers with private valuations in [w;a] follow strictly
mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategies.
Proof. As has been mentioned at the beginning of this section, there will be at least
a single cut-o point, w 2 (rH
PRE;1], so that buyers with valuations in [rH
PRE;w) will
always select the low-reserve intermediary, expecting surplus arbitrarily close to zero
from the high-reserve intermediary. This means that always 1 = 1. Using a similar
reasoning as in Theorem 6.4, we can rst show that there can only be one cut-o point,
w, before randomizing by taking the second-order derivative of the expected surplus
dierence, L
PRE() H
PRE(), from the two intermediaries at any interval [w;w+1),
 = 0;:::;0   1, where, for notational convenience, we denote rH
PRE = w0, and showing
that the selection function +1 controls the convexity of this dierence. More specif-
ically, if we do not assume anything about the pure strategy after randomizing, i.e.
() = () for all  2 (a;1], the second-order derivative of this dierence is (see
Section B.1.3 in Appendix B for the derivation):
@2(L
PRE   H
PRE)(w   < w+1)
@2 = (K   1)FK 3()f()f(2+1   1)F()+
+ (K   2)[
0 1 X
i=+1

(+1   i+1)(F(wi+1)   F(wi))

+ +1(1   F(w0)) 
 
Z a
w0
m(y)f(y)dy  
Z 1
a
(y)f(y)dy]g (6.34)Chapter 6 Intermediaries with Non-Captive Buyers 145
This means that when +1 = 1, the corresponding surplus dierence is convex, whereas
when +1 = 0, it is concave. This means that for the existence of a mixed-strategy
BNE with multiple (0  2) cut-o points before randomizing, the surplus dierence
for  2 [rH
PRE;w0
) will consist of non-negative convex intervals followed by non-positive
concave intervals, which cannot happen unless there are discontinuities at the local op-
tima (Figure 6.2), a fact which is not supported by the well-dened rst-order derivative,
so there can only be a single cut-o point w before randomizing.
Similarly, if there are m0  2 cut-o points, ai, after randomizing so that () = 
 2
f0;1g for valuations  2 [a;a+1),  = 1;:::;m0 (with am+1 = 1), and 
i 6= 
j for
ji   jj = 1;i;j = 1;:::;m0, then the second-order derivative of the dierence in expected
surplus,
@2(L
PRE H
PRE)
@2 , for  2 [a;a+1) will be (see Section B.1.4 in Appendix B for
the derivation):
@2(L
PRE   H
PRE)(a   < a+1)
@2 = (K   1)FK 3()f()[(2
   1)F()+
(K   2)
m0 X
i=+1
(
   
i)(F(ai+1)   F(ai))] (6.35)
Again, the selection strategy controls the convexity of the surplus dierence. More
specically, if 
 = 1 (
 = 0 respectively), the function in the corresponding interval is
convex (concave respectively) and we would then have a series of non-negative convex
surplus dierence intervals followed by non-positive concave alternating intervals if 
1 =
1, or the opposite when 
1 = 0. This means that there should be discontinuities at the
local optima of the corresponding intervals, which is in contrast with the well dened
rst-order derivative of L
PRE   H
PRE, and hence there can be at most a single cut-o
point a in (w;1].
Lemma 6.7 thus implies that the mixed-strategy equilibrium selection of the buyers will
involve three intervals dened by two cut-o points: buyers with valuations in the rst
interval always select the low-reserve intermediary, buyers with valuations in the middle
interval will randomize between the intermediary with a probability that is given by the
solution to (6.31), and buyers whose valuations lie in the third interval will also follow
a pure strategy. We formalize this nding in the following theorem where we also give
the conditions that w and a should satisfy.
Theorem 6.8. Let  : V 7! [0;1] be a strategy prole where (i) = 1 if rH
PRE  i < w,
(i) = m(i) if w  i  a, and (i) =  2 f0;1g if a < i  1, for each buyer i,
i = 1;:::;K, where m() satises the condition:
[2F(i)+(K  2)(1 F(i))]m(i) = (K  2)[
Z a
i
m(y)f(y)dy +(1 F(a))]+F(i)
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and w;a are given by:
FK 2(w)
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy   FK 1(w)
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy = [(w   rH
PRE)FK 2(w) 
 
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy]FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))] (6.37)
FK 2(w)

F(w) + (K   1)[1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy 
  (1   F(a))]

= FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))] (6.38)
Then, () is a unique mixed-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium prole of the buyer PRE -
PRE duopoly intermediary selection problem.
Proof. Equation (6.36) can be directly derived from Lemmas 6.6 and 6.7, where we have
used the fact that there can only be a single w and a. Given that this makes the surplus
dierence a linear function of the valuation, for the existence of a mixed-strategy BNE,
both the surplus dierence and its rst-order derivative should be zero for all  2 [w;a].
We will continue by writing the dierence in expected surplus, L
PRE() - H
PRE(),
as well as its rst-order condition (
@(L
PRE H
PRE)()
@ = 0), for a buyer with valuation
 2 [w;a] (for the derivation see Section B.1.5 in Appendix B), and then use the fact
that L
PRE(w)   H
PRE(w) = 0 and
@(L
PRE H
PRE)()
@ j=w = 0 to get the conditions for
w and a:
(L
PRE   H
PRE)(w    a) =
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy  
Z 
w
FK 1(y)dy 
  (   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE)+
+ (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))] + (   w)FK 2(w)[2F(w) + (K   1)(1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy)]+
+ (K   1)
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy[1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy   (1   F(a))] 
  (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
w
FK 2(y)dy + (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy+
+ 2
Z 
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy +
Z 
w
Z a
y2
(   y2)(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2
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@(L
PRE   H
PRE)(w    a)
@
= 0 =) FK 2()[F() + (K   1)(1   F(a))] =
= FK 2(w)[2F(w) + (K   1)(1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy)] 
  FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))]+
+ 2
Z 
w
m(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy + (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
w
m(y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy+
+
Z 
w
Z a
y2
(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 (6.40)
This should also be true at w, where the last equation above yields:
FK 2(w)[F(w) + (K   1)(1   F(a))] = FK 2(w)[2F(w) + (K   1)(1   F(w) 
 
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy)]   FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))] (6.41)
Given this last condition, (6.39) becomes:
(L
PRE   H
PRE)(w    a) =
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy + (K   1)
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy[1   F(w) 
 
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy   (1   F(a))] + rH
PREFK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))] 
  wFK 2(w)[2F(w) + (K   1)(1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy)]  
Z 
w
FK 1(y)dy 
  (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
w
FK 2(y)dy   2
Z 
w
ym(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy 
  (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
w
ym(y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy 
 
Z 
w
Z a
y2
y2(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+ FK 2()[F() + (K   1)(1   F(a))] (6.42)
Substituting for  = w yields:
(L
PRE   H
PRE)(w) = 0 =)
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy + (K   1)
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy[1   F(w) 
 
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy   (1   F(a))] =
= (w   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))] (6.43)
The system of equations (6.41) and (6.43) provides the conditions that w and a should
jointly satisfy. However, we can eliminate a from these equations and get a solution for148 Chapter 6 Intermediaries with Non-Captive Buyers
w that is independent of the former:
FK 2(w)
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy   FK 1(w)
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy = [(w   rH
PRE)FK 2(w) 
 
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy]FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))] (6.44)
and then nd a by substituting the w found in any of the equations (6.41) or (6.43).
We have reasoned about the existence of these cut-o points (due to Theorem 6.2 and
equation (6.33) respectively). To show that the w and a found are unique, we rearrange
(6.37) and (6.38):
Hw = FK 2(w)
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy   FK 1(w)
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy   [(w   rH
PRE)FK 2(w) 
 
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy]FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))] (6.45)
Ha = FK 2(w)[F(w) + (K   1)(1   F(w))]   FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE)+
+ (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))]   (K   1)FK 2(w)[
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy + (1   F(a))] (6.46)
Taking the rst-order derivative of (6.45) with respect to w yields:
@Hw
@w
= (K   2)FK 3(w)f(w)
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy   (w   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE)+
+ (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))]

  (K   1)FK 2(w)f(w)
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy (6.47)
which is strictly negative, given that
R w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy (w rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE)+
(K  1)(1 F(rH
PRE))] < 0 as can be directly derived from (6.43), which means that the
solution for w is unique.
Similarly, taking the rst-order derivative of (6.46) with respect to a yields:
@Ha
@a
=  (K   1)FK 2(w)f(a)[m(a)   ] (6.48)
which is either strictly positive when  = 1 or strictly negative when  = 0. Fi-
nally, uniqueness of solution to (6.36) is guaranteed because this integral equation can
be transformed to a rst-order linear dierential equation with continuous coecients
(existence and uniqueness theorem5).
5According to this theorem, \if the functions h and g are continuous on an open interval, I, containing
the initial value point x = x0, then there exists a unique function y = (x) that satises the dierential
equation y
0 + h(x)y = g(x) for each x 2 I, and that also satises the initial condition y(x0) = y0, where
y0 is an arbitrary prescribed initial value" (Theorem 2:4:1 in (Boyce and DiPrima, 2009)).Chapter 6 Intermediaries with Non-Captive Buyers 151
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Figure 6.5: Figure showing BNE for the buyers' PRE - PRE intermediary selection
problem when there are K = 5 buyers whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from
U(0;1). There are three distinct regions for the reserve prices: (i) pure-strategy BNE:
buyers always select the low-reserve intermediary (right), (ii) mixed-strategy BNE:
buyers with valuations in [rH
PRE;w) select the low-reserve intermediary, buyers with
valuations in [w;a] randomize between the intermediaries, and buyers with valuations
in (a;1] either select the low-reserve intermediary (center) or select the high-reserve
intermediary (left).
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Figure 6.6: Figure showing BNE for the buyers' PRE - PRE intermediary selection
problem when there are K = 10 buyers whose valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
There are three distinct regions for the reserve prices: (i) pure-strategy BNE: buyers
always select the low-reserve intermediary (right), (ii) mixed-strategy BNE: buyers with
valuations in [rH
PRE;w) select the low-reserve intermediary, buyers with valuations in
[w;a] randomize between the intermediaries, and buyers with valuations in (a;1] either
select the low-reserve intermediary (center) or select the high-reserve intermediary (left).152 Chapter 6 Intermediaries with Non-Captive Buyers
As before, let  : V 7! [0;1] denote the selection strategy of the buyers, which is a
mapping from a buyer's private valuation to the probability of selecting the low-reserve
intermediary, sL
POST, so 1   () is the probability that the buyer selects intermediary
sH
POST. Then, the expected ex-interim surplus for a buyer with private valuation 
from selecting the low- and high-reserve intermediary, L
POST();H
POST() respectively,
when rL
POST  rH
POST, can be written as:
L
POST() =
8
<
:
0 if  2 [0;rL
POST)
R 
rL
POST
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy if  2 [rL
POST;1]
(6.52)
H
PRE() =
8
<
:
0 if  2 [0;rH
POST)
R 
rH
POST
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy if  2 [rH
POST;1]
(6.53)
More specically, a buyer in each intermediary's auction expects to pay the intermedi-
ary's reserve price, if all buyers have valuations below the latter reserve price, or pays
the highest opponent bid if this is not the case, irrespective of where this opponent bid
is placed. Hence, whenever rL
POST < rH
POST, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 6.9. Whenever rL
POST < rH
POST, it is a weakly dominant strategy for a
buyer to select the low-reserve intermediary in the buyer POST - POST duopoly interme-
diary selection problem.
In fact, the aforementioned result generalizes to any number of intermediaries:
Proposition 6.10. Whenever r1
POST < r2
POST < ::: < rn
POST, it is a weakly dominant
strategy for a buyer to select the lowest-reserve intermediary in the n-POST intermediary
selection problem, n 2 N+;n  2.
Given that the expected surplus of a buyer is independent of the decisions of her op-
ponent buyers, when rL
POST = rH
POST = rPOST, her ex-interim expected surplus from
the two intermediaries is the same, i.e. 
Leq
POST() = 
Heq
POST() =
R 
r F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy. This
means that our model's prediction of the buyers' selection becomes limited.
Proposition 6.11. Whenever rL
POST = rH
POST, there are an innite number of equilibria
in weakly dominant strategies of the buyer POST - POST duopoly intermediary selection
problem.
Similar to the previous results, Proposition 6.11 generalizes to the case of n POST inter-
mediaries.
Finally, we turn our attention to the intermediary selection problem of buyers when
one intermediary implements a PRE whereas the other implements a POST intermediary
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6.1.3 Pre-Award versus Post-Award Intermediary Auctions
We now consider the duopoly competition between two intermediaries with reserve
prices, one implementing a PRE and the other a POST mechanism. As before, we study
the more interesting case where a population of K > n buyers select one of two inter-
mediaries sPRE, sPOST that implement a PRE and POST mechanism respectively.
We rst consider the special case where both intermediaries set the same reserve price
r. Then a buyer with private valuation   r expects surplus from the PRE intermediary
that can be expressed as:

eq
PRE() = (   r)FK 1(r) +
Z 
r
(   y)(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy (6.54)
That is, the buyer expects positive surplus when all other buyers' valuations are below
r (rst term) or when the highest opponent bid is less than the buyer's bid and is
submitted in the same intermediary auction (second term). On the other hand, the
expected surplus from the POST intermediary is:

eq
POST() = (   r)FK 1(r) + (   r)
Z r
0
Z 1
r
(y1)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z 
r
(   y)(1   (y))f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+
Z 
r
Z 1
y2
(   y2)(y1)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 (6.55)
That is, the buyer expects positive surplus when all other buyers' valuations are below
r (rst term) or when there is only one buyer with bid above r submitted in the other
intermediary auction (second term), paying the center's reserve price, r. Moreover,
the buyer pays the highest opponent bid when it is below  and submitted in the
same auction (third term) as well as the second-highest opponent bid, wherever this is
submitted, as long as it is above r, below , and, at the same time, the highest opponent
bid is submitted in the opponent intermediary. This leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 6.12. There exists a unique equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies in the
buyer PRE - POST duopoly intermediary selection problem where all buyers select the
intermediary implementing a POST auction, when the other intermediary implements a
PRE auction if both intermediaries set the same reserve price.154 Chapter 6 Intermediaries with Non-Captive Buyers
Proof. Taking the dierence of the expected surplus from both intermediaries yields:

eq
POST()   
eq
PRE() = (K   1)(   r)FK 2(r)
Z 1
r
(y)f(y)dy+
+
Z 
r
(   y)(1   2(y))f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+
Z 
r
Z 1
y2
(   y2)(y1)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 (6.56)
The partial derivative of this dierence w.r.t.  is:
@
eq
POST()   
eq
PRE()
@
= (K   1)FK 2(r)
Z 1
r
(y)f(y)dy+
+
Z 
r
(1   2(y))f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy +
Z 
r
Z 1
y2
(y1)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 (6.57)
However, we can write:
Z 
r
Z 1
y2
(y1)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 =
Z 
r
Z 
y2
(y1)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z 
r
Z 1

(y1)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 =
= (K   1)[FK 2()
Z 1

(y)f(y)dy   FK 2(r)
Z 1
r
(y)f(y)dy]+
+
Z 
r
(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy (6.58)
Hence, equation (6.57) can be written as:
@
eq
POST()   
eq
PRE()
@
= (K   1)FK 2()
Z 1

(y)f(y)dy+
+
Z 
r
(1   (y))f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy  0 (6.59)
Hence, given that 
eq
POST(r) = 
eq
PRE(r) and 
eq
POST() grows faster than 
eq
PRE() for
every  > r, it should always be 
eq
POST() > 
eq
PRE(), so the only equilibrium strategy
is (y) = 0.
Having derived the equilibrium selection strategies of the buyers for equal intermediary
reserve prices, we now move to the more general case when one intermediary sets a lower
reserve price than the other. Let us start with the rst case where the POST intermediary
sets a reserve price rL
POST < rH
PRE, where rH
PRE is the PRE intermediary's reserve price.
In this case, the ex-interim expected surplus of a buyer with valuation 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and PRE intermediary, L
POST;H
PRE respectively, can be expressed as:
L
POST() =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
0 if  2 [0;rL
POST)
R 
rL
POST
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy if  2 [rL
POST;rH
PRE)
(   rL
POST)F
(K 1)
1 (rL
POST)+
+(   rH
PRE)
R rH
PRE
y2=0
R 1
y1=rH
PRE
(1   (y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
R rH
PRE
rL
POST
(   y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy +
R 
rH
PRE
(   y)(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+
R 
y2=rH
PRE
R 1
y1=y2 (   y2)(1   (y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2
if  2 [rH
PRE;1]
(6.60)
H
PRE() =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 if  2 [0;rH
PRE)
(   rH
PRE)F
(K 1)
1 (rH
PRE) +
R 
rH
PRE
(   y)(1   (y))f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy
if  2 [rH
PRE;1]
(6.61)
That is, a buyer with valuation   rH
PRE that selects the low-reserve POST mechanism
pays the latter his reserve price, rL
POST, when all other bids are below this reserve price
(rst term in (6.60)), while she pays the high reserve price, rH
PRE, when the highest
opponent bid is higher than rH
PRE and is submitted in the PRE intermediary and, at
the same time, the second-highest opponent bid, lower than rH
PRE, is submitted in her
selected intermediary (second term in (6.60)). She also pays the highest opponent bid
if it is submitted in the POST mechanism (third and fourth terms in (6.60)) and the
second-highest opponent bid if it is higher than rH
PRE, lower than her bid, and, at the
same time, the highest opponent bid is submitted in the PRE intermediary auction.
On the other hand, if she selects the high-reserve PRE mechanism, she pays the latter's
reserve price if all opponent bids are below this reserve price (rst term in (6.61)), and
pays the highest opponent bid, if it is higher than rH
PRE, lower than her bid, and is
submitted in the same intermediary (second term in (6.61)).
Having expressed the expected ex-interim surplus of a buyer from the two intermediaries,
we can now derive the resulting equilibria of the intermediary selection problem in this
setting, namely that there is a unique equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies where
all buyers select the low-reserve POST intermediary:
Theorem 6.13. There exists a unique equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies in the
buyer PRE - POST duopoly intermediary selection problem where all buyers select the
intermediary implementing a POST auction with reserve price rL
POST, when the other
intermediary implements a PRE auction with reserve price rH
PRE and rL
POST < rH
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Proof. Taking the dierence of the expected surplus from both intermediaries yields:
L
POST()   H
PRE() = (K   1)(   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)
Z 1
rH
PRE
(1   (y))f(y)dy+
+
Z 
rH
PRE
(   y)(2(y)   1)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+
Z 
rH
PRE
Z 1
y2
(   y2)(1   (y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 +
Z rH
PRE
rL
POST
FK 1(y)dy (6.62)
The partial derivative of this dierence w.r.t.  is:
@L
POST()   H
PRE()
@
= (K   1)FK 2(rH
PRE)
Z 1
rH
PRE
(1   (y))f(y)dy+
+
Z 
rH
PRE
(2(y)   1)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy +
Z 
rH
PRE
Z 1
y2
(1   (y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 (6.63)
Similar to equation (6.58), we can write:
Z 
rH
PRE
Z 1
y2
(1   (y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 =
= (K   1)[FK 2()
Z 1

(1   (y))f(y)dy   FK 2(rH
PRE)
Z 1
rH
PRE
(1   (y))f(y)dy]+
+
Z 
rH
PRE
(1   (y))f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy (6.64)
Hence, equation (6.63) can be written as:
@L
POST()   H
PRE()
@
= (K   1)FK 2()
Z 1

(1   (y))f(y)dy+
+
Z 
rH
PRE
(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy  0 (6.65)
Hence, given that L
POST(rH
PRE) > H
PRE(rH
PRE) and L
POST() grows faster than H
PRE()
for every  > rH
PRE, it should always be L
POST() > H
PRE(), so the only equilibrium
strategy is (y) = 1.
Until now, we have shown that buyers always select the POST intermediary against a
PRE competing intermediary given that the former's reserve price is lower or equal to
the latter's. We complete our analysis with the scenario where the PRE intermediary
sets a reserve price, rL
PRE, strictly lower than the POST mechanism's, rH
POST. In this last
case, the ex-interim expected surplus of a buyer with private valuation 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mechanisms will be:
L
PRE() =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 if  2 [0;rL
PRE)
R 
rL
PRE
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy if  2 [rL
PRE;rH
POST)
(   rL
PRE)F
(K 1)
1 (rL
PRE) +
R rH
POST
rL
PRE
(   y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+
R 
rH
POST
(   y)(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy if  2 [rH
POST;1]
(6.66)
H
POST() =
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
0 if  2 [0;rH
POST)
(   rH
POST)
R rH
POST
y2=0
R 1
y1=y2 (y1)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
R 
rH
POST
(   y)(1   (y))f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+
R 
y2=rH
POST
R 1
y1=y2 (   y2)(y1)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2
if  2 [rH
POST;1]
(6.67)
More specically, a buyer with valuation   rH
POST that selects the low-reserve PRE
mechanism pays the latter his reserve price when all opponent bids are less than this
reserve price (rst term in (6.66)), and pays the highest opponent bid if this is lower than
her bid and is submitted in the same intermediary (second and third terms in (6.66)).
On the other hand, if she selects the high-reserve POST intermediary, she pays his reserve
price, rH
POST, when the second-highest opponent bid is less than this reserve price and,
at the same time, the highest opponent bid is submitted in the other (PRE) intermediary
(rst term in (6.67)). She also pays the highest opponent bid if it is higher than rH
POST,
less than her bid, and is submitted in the same intermediary (second term in (6.67)).
Finally, she pays the second-highest opponent bid if it is also less than her bid, higher
than rH
POST, and, at the same time, the highest opponent bid is submitted in the other
(PRE) intermediary (third term in (6.67)).
As we will immediately show, there is a pure-strategy BNE where all buyers select the
PRE intermediary given that the intermediaries' reserve prices satisfy a condition, similar
in concept to Section 6.1.1. Formally:
Theorem 6.14. There exists a pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the buyer PRE
- POST duopoly intermediary selection problem where all buyers select the low-reserve
intermediary implementing a PRE auction with reserve price rL
PRE, when the other in-
termediary implements a POST auction with reserve price rH
POST and rL
PRE < rH
POST, if
the intermediary reserve prices satisfy the condition:
Z rH
POST
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy  (K   1)
Z 1
rH
POST
[1   F(y)]FK 2(y)dy (6.68)158 Chapter 6 Intermediaries with Non-Captive Buyers
Proof. Equation (6.67) for valuations   rH
POST can be written as:
L
PRE() =
Z rH
POST
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy+( rH
POST)FK 1(rH
POST)+
Z 
rH
POST
(   y)(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy
(6.69)
Using equation (B.92), a buyer's ex-interim expected surplus from the high-reserve, POST
intermediary, when her valuation is   rH
POST will be:
H
POST() = (   rH
POST)FK 1(rH
POST) +
Z 
rH
POST
(   y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+ (K   1)
Z 
rH
POST
Z 1
y2
(y1)f(y1)FK 2(y2)dy1dy2 (6.70)
Taking their dierence yields:
L
PRE()   H
POST() =
Z rH
POST
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy  
Z 
rH
POST
(   y)(1   (y))f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy 
  (K   1)
Z 
rH
POST
Z 1
y2
(y1)f(y1)FK 2(y2)dy1dy2 (6.71)
Consider the case that all (other) buyers select the low-reserve intermediary auction,
that is () = 1 for all  2 [rH
POST;1]. Then equation (6.71) yields:
L
PRE() H
POST() =
Z rH
POST
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy  (K  1)
Z 
rH
POST
Z 1
y2
f(y1)FK 2(y2)dy1dy2
(6.72)
Taking the rst-order derivative of this dierence w.r.t.  yields:
@
@
(L
PRE()   H
POST()) =  (K   1)FK 2()[1   F()]  0 (6.73)
i.e. the ex-interim expected surplus dierence is decreasing and, since L
PRE(rH
POST)  
H
POST(rH
POST) > 0, the only condition for () = 1 to be a pure-strategy BNE, is for
this dierence to be non-negative for the maximum valuation,  = 1:
L
PRE(1) H
POST(1) =
Z rH
POST
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy  (K  1)
Z 1
rH
POST
[1   F(y)]FK 2(y)dy  0
(6.74)
thus yielding equation (6.68).
Similarly, it is easy to see that buyers will never all select the high-reserve POST inter-
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Proposition 6.15. There is no pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the buyer PRE
- POST duopoly intermediary selection problem where all buyers always select the high-
reserve intermediary implementing a POST auction.
This is because L
PRE(rH
POST)   H
POST(rH
POST) =
R rH
POST
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy > 0 irrespective
of the selection strategies of the other buyers.
As in Section 6.1.1, it still remains to show what are the resulting equilibrium interme-
diary selection strategies of the buyers when the condition of equation (6.68) does not
hold. Since L
PRE(rH
POST)   H
POST(rH
POST) > 0 and the rst-order derivative of the
expected surplus dierence for any strategy () is:
@
@
(L
PRE()   H
POST()) =  
Z 
rH
POST
(1   (y))f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy 
  (K   1)FK 2()
Z 1

(y)f(y)dy < 0 (6.75)
this means that there should be at least one cut-o point w 2 (rH
POST;1) so that
L
PRE(w) = H
POST(w) and where the intermediary selection strategy changes. The-
orem 6.16 shows that this is indeed the case.
Theorem 6.16. Let  : V 7! [0;1] be a strategy prole where (i) = 1 if rH
POST  i <
w, and (i) = 0 if w  i  1, for each buyer i, i = 1;:::;K, where w 2 (rH
POST;1], a
cut-o value given by:
Z rH
POST
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy = (K   1)[F(w)
Z w
rH
POST
FK 2(y)dy  
Z w
rH
POST
FK 1(y)dy] (6.76)
Then, when the condition of Theorem 6.14 does not hold, () is a pure-strategy BNE
prole of the buyer PRE - POST duopoly intermediary selection problem where one inter-
mediary implements a PRE auction with a reserve price rL
PRE and the other implements
a POST auction with a reserve price rH
POST > rL
PRE.
Proof. () = 1 when rH
POST   < w, since a buyer expects a positive surplus from
the low-reserve PRE intermediary if her valuation is close to rH
POST from above, but
arbitrarily close to zero surplus from the POST intermediary. If () is the intermediary
selection strategy of the other buyers with valuations   w, then the di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expected surplus of a buyer with valuation  2 [rH
POST;w) will be:
L
PRE()   H
POST() =
Z rH
POST
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy   (K   1)[
Z 
rH
POST
Z w
y2
f(y1)FK 2(y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z 
rH
POST
Z 1
w
(y1)f(y1)FK 2(y2)dy1dy2] =
=
Z rH
POST
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy   (K   1)[
Z 
rH
POST
[F(w)   F(y)]FK 2(y)dy+
+
Z 
rH
POST
Z 1
w
(y1)f(y1)FK 2(y2)dy1dy2] (6.77)
At  = w, the dierence in expected surplus should be zero, i.e.:
Z rH
POST
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy = (K   1)[
Z w
rH
POST
[F(w)   F(y)]FK 2(y)dy+
+
Z w
rH
POST
Z 1
w
(y1)f(y1)FK 2(y2)dy1dy2] (6.78)
Then, the corresponding dierence in expected surplus for a buyer with private valuation
 2 [w;1] is:
L
PRE()   H
POST() =
Z rH
POST
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy  
Z 
w
(   y)(1   (y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy 
  (K   1)[
Z w
rH
POST
Z 1
y2
(y1)f(y1)FK 2(y2)dy1dy2 +
Z 
w
Z 1
y2
f(y1)FK 2(y2)dy1dy2] =
=
Z rH
POST
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy  
Z 
w
(   y)(1   (y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy 
  (K   1)[
Z w
rH
POST
Z w
y2
f(y1)FK 2(y2)dy1dy2 +
Z w
rH
POST
Z 1
w
(y1)f(y1)FK 2(y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z 
w
Z 1
y2
(y1)f(y1)FK 2(y2)dy1dy2] (6.79)
Using equation (6.78), this can be written as:
L
PRE()   H
POST() =  
Z 
w
(   y)(1   (y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy 
  (K   1)
Z 
w
Z 1
y2
(y1)f(y1)FK 2(y2)dy1dy2 (6.80)
which is negative for all () 2 [0;1]. This means that a buyer with valuation  2
[w;1] will always select the high-reserve, POST intermediary irrespective of the selectionChapter 6 Intermediaries with Non-Captive Buyers 161
strategy of the other buyers. Hence, () = 0 for  2 [w;1] and then equation (6.78)
yields the condition of equation (6.76).
This concludes our analysis on the intermediary selection strategy of the buyers. In what
follows, we consider the intermediaries' and center's best responses to this selection.
6.2 Intermediaries' and Center's Best Responses
Having characterized the equilibrium intermediary selection strategy of the buyers, in
this section, we look at the equilibrium reserve-price-setting problem of the interme-
diaries and the center which take into account the selection strategies of the buyers
(and the expected behavior of the intermediaries for the center) when announcing their
reserve prices.
Given the non-trivial equilibrium selection strategies of the buyers, in the following
subsections, we numerically nd -NE for the intermediaries' reserve prices. As before,
we run the ctitious play algorithm for the example with buyers whose private valuations
are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1) for a population of K = 4 and K = 10 buyers. These
numbers allow us to compare the results of this chapter with those in Chapter 5 for
captive buyers. We start with the homogeneous PRE and POST intermediary duopoly
competitions in Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, and then move to the heterogeneous PRE-POST
competition in Section 6.2.3.
6.2.1 Pre-Award Second-Price Sealed-Bid Intermediary Auctions
As has been shown, in this setting, the buyers' intermediary selection strategy involves
three intervals in the support of their private valuations, unless the intermediary reserve
prices are suciently dierent. In the former unique equilibrium, buyers whose valua-
tions lie in the low-valuation interval always choose the low-reserve intermediary. Buyers
whose valuations lie in the middle interval follow a strictly mixed strategy. Finally, the
strategy of the buyers with valuations in the high-valuation interval is for all of them to
go to either the high-reserve intermediary, or the low-reserve one, but not both. Given
the complexity of this strategy, it seems unlikely that it is possible to analytically derive
the Nash equilibrium reserve-price-setting strategies of the intermediaries.
For this reason, in accordance with the methodology of Chapter 5, we run the ctitious
play algorithm in this setting to shed some light on the eects of the buyers' non-
captivity to the generated prots and social welfare. Our results for K = 4 and K = 10
buyers with uniformly i.i.d. drawn private valuations in [0;1] are shown in Figure 6.7
and Figure 6.8 respectively. As can be seen, the center best responds by setting a
higher reserve price compared to the setting with captive buyers. Furthermore, the162 Chapter 6 Intermediaries with Non-Captive Buyers
center benets from the competition of the intermediaries to attract buyers since its
average revenue is also higher compared to the captive buyers setting (cf. Figure 5.11).
Additionally, it can be seen that the support of the mixing of reserve prices shrinks as
the number of buyers increases.
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Figure 6.7: Center's average revenue (left) and empirical c.d.f. at the center's opti-
mal reserve price (right) of the ctitious play intermediaries' -NE reserve-price-setting
strategies for a duopoly PRE intermediary setting with non-captive K = 4 buyers whose
private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
This concludes our exposition of the intermediaries equilibrium reserve prices in the
PRE duopoly non-captive intermediary setting. We continue with the case of two POST
intermediaries where it will be trivially shown that their reserve prices are driven towards
the center's reserve price.
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Figure 6.8: Center's average revenue (left) and empirical c.d.f. at the center's opti-
mal reserve price (right) of the ctitious play intermediaries' -NE reserve-price-setting
strategies for a duopoly PRE intermediary setting with non-captive K = 10 buyers whose
private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).Chapter 6 Intermediaries with Non-Captive Buyers 163
6.2.2 Post-Award Second-Price Sealed-Bid Intermediary Auctions
In Section 6.1.2, we have seen that buyers have a dominant strategy of selecting the
lowest-reserve intermediary. This creates zero demand for the remaining intermediaries
and naturally suppresses their reserve prices to the minimum level, i.e. the center's
reserve price, , yielding a positive prot only when the buyers with the highest and
the second-highest valuations select him or when the buyer with the highest valuation
is in his market but all opponent intermediary bids are less than . We formalize this
observation in the following proposition.
Proposition 6.17. It is a pure-strategy equilibrium in the n-POST intermediary reserve-
price-setting problem, n 2 N+;n  2, for all intermediaries to set a reserve price
ri
POST = , i = 1;:::;n.
Since the intermediary selection problem admits an innite number of equilibria, there is
no sensible way for the center to optimize its reserve price unless it has knowledge of the
exact selection strategies of the buyers. This concludes our analysis of the competition
between POST intermediaries. In what follows, we remove the limitation of homogeneity
between intermediaries and let one intermediary implement a PRE auction and the other
a POST auction.
6.2.3 Pre- versus Post-Award Second-Price Sealed-Bid Intermediary
Auctions
As we have shown in Section 6.1.3, buyers always choose the POST intermediary against
a PRE one, as long as the latter sets a reserve price that is not less than that of the POST
intermediary. If this is not the case, then low-valuation buyers select the low-reserve PRE
intermediary, whereas high-valuation buyers select the high-reserve POST intermediary.
It is hence not clear whether the POST mechanism is better o by undercutting his
PRE opponent, obtaining all the available market-share and driving his reserve price
downwards, or he prefers setting a high-enough reserve price that increases his prot.
To shed some light on this, we conducted a number of numerical experiments, using
the ctitious play algorithm, for the examples of K = 4 and 10 buyers whose private
valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1). Our results for these two cases are shown in
Figures 6.9 and 6.10 respectively. As can be seen, the supports of both intermediaries'
equilibrium strategies are very small. Moreover, it can be seen that the PRE intermediary
best responds by setting very high reserve prices in an eort to increase his prot against
the more ecient POST mechanism. Also, it can be observed that all reserve prices are
higher compared to the case with captive buyers.164 Chapter 6 Intermediaries with Non-Captive Buyers
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Figure 6.9: Center's average revenue (left) and empirical c.d.f. at the center's opti-
mal reserve price (right) of the ctitious play intermediaries' -NE reserve-price-setting
strategies for a duopoly PRE-POST intermediary setting with non-captive K = 4 buyers
whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
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Figure 6.10: Center's average revenue (left) and empirical c.d.f. at the center's opti-
mal reserve price (right) of the ctitious play intermediaries' -NE reserve-price-setting
strategies for a duopoly PRE-POST intermediary setting with non-captive K = 10 buyers
whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
Having illustrated the approximate equilibrium behavior of the intermediaries and the
center, in the following subsection, we compare the obtained prots and social welfare
for the two examples above.
6.2.4 Comparison of the Two Intermediary Mechanisms
In this subsection, we provide a comparison of the homogeneous PRE and heterogeneous
PRE - POST duopoly competitions. In more detail, Figures 6.11 - 6.14 depict the inter-
mediaries' average prots, buyers' average surplus, the center's average revenue as well
as the social welfare respectively under the two settings.
In these two examples, intermediaries seem to benet from their heterogeneity since they
are both better o compared to the case of two PRE mechanisms. One of the reasons forChapter 6 Intermediaries with Non-Captive Buyers 165
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Figure 6.11: Intermediaries' average prots with reserve prices for the three interme-
diary mechanisms for K = 4 and K = 10 captive and non-captive buyers whose private
valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
this might be the fact that the center's optimal reserve price in the heterogeneous setting
is smaller, thus increasing their probability of having a buyer whose bid is above their
reserve price. As can also be seen, the POST intermediary yields higher average prot
than his PRE opponent. This is in agreement with the results of Chapter 5 when buyers
are captive. In general, intermediaries' average prots decrease as the number of buyers
increases for the two examples, with the notable exception of POST intermediaries that
benet from competition against PRE auctioneers. This decrease can be attributed to the
disproportionate increase of the center's reserve price (as Figure 6.15 shows) compared
to the prot that should increase because of the higher number of buyers. This decrease
is in accordance with the results for a single intermediary (cf. Figure 5.1), although,
in this latter, case this decrease is apparent for a higher number of buyers. What's
more, numerical errors due to the discretization used might make this eect even more
apparent.
Regarding the buyers' average surplus, this also decreases with the total number of
their population, as both the center's reserve price and intermediaries' support of ran-
domization for their reserve-price-setting strategies increase. As Figure 6.12 reveals,
buyers benet more from the competition between two PRE intermediaries compared to
a heterogeneous PRE - POST competition. Also, the strategic selection of an intermediary
increases buyers' average surplus for the duopoly PRE case, but not for the heterogeneous
PRE - POST scenario. However, these results are subject to numerical errors due to the
fact that the experiments for captive buyers correspond to expected surplus whereas the
experiments for non-captive buyers are averages over a number of simulations.
The center's average revenue is also higher for homogeneous PRE intermediaries as well as166 Chapter 6 Intermediaries with Non-Captive Buyers
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Figure 6.12: Buyers' average surplus with intermediaries imposing reserve prices for
the three intermediary mechanisms for K = 4 and K = 10 captive and non-captive
buyers whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
compared to the case where buyers are captive. In contrast, the center's attained revenue
is smaller for the PRE - POST competition compared to the scenario with captive buyers.
Similarly, for non-captive buyers, the social welfare is higher for PRE intermediaries,
again due to the higher optimal center's reserve price, compared to the PRE - POST
competition. Also the ad exchange system seems to be worse o as a whole for PRE versus
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Figure 6.13: Center's average revenue with intermediaries imposing reserve prices for
the three intermediary mechanisms for K = 4 and K = 10 captive and non-captive
buyers whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).Chapter 6 Intermediaries with Non-Captive Buyers 167
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Figure 6.14: Social welfare with intermediaries imposing reserve prices for the three
intermediary mechanisms for K = 4 and K = 10 captive and non-captive buyers whose
private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from U(0;1).
POST intermediaries whose buyers strategically select one of the two mechanisms. This
is expected since both the center's average revenue and the buyers' average surplus is
smaller in the latter case. This ends our analysis of the duopoly intermediary competition
with non-captive buyers.
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Figure 6.15: Center's optimal reserve price with intermediaries imposing reserve prices
for the three intermediary mechanisms for K = 4 and K = 10 captive and non-captive
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6.3 Summary
In contrast to the previous chapters, where the focus was on the competition of in-
termediaries with captive buyers that are non-strategically allocated to the interme-
diaries, within this chapter we studied the imperfect intermediaries' competition with
non-captive buyers. Since the intermediary selection problem of the buyers constitutes a
key research challenge of this thesis, we focused on deriving such Bayes-Nash equilibrium
intermediary selection strategies, albeit in a simple duopoly setting.
To this end, we rst studied the intermediary selection problem of buyers in a set-
ting with two PRE intermediaries. We proved the existence of a unique pure-strategy
Bayes-Nash equilibrium under some dened conditions on the dierence between the
intermediaries' reserve prices. We then showed that, when these conditions are not met,
there is a unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium involving three intervals in the sup-
port of the buyers valuations: buyers with low valuations always select the low-reserve
intermediary, buyers whose valuations lie in the rightmost interval deterministically se-
lect one of the intermediaries, whereas buyers whose valuations lie in the middle interval
follow a strictly mixed strategy whose form will be dierent for dierent distributions of
private valuations and numbers of buyers. Our results for the duopoly PRE competition
are of interest to the general literature on competing auctions where, in the majority of
cases, bidders have been found to equally randomize between auctioneers in equilibrium
(see Section 2.5 for details). We then repeated our analysis for two POST intermediaries
where we showed that buyers always select the low-reserve intermediary but there are
an innite number of Nash equilibria when the intermediaries' reserve prices are equal.
Following this, we analyzed the heterogeneous competition between a PRE and a POST
intermediary, where we proved that buyers always choose the more ecient POST mech-
anism if his reserve price is not higher than that of the PRE. If, in contrast, this does
not hold, then buyers with private valuations above a cut-o point still select the POST
intermediary but buyers with lower valuations select the low-reserve PRE intermediary.
Given the intermediary selection strategies of the buyers, we looked at the equilibrium
reserve-price-setting problem of the intermediaries. Letting the buyers select an inter-
mediary makes the analysis too technical, since the derivations are involved even when
buyers are captive and symmetrically allocated to the intermediaries. For this reason,
we limited our analysis to numerical simulations for two examples with buyers whose
private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from the uniform distribution U(0;1). These exam-
ples showed that both the center's average revenue and the social welfare targets are
aligned, being higher for homogeneous PRE intermediaries, however intermediaries are
better o implementing heterogeneous mechanisms. In this last case, in accordance with
the results of Chapter 5, the POST intermediary obtains higher average prot.Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
In this nal chapter, we conclude by reviewing the contributions of this work towards
the research objective of studying the impact of the auction design under competition
for demand-side intermediaries in online advertising exchanges. To this end, in Section
7.1, we summarize the main results within each chapter of this thesis and discuss their
implications for real-world ad exchanges. Thereafter, in Section 7.2, we shortly provide
a number of suggestions to the designers of DSPs based on our analysis in the previous
chapters. Finally, in Section 7.3, we identify promising lines of future work that could
be pursued continuing the research of this work.
7.1 Summary of Results
Advertising exchanges are becoming the de facto means of trading ads online. Real-
time bidding allows advertisers to achieve what has never been possible in the past,
that is to target their ads only to potentially interested users, reducing their cost and
simultaneously the number of annoying ads that people see on the web.
Two of the most important parties of ad exchanges are the demand- and supply-side
intermediaries that take the role of brokers on behalf of their customers. These inter-
mediaries are vital to the successful adoption of ad exchanges, since they provide all
the tools and infrastructure that allows medium and smaller advertisers to participate
in these exchanges. Our focus within this thesis has been the competition between the
demand-side intermediaries along with their eect on the exchange and the advertisers.
Modern such intermediaries, known as DSPs, typically run their own local auctions be-
fore the exchange's central auction and submit (usually a single) bid at the exchange
on behalf of their (multiple) advertisers. Hence, demand-side intermediaries hide some
of the demand from the exchange and behave as bidding rings whose centers are prot
maximizing. This creates a number of complications for the revenue of the exchange
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and the ad exchange ecosystem as a whole. Hence, a careful study of some of the
currently-used mechanisms can provide guidance on the proper design and optimization
of all the auctions involved which will determine the prosperous operation of this new
marketplace.
We have seen that previous literature does not satisfy our research aims of studying
the imperfect competition between such intermediaries. Specically, the literature on
bidding rings focuses on cases with a single ring and does not consider prot maximizing
ring centers, as is the case in the ad exchange setting. Furthermore, the literature
on competing auctioneers focuses on the more general case of independent competing
auctioneers which do not subsequently compete at another auction. Finally, the more
relevant work of Feldman et al. (2010) is only for the limiting case of one buyer per
intermediary and the paper by Mansour et al. (2012) does not fully take into account
the strategic actions of the intermediaries (such as setting appropriate reserve prices)
and the advertisers (such as selecting an intermediary).
For this reason, within this thesis, we looked at the intermediaries' competition in a sim-
plied single-item IPV setting. Specically, in Chapter 4 we studied three widely-used
mechanisms, two variations of the Vickrey auction, called the PRE and POST mechanisms,
and FPSB auctions, in a simple symmetric setting with intermediaries implementing the
same mechanism (i.e. homogeneous). We assumed that they do not impose any reserve
prices but instead make a prot by pocketing the dierence between their local bids and
their payment at the exchange. We have shown that none of the three mechanisms yields
the highest prot in all settings but homogeneous POST auctions are the most ecient.
Moreover, our numerical results showed that FPSB intermediary auctions provide a good
trade-o between prot and eciency, especially for small numbers of intermediaries
and buyers per intermediary, as is usually the case nowadays.
We then continued our analysis in Chapter 5 where we considered the duopoly compe-
tition between homogeneous mechanisms along with the competition between PRE and
POST intermediary auctioneers. This duopoly simplication was necessary for reasons
of analytical tractability, but even in this simple setting, a number of insights about
the eects of intermediary competition can be obtained. In this setting, we proved the
existence of a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for the intermediaries' reserve
prices in a POST duopoly competition subject to some constraints on the distribution of
private valuations and the number of buyers. In this equilibrium, both intermediaries
implement the optimal monopolistic intermediary reserve price, i.e. a xed markup on
top of the center's reserve price. For the remaining cases, we have reasoned why inter-
mediaries are likely to follow mixed strategies due to their competition and the double
marginalization eect, as Feldman et al. (2010) have shown for the PRE auctions. Given
the inherent diculty in analytically expressing these strategies, after characterizing the
expected utilities of the stakeholders, wherever this was possible, we conducted a num-
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of the intermediaries. In more detail, we used the ctitious play algorithm to obtain
approximate Nash equilibria of the intermediaries' reserve-price-setting game, and com-
pared the resulting approximate equilibrium utilities of all the stakeholders as well as
the social welfare for the above-mentioned mechanisms. Our results depict the prot
superiority of the PRE mechanism for the intermediaries in this setting in accordance
with some of the results of Feldman et al. (2010). However, POST mechanisms are by far
better in terms of the eciency attained, that might be more desirable in the long-term.
What's more, buyers in total benet from intermediaries using dierent mechanisms, as
our results for the setting with one PRE and one POST intermediary. In all cases, the
introduction of the reserve prices benet only the intermediaries, since the utilities of
the other players as well as the total social welfare decrease compared to the setting of
Chapter 4.
Following this, in Chapter 6, we let buyers strategically select one of the intermedi-
aries again in a duopoly intermediary setting. The derivation of FPSB equilibrium
bidding strategies when taking into account both the participation decision of the other
advertisers becomes cumbersome. For this reason, we analyzed the homogeneous and
heterogeneous competition of the two Vickrey variations. Specically, we rst looked at
the intermediary selection problem of the buyers and derived their corresponding equi-
librium strategies. We found that, in the case of two PRE intermediaries, the resulting
equilibrium intermediary selection strategy of the buyers is rather complex; it is in mixed
strategies unless the reserve prices are very dierent, where, in the latter case, all buy-
ers select the low-reserve intermediary. We then continued our analysis with a duopoly
POST setting and have found in a straightforward manner that buyers always select the
low-reserve intermediary, thus driving the intermediaries' reserve prices downwards, to-
wards the center's reserve price. The intermediary selection strategies in a heterogeneous
Vickrey setting are also simpler to derive; buyers always select the POST auctioneer as
long as his reserve price is not above the one for the PRE mechanism, otherwise high-
valuation buyers still select the former mechanism but low-valuation buyers switch to
the PRE auctioneer. Finally, in most cases, given the mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium
selection strategies of the buyers, the intermediaries' equilibrium reserve prices become
too technical to derive. Hence, we repeated ctitious play in this setting in two examples
with advertisers whose private valuations are i.i.d. drawn from the uniform distribution
U(0;1). We found that the center's average revenue, the buyers' average surplus and the
social welfare obtained are higher for the case of two PRE mechanisms but, in contrast,
intermediaries' prot increases if they implement dierent Vickrey mechanisms, where
the POST intermediary benets from this heterogeneity.
Our formulation is general enough to include other settings with intermediaries (as
described in Section 2.3) and is of relevance to the growing literature on bidding rings.
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make a suggestion on the intermediary mechanism that seems more suitable in each of
the studied environments.
7.2 Demand-Side Intermediary Policy Recommendations
The work within this thesis has combined theoretical insights and numerical simula-
tions to compare three natural choices for demand-side intermediary auctioneers that
make a prot by getting the dierence of what they get paid by their advertisers and
what they pay at the exchange. Given the complexity of the ad exchange system, our
results are bounded by the limitations of such simulations, such as the distributions
of private valuations considered that might not always be representative of the actual
such distributions as well as the number of intermediaries considered in some scenar-
ios. Nevertheless, these results can qualitatively shed some light in the proper design of
demand-side intermediary auctions and give intuition on the issues of their competition.
Given that the vast majority of DSPs at this time do not impose reserve prices, our
results from Chapter 4 show that current DSPs should benet from using FPSB local
auctions; currently, less than a handful of intermediaries participate at each individual
auction due to the vast number of available impressions, and each has a small number
of interested advertisers. Hence, as Figure 4.6 illustrates, the FPSB auction yields the
highest prot among the three mechanisms studied. What's more, FPSB auctions are
more ecient than their closest-in-prot PRE competitors and eciency is vastly impor-
tant for the future adoption of ad exchanges and real-time bidding. Another benet of
FPSB auctions is their transparency, since there is no need to reveal the whole book of
bids. Nevertheless, advertisers will need to continuously adapt their bids and BNE bids
are less predictable from the auctioneer's point of view. For this reason, PRE auctions
that are DSIC might also be a good option in this case due to their strategic simplicity,
although their smaller social welfare might be detrimental for the future adoption of
RTB.
As we have shown, a reserve price can increase an intermediary's attained prot, so we
expect more and more DSPs to enforce such prices. Our analysis in this case suggests
that, when advertisers strategically select their DSP, they are more likely to select a
POST intermediary compared to a PRE intermediary. This means that all intermediaries
are likely to adopt the former mechanism. However, given that such a strategic selection
on behalf of the advertisers is likely to take place less often, the analysis of Chapter 5
becomes useful. Specically, the results show that both POST intermediaries' and the ad
exchange's reserve prices are driven downwards, increasing the eciency and advertisers'
surplus at the small expense of the intermediaries' attained prot, compared to e.g. PRE
intermediaries. What's more, POST auctions are more transparent and their operation
is more easy to explain to advertisers compared to their PRE counterpart.Chapter 7 Conclusions and Future Work 173
Finally, regarding the ad exchange's (or publisher's) reserve price optimization, we have
shown that this will generally depend both on the number of buyers and intermediaries,
in accordance with the results of Feldman et al. (2010), and that this reserve price will
be higher than a monopolist's optimal reserve price without intermediaries, with the
notable exception of POST intermediaries setting reserve prices, where the exchange's
reserve price is driven to zero as the number of buyers increases. Hence, knowledge of
the type of intermediary mechanisms participating in an ad exchange is helpful for the
exchange's auction designer to eectively optimize its reserve price.
This concludes the analysis of the work done to date. A number of open challenges
remain to be tackled, as outlined in the following section.
7.3 Future Work
As has been summarized in Section 7.1, the contributions within this thesis have ad-
dressed, to the extent that this was possible, our initial research aims. Despite these
achievements, a number of open problems yet remain to be solved in this complex
marketplace. Indeed, our results show that dierent auction formats are not easily com-
parable and that one needs to perform a market analysis before selecting one mechanism
over the other. Moreover, our analysis constitutes only a rst step in the analysis of
competition between demand-side intermediaries. For the sake of analytical tractability,
we had to make a number of simplifying assumptions at various places throughout the
thesis such as symmetry, homogeneity and duopoly markets for the intermediaries. Some
of these assumptions seem to be binding for an analysis using the tool set provided by
traditional auction theory. Hence, new solution concepts and methodologies need to be
derived. Some potential lines of investigation to extend the scope of this work include:
 Heterogeneous and asymmetric intermediary auctioneers. The rst im-
mediate extension of our results is for the case of symmetric heterogeneous in-
termediaries, when rst-price sealed-bid auctioneers compete against second-price
sealed-bid ones. Kotowski (2014) has derived the equilibrium bidding functions
for two rst-price sealed-bid auctions in auctions with discrimination, so deriving
similar functions for our setting would nicely supplement the existing results in
this direction. The other direct extension is for intermediaries with dierent num-
ber of buyers each, a setting which is more likely to arise in practice; a study by
Nicholls et al. (2013) has shown that in the U.S., the top 3 DSPs accounted for
50-60% of the market share in 2013. Nevertheless, this creates asymmetries at the
central auction, which, along with the problems of competition between auctions
(see Section 2.5), would also limit the analytical tractability of the results.174 Chapter 7 Conclusions and Future Work
 Managed- versus self-service demand-side intermediaries. The work de-
scribed in the previous chapters deals with the competition of self-service inter-
mediaries which run local auctions, given the intermediaries' lack of knowledge of
their advertisers' valuations. Since, even today, most of the demand-side interme-
diaries still follow the managed-service model, it would be interesting to see what
is the cost or benet of such intermediaries with full knowledge of advertisers'
valuations against the other type, taking also into account the cost of managing a
campaign that intermediaries of managed-service type undertake. This will shed
light in the future of online advertising and the future of traditional ad networks.
 Repeated setting. Throughout this thesis, we have considered the auction of
a single good that corresponds to an advertising slot. In reality, billions of such
auctions take place every day for dierent goods and with dierent participants,
each of which might enter and leave at any point and also has some budget. Hence,
it is important to study this more realistic setting. Given the insights gained from
our analysis, this seems to be technically challenging, hence new methodologies and
concepts need to be developed. We consider mean-eld approximation methods
that have recently gained momentum and have also been used in the context
of advertising auctions (Balseiro et al., 2013; Gummadi et al., 2012; Iyer et al.,
2011; Athey and Nekipelov, 2010) a promising direction for research in this area.
Specically, a study on the competition of DSPs which do not have full information
about their opponents and advertisers in such a context would fully complement
the analysis within this thesis.
We believe that these extensions could further increase the applicability and insights
of the analysis within this thesis, oering insightful guidance and contributing to the
successful operation of this new, complex marketplace.Appendix A
Supplement for Chapter 5
A.1 Derivations for Duopoly PRE - PRE Intermediaries with
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The high-reserve intermediary's ex-ante expected prot can be written as:
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PRE
F
(k)
2 (x)dxdy =
= Fk(rL
PRE)(1   Fk(rH
PRE))(rL
PRE   ) + kFk 1(rH
PRE)(1   F(rH
PRE))
Z rH
PRE
rL
PRE
F
(k)
2 (y)dy+
+
Z 1
rH
PRE
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rL
PRE
F
(k)
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A.2 Derivations for Duopoly POST - POST Intermediaries
with Reserve Prices
When both intermediaries implement POST mechanisms with equilibrium reserve prices
rL
POST = rH
POST = r
POST =  +
1 F(r
POST)
f(r
POST) , the center's ex-ante expected revenue is:
revenuePOST(r
POST) =
Z 1
rPOST
yf
(2)
2 (y)dy+2F(r
POST)(1 F(r
POST)[r
POST 
1   F(r
POST
f(r
POST
]
(A.3)
Taking the rst-order derivative of this w.r.t. r
POST yields
@revenuePOST(r
POST)
@r
POST
=  2r
POST(1   F(r
POST))f(r
POST) + 2[f(r
POST)(1   F(r
POST)) 
  f(r
POST)F(r
POST)][r
POST  
1   F(r
POST)
f(r
POST)
]
+ 2F(r
POST)(1   F(r
POST))[1  
 f2(r
POST)   (1   F(r
POST))f0(r
POST)
f2(r
POST)
] =
= 2f r
POSTf(r
POST)F(r
POST)   (1   F(r
POST))(1   2F(r
POST))+
+ F(r
POST)(1   F(r
POST))(2 +
(1   F(r
POST))f0(r
POST)
f2(r
POST)
)g
= 2fF(r
POST)[3(1   F(r
POST))   r
POSTf(r
POST)]   (1   F(r
POST))2[1   F(r
POST)
f0(r
POST)
f2(r
POST)
]g
(A.4)
When both intermediaries implement POST mechanisms with reserve prices rL
POST 
rH
POST with k > 1 buyers each, then their ex-ante expected prots will be:Appendix A Supplement for Chapter 5 179
profitL
POST(rL
POST) = Fk(rH
POST)[kFk 1(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))(rL
POST   )+
+
Z 1
rL
POST
(y   )f
(k)
2 (y)dy] +
Z 1
rH
POST
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rH
POST
(y   x)f
(k)
1 (x)dxdy =
= Fk(rH
POST)[kFk 1(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))(rL
POST   ) +
Z 1
rL
POST
(y   )f
(k)
2 (y)dy 
 
Z 1
rH
POST
(y   rH
POST)f
(k)
2 (y)dy] +
Z 1
rH
POST
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rH
POST
Fk(x)dxdy =
= Fk(rH
POST)[kFk 1(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))(rL
POST   ) + 1      F
(k)
2 (rL
POST)(rL
POST   ) 
 
Z 1
rL
POST
F
(k)
2 (y)dy   (1   rH
POST  
Z 1
rH
POST
F
(k)
2 (y)dy)] +
Z 1
rH
POST
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rH
POST
Fk(x)dxdy =
= Fk(rH
POST)[rH
POST      Fk(rL
POST)(rL
POST   )  
Z rH
POST
rL
POST
F
(k)
2 (y)dy]+
+
Z 1
rH
POST
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rH
POST
Fk(x)dxdy (A.5)
profitH
POST(rH
POST) = Fk(rL
POST)[kFk 1(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))(rH
POST   )+
+
Z 1
rH
POST
(y   )f
(k)
2 (y)dy] + kFk 1(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))
Z rH
POST
rL
POST
(rH
POST   y)f
(k)
1 (y)dy+
+
Z 1
rH
POST
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rL
POST
(y   x)f
(k)
1 (x)dxdy =
= Fk(rL
POST)[kFk 1(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))(rH
POST   ) +
Z 1
rH
POST
(y   )f
(k)
2 (y)dy 
 
Z 1
rH
POST
(y   rL
POST)f
(k)
2 (y)dy] + kFk 1(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))[
Z rH
POST
rL
POST
Fk(y)dy 
  Fk(rL
POST)(rH
POST   rL
POST)] +
Z 1
rH
POST
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rL
POST
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= Fk(rL
POST)[kFk 1(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))(rH
POST   ) + 1      F
(k)
2 (rH
POST)(rH
POST   ) 
 
Z 1
rH
POST
F
(k)
2 (y)dy   (1   rL
POST   F
(k)
2 (rH
POST)(rH
POST   rL
POST)  
Z 1
rH
POST
F
(k)
2 (y)dy) 
  kFk 1(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))(rH
POST   rL
POST)]+
+ kFk 1(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))
Z rH
POST
rL
POST
Fk(y)dy +
Z 1
rH
POST
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rL
POST
Fk(x)dxdy =
= Fk(rL
POST)[rL
POST      Fk(rH
POST)(rH
POST   ) + Fk(rH
POST)(rH
POST   rL
POST)]+
+ kFk 1(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))
Z rH
POST
rL
POST
Fk(y)dy +
Z 1
rH
POST
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rL
POST
Fk(x)dxdy =
= Fk(rL
POST)(1   Fk(rH
POST))(rL
POST   ) + kFk 1(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))
Z rH
POST
rL
POST
Fk(y)dy+
+
Z 1
rH
POST
f
(k)
2 (y)
Z y
rL
POST
Fk(x)dxdy (A.6)
Taking the rst-order derivatives w.r.t. the reserve prices of the above equations yields:
@profitL
POST(rL
POST)
@rL
POST
= Fk(rH
POST)[ kFk 1(rL
POST)f(rL
POST)(rL
POST   ) 
  Fk(rL
POST) + F
(k)
2 (rL
POST)] =  Fk(rH
POST)[kFk 1(rL
POST)f(rL
POST)(rL
POST   )+
+ Fk(rL
POST)   kFk 1(rL
POST) + (k   1)Fk(rL
POST)] =
=  kFk 1(rL
POST)Fk(rH
POST)[f(rL
POST)(rL
POST   ) + F(rL
POST)   1] (A.7)
@profitH
POST(rH
POST)
@rH
POST
=  kFk 1(rH
POST)f(rH
POST)Fk(rL
POST)(rL
POST   )+
+ [k(k   1)Fk 2(rH
POST)f(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))   kFk 1(rH
POST)f(rH
POST)]
Z rH
POST
rL
POST
Fk(y)dy+
+ kFk 1(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))Fk(rH
POST)   f
(k)
2 (rH
POST)
Z rH
POST
rL
POST
Fk(y)dy =
=  kFk 1(rH
POST)f(rH
POST)[Fk(rL
POST)(rL
POST   ) +
Z rH
POST
rL
POST
Fk(y)dy]+
+ kF2k 1(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST)) (A.8)
Taking the rst-order derivative of the last equation w.r.t. rH
POST above yields:Appendix A Supplement for Chapter 5 181
@2profitH
POST(rH
POST)
@(rH
POST)2 = k(2k   1)F2k 2(rH
POST)f(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST)) 
  kF2k 1(rH
POST)f(rH
POST)   [k(k   1)Fk 2(rH
POST)f2(rH
POST)+
+ kFk 1(rH
POST)f0(rH
POST)][Fk(rL
POST)(rL
POST   ) +
Z rH
POST
rL
POST
Fk(y)dy] 
  kFk 1(rH
POST)f(rH
POST)Fk(rH
POST) =
= k(2k   1)F2k 2(rH
POST)(1   F(rH
POST))f(rH
POST)   2kF2k 1(rH
POST)f(rH
POST) 
  [k(k   1)Fk 2(rH
POST)f2(rH
POST) + kFk 1(rH
POST)f0(rH
POST)][Fk(rL
POST)(rL
POST   )+
+
Z rH
POST
rL
POST
Fk(y)dy]   kFk 1(rH
POST)f(rH
POST)Fk(rH
POST) (A.9)
For rPOST
L = rH
POST = r
POST =  +
1 F(r
POST)
f(r
POST) the last equation yields:
@2profitH
POST(rH
POST)
@(rH
POST)2 jrPOST
L =rH
POST=r
POST = k(2k   1)F2k 2(r
POST)(1   F(r
POST))f(r
POST) 
  2kF2k 1(r
POST)f(r
POST)   k(k   1)F2k 2(r
POST)f2(r
POST)(r
POST   ) 
  kF2k 1(r
POST)f0(r
POST)(r
POST   ) =
= kF2k 2(r
POST)[(2k   1)(1   F(r
POST))f(r
POST)   2F(r
POST)f(r
POST) 
  (k   1)(1   F(r
POST))f(r
POST)   kF(r
POST)f0(r
POST)
1   F(r
POST)
f(r
POST)
] =
= kF2k 2(r
POST)[k(1   F(r
POST))f(r
POST)   2F(r
POST)f(r
POST) 
  kF(r
POST)f0(r
POST)
1   F(r
POST)
f(r
POST)
] (A.10)
When both intermediaries set this reserve price, the center's ex-ante expected revenue
is:
revenue(r
POST) = 2Fk(r
POST)(1   Fk(r
POST))[r
POST  
1   F(r
POST)
f(r
POST)
]+
+
Z 1
r
POST
2y(1   Fk(y))kFk 1(y)f(y)dy (A.11)
Taking the rst-order derivative w.r.t. r
POST yields:182 Appendix A Supplement for Chapter 5
@revenue(r
POST)
@r
POST
= 2f[kFk 1(r
POST)(1   Fk(r
POST))   kFk 1(r
POST)Fk(r
POST)]f(r
POST)r
POST 
  k(1   2Fk(r
POST))(1   F(r
POST))   k(1   Fk(r
POST))Fk 1(r
POST)f(r
POST)+
+ Fk(r
POST)(1   Fk(r
POST))[2 +
(1   F(r
POST))f0(r
POST)
f2(r
POST)
]g =
= 2Fk 1(r
POST)f kFk(r
POST)f(r
POST)r
POST   k(1   F(r
POST))(1   2Fk(r
POST))+
+ F(r
POST)(1   Fk(r
POST))[2 +
(1   F(r
POST))f0(r
POST)
f2(r
POST)
]g =
= 2Fk 1(r
POST)fkFk(r
POST)[1   F(r
POST)   r
POSTf(r
POST)] + (1   Fk(r
POST))[2F(r
POST) 
  k(1   F(r
POST)) + F(r
POST)(1   F(r
POST))
f0(r
POST)
f2(r
POST)
]g =
= 2Fk 1(r
POST)fkFk(r
POST)[1   F(r
POST)   r
POSTf(r
POST)]   (1   Fk(r
POST))[k 
  (k + 2)F(r
POST)   F(r
POST)(1   F(r
POST))
f0(r
POST)
f2(r
POST)
]g (A.12)Appendix B
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B.1 Derivations for Buyer PRE - PRE Duopoly Intermediary
Selection
In this section, we will show all the derivations used in Section 6.1.1. Wherever needed,
we will use the relationships between the highest- and second-highest-order statistics1
among K   1 draws from a distribution F with density f, F
(K 1)
1 () and F
(K 1)
2 ()
respectively, as well as their joint density, f
(K 1)
1;2 () (Krishna, 2010):
F
(K 1)
1 (y) = FK 1(y) (B.1)
f
(K 1)
1 (y) = (K   1)FK 2(y)f(y) (B.2)
F
(K 1)
2 (y) = (K   1)FK 2(y)   (K   2)FK 1(y) (B.3)
f
(K 1)
2 (y) = (K   1)(K   2)(1   F(y))FK 3(y)f(y) (B.4)
f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2) = (K   1)(K   2)f(y1)f(y2)FK 3(y2) = (K   1)f(y1)f
(K 2)
1 (y2) (B.5)
B.1.1 Pure-Strategy Bayes-Nash Equilibria with Multiple Cut-O Points
We consider m cut-o points w1;w2;:::;wk;m  1, where L
PRE(wi) = H
PRE(wi) so that
buyers switch their strategies, 1;2;:::;m+1 2 f0;1g in the sub-intervals [rH
PRE;w1),
[w1;w2), :::, [wk;1]. Given that at rH
PRE, the expected utility from the high-reserve
intermediary is zero, whereas for the low-reserve is, in general, positive, 1 = 1 always.
In what follows, we provide a closed form representation of the expected utility from
both intermediaries and then take their dierence L
PRE   H
PRE, which we denote D.
1In classical statistics, these are the K- and (K   1)-order statistics, however economists tend to
denote these as the rst- and second-order statistics respectively (we refer the reader, for example, to
Appendix C of Krishna (2010)).
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So, there are three cases: (i) valuations in the interval [rH
PRE;w1), (ii) valuations in a
random interval [w;w+1]; 2 f1;:::;m   1g, and (iii) valuations greater or equal to
the last cut-o point up to 1. Then, we can write the expected utilities as 2:
L
PRE(rH
PRE   < w1) =
Z 
rL
PRE
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy + (K   1)
m 1 X
i=1

(1   i+1)(F(wi+1) 
  F(wi))
Z 
rH
PRE
(   y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy

+ (K   1)(1   m+1)(1   F(wk))
Z 
rH
PRE
(   y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy
(B.6)
H
PRE(rH
PRE   < w1) = (   rH
PRE)F
(K 1)
1 (rH
PRE) + (K   1)(   rH
PRE)F
(K 2)
1 (rH
PRE)[F(w) 
  F(rH
PRE) +
m 1 X
i=1

i+1(F(wi+1)   F(wi))

+ m+1(1   F(wk))]
(B.7)
D0 = (L
PRE   H
PRE)(rH
PRE   < w1) =
Z 
rL
PRE
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy   (   rH
PRE)F
(K 1)
1 (rH
PRE) 
  (K   1)(   rH
PRE)F
(K 2)
1 (rH
PRE)[1   F(rH
PRE)] + (K   1)[
m 1 X
i=1

(1   i+1)(F(wi+1)   F(wi))

+
+ (1   m+1)(1   F(wk))]
Z 
rH
PRE
F
(K 2)
1 (y)dy (B.8)
@D0
@
= F
(K 1)
1 ()   F
(K 1)
1 (rH
PRE)   (K   1)F
(K 2)
1 (rH
PRE)(1   F(rH
PRE))+
+ (K   1)[
m 1 X
i=1

(1   i+1)(F(wi+1)   F(wi))

+ (1   m+1)(1   F(wk))]F
(K 2)
1 ()
(B.9)
@2D0
@2 = f
(K 1)
1 () + (K   1)[
m 1 X
i=1

(1   i+1)(F(wi+1)   F(wi))

+
+ (1   m+1)(1   F(wk))]f
(K 2)
1 ()  0 (B.10)
2For all double integrals, the outer part refers to y2 (second highest valuation) and the inner part to
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L
PRE(w   < w+1) =
Z w1
rL
PRE
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy + (   w1)F
(K 1)
1 (w1)+
+
 1 X
i=1

i+1(   wi+1)F
(K 1)
1 (wi+1)

 
 1 X
i=1

i+1(   wi)F
(K 1)
1 (wi)

 
  +1(   w)F
(K 1)
1 (w)+
+
 1 X
i=1

i+1
Z wi+1
wi
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy

+ +1
Z 
w
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+ (K   1)
m 1 X
i=1

(1   i+1)(F(wi+1)   F(wi))
Z w1
rH
PRE
(   y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy

+
+ (K   1)(1   m+1)(1   F(wk))
Z w1
rH
PRE
(   y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy+
+ (K   1)
 1 X
j=1

j+1(1   j+1)
Z wj+1
wj
(   y)(F(wj+1)   F(y))f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy

+
+ (K   1)
 1 X
j=1
m 1 X
i=j+1

j+1(1   i+1)(F(wi+1)   F(wi))
Z wj+1
wj
(   y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy

+
+ (K   1)
 1 X
j=1

j+1(1   m+1)(1   F(wk))
Z wj+1
wj
(   y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy

+
+ (K   1)+1(1   +1)
Z 
w
(   y)(F(w+1)   F(y))f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy+
+ (K   1)
m 1 X
i=+1

+1(1   i+1)(F(wi+1)   F(wi))
Z 
w
(   y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy

+
+ (K   1)+1(1   m+1)(1   F(wk))
Z 
w
(   y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy (B.11)
H
PRE(w   < w+1) = (   rH
PRE)F
(K 1)
1 (rH
PRE) +
 1 X
i=1
(1   i+1)(   wi+1)F
(K 1)
1 (wi+1) 
 
 1 X
i=1
(1   i+1)(   wi)F
(K 1)
1 (wi)   (1   +1)(   w)F
(K 1)
1 (w)+
+ (K   1)(   rH
PRE)F
(K 2)
1 (rH
PRE)[F(w1)   F(rH
PRE) +
m 1 X
i=1
i+1(F(wi+1)   F(wi))+
+ m+1(1   F(wk))] +
 1 X
i=1
(1   i+1)
Z wi+1
wi
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy + (1   +1)
Z 
w
F
(K 1)
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+ (K   1)
 1 X
j=1

(1   j+1)j+1
Z wj+1
wj
(   y)(F(wj+1)   F(y))f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy

+
+ (K   1)
 1 X
j=1
m 1 X
i=j+1

(1   j+1)i+1(F(wi+1)   F(wi))
Z wj+1
wj
(   y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy

+
+ (K   1)
 1 X
j=1

(1   j+1)m+1(1   F(wk))
Z wj+1
wj
(   y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy

+
+ (K   1)(1   +1)+1
Z 
w
(   y)(F(w+1)   F(y))f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy+
+ (K   1)
m 1 X
i=+1

(1   +1)i+1(F(wi+1)   F(wi))
Z 
w
(   y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy

+
+ (K   1)(1   +1)m+1(1   F(wk))
Z 
w
(   y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy (B.12)
D = (L
PRE   H
PRE)(w <   w+1) =
Z w1
rL
PRE
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy   (   rH
PRE)F
(K 1)
1 (rH
PRE)+
+ (   w1)F
(K 1)
1 (w1) +
 1 X
i=1

(2i+1   1)[(   wi+1)F
(K 1)
1 (wi+1)   (   wi)F
(K 1)
1 (wi)]

 
  (2+1   1)(   w)F
(K 1)
1 (w)   (K   1)(   rH
PRE)F
(K 2)
1 (rH
PRE)[1   F(rH
PRE)]+
+
 1 X
i=1

(2i+1   1)
Z wi+1
wi
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy

+ (2+1   1)
Z 
w
F
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+ (K   1)[(   w1)F
(K 2)
1 (w1) +
Z w1
rH
PRE
F
(K 2)
1 (y)dy][
m 1 X
i=1

(1   i+1)(F(wi+1)   F(wi))

+
+ (1   m+1)(1   F(wk))]+
+ (K   1)
 1 X
j=1
m 1 X
i=j+1

(j+1   i+1)(F(wi+1)   F(wi))
Z wj+1
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+ (K   1)
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B.1.2 Mixed-Strategy Bayes-Nash Equilibria with Arbitrary Pure Strate-
gies Before and After Randomizing
Suppose that buyers follow a pure strategy () = p() for valuations  2 [rH
PRE;w),
a mixed strategy () = m() 2 (0;1) for valuations  2 [w;a], and a pure strategy
() = () for all  2 (a;1]. Then, the expected utility of a buyer with valuation
 2 [w;a] from the low- and high-reserve intermediary, L
PRE and H
PRE respectively,
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Hence, their dierence will be:
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Taking the rst and second derivatives of the utility dierence L
PRE  H
PRE yields the
following equations:
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B.1.3 Mixed-Strategy Bayes-Nash Equilibria with Multiple Cut-O
Points Before Randomizing
In what follows, we will analytically derive the closed-form expression of the expected
utilities from the low-reserve and high-reserve intermediary, L
PRE and H
PRE respec-
tively, when buyers follow a pure strategy () = 1 = 1 for all  2 [rH
PRE;w1), () =
2 = 0 for all  2 [w1;w2) and so on, () = 0 2 f0;1g for all  2 [w0 1;w0), and
then a mixed strategy () = m() 2 (0;1) for all  2 [w;a], and () = () 2 f0;1g
if  2 (a;1].Appendix B Supplement for Chapter 6 193
For a buyer whose valuation  2 [w;w+1) for some  = 1;:::;0   1, the expected
utilities from the low- and high-reserve intermediaries will be:
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+
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Z 1
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(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2

+
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y2
(   y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
0 1 X
i=+1

i+1(1   +1)
Z 
w
Z wi+1
wi
(   y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2

+
+ (1   +1)
Z 
w
Z a
w0

(   y2)m(y1)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+ (1   +1)
Z 
w
Z 1
a
(   y2)(y1)f
(K 1)
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So, their dierence will be:
(L
PRE   H
PRE)(w   < w+1) =
Z w1
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy   (   rH
PRE)FK 1(rH
PRE)+
+ (   w1)FK 1(w1)   (K   1)(   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(w1)   F(rH
PRE)+
+
0 1 X
i=1

i+1(F(wi+1)   F(wi))

+
Z a
w0

m(y)f(y)dy +
Z 1
a
(y)f(y)dy]+
+
 1 X
i=1
(2i+1   1)
Z wi+1
wi
(   y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy + (2+1   1)
Z 
w
(   y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+
0 1 X
i=1

(1   i+1)
Z w1
rH
PRE
Z wi+1
wi
(   y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2

+
+
Z w1
rH
PRE
Z a
w0
(   y2)(1   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z w1
rH
PRE
Z 1
a
(   y2)(1   (y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
 1 X
j=1
 0 1 X
i=j+1

(j+1   i+1)
Z wj+1
wj
Z wi+1
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(   y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2

+
+
Z wj+1
wj
Z a
w0
(   y2)(j+1   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z wj+1
wj
Z 1
a
(   y2)(j+1   (y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2

+
+
0 1 X
i=+1

(+1   i+1)
Z 
w
Z wi+1
wi
(   y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2

+
+
Z 
w
Z a
w0
(   y2)(+1   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z 
w
Z 1
a
(   y2)(+1   (y1))f
(K 1)
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Taking the rst- and second-order derivatives of this utility dierence then yields:
@(L
PRE   H
PRE)(w   < w+1)
@
=  FK 1(rH
PRE) + FK 1(w1)   (K   1)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(w1)   F(rH
PRE)+
+
0 1 X
i=1

i+1(F(wi+1)   F(wi))

+
Z a
w0

m(y)f(y)dy +
Z 1
a
(y)f(y)dy]+
+
 1 X
i=1

(2i+1   1)
Z wi+1
wi
f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy

+ (2+1   1)
Z 
w
f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+
0 1 X
i=1

(1   i+1)
Z w1
rH
PRE
Z wi+1
wi
f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2

+
+
Z w1
rH
PRE
Z a
w0
(1   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z w1
rH
PRE
Z 1
a
(1   (y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
 1 X
j=1
 0 1 X
i=j+1

(j+1   i+1)
Z wj+1
wj
Z wi+1
wi
f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2

+
+
Z wj+1
wj
Z a
w0
(j+1   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z wj+1
wj
Z 1
a
(j+1   (y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2

+
+
0 1 X
i=+1

(+1   i+1)
Z 
w
Z wi+1
wi
f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2

+
+
Z 
w
Z a
w0
(+1   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z 
w
Z 1
a
(+1   (y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 (B.29)
@2(L
PRE   H
PRE)(w   < w+1)
@2 = (2+1   1)f
(K 1)
1 ()+
+
0 1 X
i=+1

(+1   i+1)
Z wi+1
wi
f
(K 1)
1;2 (y;)dy

+
+
Z a
w0
(+1   m(y))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y;)dy +
Z 1
a
(+1   (y))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y;)dy =
= (K   1)FK 2()f()(2+1   1)+
+ (K   1)(K   2)FK 3()f()
0 1 X
i=+1

(+1   i+1)(F(wi+1)   F(wi))

+
+ (K   1)(K   2)FK 3()f()[+1
Z 1
w0
f(y)dy  
Z a
w0
m(y)f(y)dy  
Z 1
a
(y)f(y)dy] =Appendix B Supplement for Chapter 6 197
= (K   1)FK 3()f()f(2+1   1)F()+
+ (K   2)[
0 1 X
i=+1

(+1   i+1)(F(wi+1)   F(wi))

+ +1(1   F(w0)) 
 
Z a
w0
m(y)f(y)dy  
Z 1
a
(y)f(y)dy]g (B.30)
This means that when +1 = 1, the corresponding utility dierence is convex, whereas
when +1 = 0, it is concave.
Similarly, for the special case where  2 [rH
PRE;w1), the corresponding utility dierence
and its second order derivative (given that 1 = 1 always) will be:
(L
PRE   H
PRE)(rH
PRE   < w1) =
Z 
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy   (   rH
PRE)FK 1(rH
PRE) 
  (K   1)(   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(w1)   F(rH
PRE) +
0 1 X
i=1

i+1(F(wi+1)   F(wi))

+
+
Z a
w0

m(y)f(y)dy +
Z 1
a
(y)f(y)dy]+
+
0 1 X
i=1

(1   i+1)
Z 
rH
PRE
Z wi+1
wi
(   y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2

+
+
Z 
rH
PRE
Z 1
w0
(   y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 
 
Z 
rH
PRE
Z a
w0
(   y2)m(y1)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 
 
Z 
rH
PRE
Z 1
a
(   y2)(y1)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 (B.31)
@2(L
PRE   H
PRE)(rH
PRE   < w1)
@2 = (K   1)FK 3()f()fF()+
+ (K   2)[
0 1 X
i=1

(1   i+1)(F(wi+1)   F(wi))

+ 1   F(w0) 
 
Z a
w0
m(y)f(y)dy  
Z 1
a
(y)f(y)dy]g  0 (B.32)
B.1.4 Mixed-Strategy Bayes-Nash Equilibria with Multiple Cut-O
Points After Randomizing
In what follows, we will analytically derive the closed-form expression of the expected
utilities from the low-reserve and high-reserve intermediary, L
PRE and H
PRE respec-
tively, when buyers follow a pure strategy () = 1 for all  2 [rH
PRE;w), a mixed198 Appendix B Supplement for Chapter 6
strategy () = m() 2 (0;1) for all  2 [w;a1], and, in the general case, then fol-
low pure strategies () = () for all  2 (a1;1], so that () = 
1 if  2 (a1;a2),
() = 
2 if i 2 [a2;a3) and so on, () = 
m0 if  2 [am0;1], where 
i 2 f0;1g and

i 6= 
i+1, 8i 2 f1;:::;m0g.
For a buyer whose valuation  2 [a;a+1) for some  = 1;:::;m0, the expected utilities
from the low- and high-reserve intermediaries will be (we use the convention that am0+1 =
1 for notational convenience):
L
PRE(a   < a+1) =
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy + (   w)FK 1(w)+
+
Z a1
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy +
 1 X
i=1


i
Z ai+1
ai
(   y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy

+
+ 

Z 
a
(   y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy +
Z w
rH
PRE
Z a1
w
(   y2)(1   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
m0 X
i=1

(1   
i)
Z w
rH
PRE
Z ai+1
ai
(   y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2

+
+
Z a1
w
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y2
(   y2)(1   m(y1))m(y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
m0 X
i=1

(1   
i)
Z a1
w
Z ai+1
ai
(   y2)m(y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2

+
+
 1 X
j=1

(1   
j)
j
Z aj+1
aj
Z aj+1
y2
(   y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+ 
j
m0 X
i=j+1

(1   
i)
Z aj+1
aj
Z ai+1
ai
(   y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2

+
+ (1   
)

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a
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y2
(   y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+ 

m0 X
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
(1   
i)
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(   y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2

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H
PRE(a   < a+1) = (   rH
PRE)FK 1(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(w)   F(rH
PRE)+
+
Z a1
w
m(y)f(y)dy +
m0 X
i=1


i(F(ai+1)   F(ai))

] +
Z a1
w
(   y)(1   m(y))f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+
 1 X
i=1

(1   
i)
Z ai+1
ai
(   y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy

+ (1   
)
Z 
a
(   y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+
Z a1
w
Z a1
y2
(   y2)m(y1)(1   m(y2))f
(K 1)
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+
m0 X
i=1


i
Z a1
w
Z ai+1
ai
(   y2)(1   m(y2))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2

+
+
 1 X
j=1


j(1   
j)
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y2
(   y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
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
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(   y2)f
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
+
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(1   
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(   y2)f
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
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   y2)f
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
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So, their dierence will be:
(L
PRE   H
PRE)(a   < a+1) =
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy + (   w)FK 1(w)   (   rH
PRE)FK 1(rH
PRE) 
  (K   1)(   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(w)   F(rH
PRE) +
Z a1
w
m(y)f(y)dy+
+
m0 X
i=1


i(F(ai+1)   F(ai))

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w
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rH
PRE
Z a1
w
(   y2)(1   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
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m0 X
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
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Z w
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(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2

+
+
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w
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ai
(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
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and its rst and second order derivatives will have the following form:
@(L
PRE   H
PRE)(a   < a+1)
@
= FK 1(w)   FK 1(rH
PRE) 
  (K   1)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(w)   F(rH
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w
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ai
f
(K 1)
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+
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@2(L
PRE   H
PRE)(a   < a+1)
@2 = (2
   1)f
(K 1)
1 ()+
+ (K   1)(K   2)
m0 X
i=+1
(
   
i)
Z ai+1
ai
f(y)f()FK 3()dy =
= (K   1)FK 3()f()[(2
   1)F() + (K   2)
m0 X
i=+1
(
   
i)(F(ai+1)   F(ai))]
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B.1.5 Mixed-Strategy Bayes-Nash Equilibria with Two Cut-O Points
We will now derive the closed-form expression of the expected utilities from the low-
reserve and high-reserve intermediary, L
PRE and H
PRE respectively, when buyers follow
a pure strategy () = 1 for all  2 [rH
PRE;w), a mixed strategy () = m() 2 (0;1)
for all  2 [w;a], and then follow pure strategies () =  2 f0;1g for all  2 (a;1].Appendix B Supplement for Chapter 6 201
If  2 [0;rL
PRE], the buyer can not participate in any of the two auctions, so in this case
L
PRE() = H
PRE() = 0.
If  2 [rL
PRE;rH
PRE), then a buyer expects positive utility only from the low-reserve
intermediary, as this is the only possible auction to participate in. So, in this case:
L
PRE(rL
PRE   < rH
PRE) =
Z 
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy (B.38)
and H
PRE(rL
PRE   < rH
PRE) = 0.
More specically, when  2 [rH
PRE;w), then we can write the expected utility from the
two intermediaries as:
L
PRE(rH
PRE   < w) =
Z 
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy +
Z 
rH
PRE
Z a
w
(   y2)(1   m(y1))f
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Z 1
a
(   y2)(1   )f
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1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 (B.39)
H
PRE(rH
PRE   < w) = (   rH
PRE)FK 1(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(w) 
  F(rH
PRE) +
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy +
Z 1
a
f(y)dy] (B.40)
So, their dierence will be:
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1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2  
Z 
rH
PRE
Z 1
a
(   y2)f
(K 1)
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=
Z 
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy   (   rH
PRE)FK 1(rH
PRE)   (K   1)(   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(w) 
  F(rH
PRE) +
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy +
Z 1
a
f(y)dy] + (K   1)[1   F(w)]
Z 
rH
PRE
(   y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy 
  (K   1)
Z 
rH
PRE
(   y2)f
(K 2)
1 (y2)dy2[
Z a
w
m(y1)f(y1)dy1 +
Z 1
a
f(y1)dy1] =
=
Z 
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy   (   rH
PRE)FK 1(rH
PRE)   (K   1)(   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(w) 
  F(rH
PRE) +
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy +
Z 1
a
f(y)dy] + (K   1)[1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy 
 
Z 1
a
f(y)dy][ (   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE) +
Z 
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy] =
=
Z 
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy   (   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))]+
+ (K   1)
Z 
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy[1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy   (1   F(a))] (B.41)
Whenever  2 [w;a], the expected utility from the low- and high-reserve intermediaries
will be:
L
PRE(w    a) = (   rL
PRE)FK 1(rL
PRE) +
Z w
rL
PRE
(   y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+
Z 
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy +
Z w
rH
PRE
Z a
w
(   y2)(1   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z w
rH
PRE
Z 1
a
(   y2)(1   )f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z 
w
Z a
y2
(   y2)(1   m(y1))m(y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z 
w
Z 1
a
(   y2)(1   )m(y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 =
=
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy + (   w)FK 1(w) +
Z 
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+
Z w
rH
PRE
Z a
w
(   y2)(1   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z w
rH
PRE
Z 1
a
(   y2)(1   )f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z 
w
Z a
y2
(   y2)(1   m(y1))m(y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z 
w
Z 1
a
(   y2)(1   )m(y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 (B.42)Appendix B Supplement for Chapter 6 203
H
PRE(w    a) = (   rH
PRE)FK 1(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(w) 
  F(rH
PRE) +
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy +
Z 1
a
f(y)dy] +
Z 
w
(   y)(1   m(y))f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
  F(rH
PRE) +
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy +
Z 1
a
f(y)dy] +
Z 
w
(   y)(1   m(y))f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+
Z 
w
Z a
y2
(   y2)m(y1)(1   m(y2))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z 
w
Z 1
a
(   y2)(1   m(y2))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 (B.43)
Hence, their dierence is:
(L
PRE   H
PRE)(w    a) =
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy   (   rH
PRE)FK 1(rH
PRE)+
+ (   w)FK 1(w) +
Z 
w
(   y)(2m(y)   1)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy 
  (K   1)(   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(w)   F(rH
PRE) +
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy +
Z 1
a
f(y)dy]+
+
Z w
rH
PRE
Z a
w
(   y2)(1   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z w
rH
PRE
Z 1
a
(   y2)(1   )f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z 
w
Z a
y2
(   y2)(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z 
w
Z 1
a
(   y2)(m(y2)   )f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 =
=
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy   (   rH
PRE)FK 1(rH
PRE) + (   w)FK 1(w)+
+ 2
Z 
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy  
Z 
w
(   y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy 
  (K   1)(   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(w)   F(rH
PRE) +
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy + (1   F(a))]+
+
Z w
rH
PRE
Z a
w
(   y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2  
Z w
rH
PRE
Z a
w
(   y2)m(y1)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z w
rH
PRE
Z 1
a
(   y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2   
Z w
rH
PRE
Z 1
a
(   y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z 
w
Z a
y2
(   y2)(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z 
w
Z 1
a
(   y2)m(y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2   
Z 
w
Z 1
a
(   y2)f
(K 1)
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=
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy   (   rH
PRE)FK 1(rH
PRE) + (   w)FK 1(w)+
+ 2
Z 
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy + (   w)FK 1(w)  
Z 
w
FK 1(y)dy 
  (K   1)(   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(w)   F(rH
PRE) +
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy + (1   F(a))]+
+
Z w
rH
PRE
Z 1
w
(   y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2   
Z 
rH
PRE
Z 1
a
(   y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 
 
Z w
rH
PRE
Z a
w
(   y2)m(y1)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 +
Z 
w
Z 1
a
(   y2)m(y2)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z 
w
Z a
y2
(   y2)(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 =
=
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy  
Z 
w
FK 1(y)dy   (   rH
PRE)FK 1(rH
PRE) + 2(   w)FK 1(w)+
+ 2
Z 
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy   (K   1)(   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(w)   F(rH
PRE)+
+
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy + (1   F(a))] + (K   1)(1   F(w))
Z w
rH
PRE
(   y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy 
  (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
rH
PRE
(   y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy 
  (K   1)
Z w
rH
PRE
(   y2)f
(K 2)
1 (y2)dy2
Z a
w
m(y1)f(y1)dy1+
+ (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy+
+
Z 
w
Z a
y2
(   y2)(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 =
=
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy  
Z 
w
FK 1(y)dy   (   rH
PRE)FK 1(rH
PRE) + 2(   w)FK 1(w)+
+ 2
Z 
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy   (K   1)(   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(w)   F(rH
PRE)+
+
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy + (1   F(a))] + (K   1)(1   F(w))[(   w)FK 2(w) 
  (   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE) +
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy]   (K   1)(1   F(a))[ (   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)+
+
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy +
Z 
w
FK 2(y)dy]   (K   1)
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy[(   w)FK 2(w) 
  (   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE) +
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy] + (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy+
+
Z 
w
Z a
y2
(   y2)(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
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=
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy  
Z 
w
FK 1(y)dy   (   rH
PRE)FK 1(rH
PRE) + 2(   w)FK 1(w)+
+ 2
Z 
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy   (K   1)(   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(w)   F(rH
PRE)+
+
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy + (1   F(a))] + (K   1)(1   F(w))(   w)FK 2(w) 
  (K   1)(1   F(w))(   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(w))
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy+
+ (K   1)(1   F(a))(   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)   (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy 
  (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
w
FK 2(y)dy   (K   1)(   w)FK 2(w)
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy+
+ (K   1)(   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy   (K   1)
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy+
+ (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy+
+
Z 
w
Z a
y2
(   y2)(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 =
=
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy  
Z 
w
FK 1(y)dy   (   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE)+
+ (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))] + 2(   w)FK 1(w) + 2
Z 
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+ (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy + (K   1)(   w)FK 2(w)[1   F(w) 
 
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy] + (K   1)
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy[1   F(w)   (1   F(a)) 
 
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy]   (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
w
FK 2(y)dy+
+
Z 
w
Z a
y2
(   y2)(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 =
=
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy  
Z 
w
FK 1(y)dy   (   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE)+
+ (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))] + (   w)FK 2(w)[2F(w) + (K   1)(1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy)]+
+ (K   1)
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy[1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy   (1   F(a))] 
  (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
w
FK 2(y)dy + (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy+
+ 2
Z 
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy +
Z 
w
Z a
y2
(   y2)(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2
(B.44)
Finally, using (B.35) for m0 = 1 and  = 1, we get the equivalent utility dierence for
buyers with valuations in (a;1]:206 Appendix B Supplement for Chapter 6
(L
PRE   H
PRE)(a <   1) =
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy + (   w)FK 1(w)   (   rH
PRE)FK 1(rH
PRE) 
  (K   1)(   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(w)   F(rH
PRE) +
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy +
Z 1
a
f(y)dy]+
+ 2[
Z a
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy +
Z 
a
(   y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy] 
 
Z 
w
(   y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy + (K   1)
Z w
rH
PRE
Z 1
w
(   y2)f(y1)f
(K 2)
1 (y2)dy1dy2 
  (K   1)
Z w
rH
PRE
Z a
w
(   y2)f
(K 2)
1 (y2)m(y1)f(y1)dy1dy2 
  (K   1)
Z w
rH
PRE
Z 1
a
(   y2)f
(K 2)
1 (y2)f(y1)dy1dy2+
+
Z a
w
Z a
y2
(   y2)(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z a
w
Z 1
a
(   y2)(m(y2)   )f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z 
a
Z 1
y2
(   y2)(   )f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 =
=
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy  
Z 
w
FK 1(y)dy   (   rH
PRE)FK 1(rH
PRE) + 2(   w)FK 1(w) 
  (K   1)(   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(w)   F(rH
PRE) +
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy +
Z 1
a
f(y)dy]+
+ 2[
Z a
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy +
Z 
a
(   y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy]+
+ (K   1)[1   F(w)][(   w)FK 2(w)   (   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE) +
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy] 
  (K   1)[(   w)FK 2(w)   (   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE) +
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy]
[
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy +
Z 1
a
f(y)dy] +
Z a
w
Z a
y2
(   y2)(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z a
w
Z 1
a
(   y2)(m(y2)   )f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 =
=
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy  
Z 
w
FK 1(y)dy   (   rH
PRE)FK 1(rH
PRE) + 2(   w)FK 1(w) 
  (K   1)(   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[1   F(rH
PRE)] + 2[
Z a
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+
Z 
a
(   y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy] + (K   1)[(   w)FK 2(w)+
+
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy][1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy  
Z 1
a
f(y)dy]+
+
Z a
w
Z a
y2
(   y2)(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+
Z a
w
Z 1
a
(   y2)(m(y2)   )f
(K 1)
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=
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy  
Z 
w
FK 1(y)dy   (   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1 
  F(rH
PRE))] + 2(   w)FK 1(w) + 2
Z a
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy   2(   a)FK 1(a)+
+ 2
Z 
a
FK 1(y)dy + (K   1)(   w)FK 2(w)[1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy 
  (1   F(a))] + (K   1)
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy[1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy 
  (1   F(a))] +
Z a
w
Z a
y2
(   y2)(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+ (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z a
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy 
  (K   1)(1   F(a))[(   a)FK 2(a)   (   w)FK 2(w) +
Z a
w
FK 2(y)dy] =
=
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy  
Z a
w
FK 1(y)dy   (1   2)
Z 
a
FK 1(y)dy 
  (   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))] + (   w)FK 2(w)[2F(w)+
+ (K   1)(1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy)]   (   a)FK 2(a)[F(a)+
+ (K   1)(1   F(a))] + (K   1)
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy[1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy 
  (1   F(a))]   (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z a
w
FK 2(y)dy+
+ 2
Z a
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy + (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z a
w
(   y)m(y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy+
+
Z a
w
Z a
y2
(   y2)(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 (B.45)
As has been mentioned, it should also be that
@(L
PRE H
PRE)()
@ = 0 for all  2 [w;a].
Hence, using (B.44), the rst-order derivative of the expected utility dierence from the
two intermediaries in [w;a] will be:
@(L
PRE   H
PRE)(w    a)
@
=  FK 2()[F() + (K   1)(1   F(a))]   FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE)+
+ (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))] + FK 2(w)[2F(w) + (K   1)(1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy)]+
+ 2
Z 
w
m(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy + (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
w
m(y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy+
+
Z 
w
Z a
y2
(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
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=) FK 2()[F() + (K   1)(1   F(a))] = FK 2(w)[2F(w) + (K   1)(1   F(w) 
 
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy)]   FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))]+
+ 2
Z 
w
m(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy + (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
w
m(y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy+
+
Z 
w
Z a
y2
(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 (B.46)
This should also be true at w, where the equation above yields:
FK 2(w)[F(w) + (K   1)(1   F(a))] = FK 2(w)[2F(w) + (K   1)(1   F(w) 
 
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy)]   FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))] (B.47)
After rearranging and using the condition of (B.46), the expected utility dierence of
(B.44) gives the following equation:
(L
PRE   H
PRE)(w    a) =
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy + (K   1)
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy[1   F(w) 
 
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy   (1   F(a))] + rH
PREFK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))] 
  wFK 2(w)[2F(w) + (K   1)(1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy)]  
Z 
w
FK 1(y)dy 
  (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
w
FK 2(y)dy   2
Z 
w
ym(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy 
  (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
w
ym(y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy 
 
Z 
w
Z a
y2
y2(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+ 

FK 2(w)[2F(w) + (K   1)(1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy)] 
  FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))] + 2
Z 
w
m(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+
+ (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
w
m(y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy+
+
Z 
w
Z a
y2
(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2

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=
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy + (K   1)
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy[1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy 
  (1   F(a))] + rH
PREFK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))]   wFK 2(w)[2F(w)+
+ (K   1)(1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy)]  
Z 
w
FK 1(y)dy 
  (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
w
FK 2(y)dy   2
Z 
w
ym(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy 
  (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
w
ym(y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy 
 
Z 
w
Z a
y2
y2(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+ FK 2()[F() + (K   1)(1   F(a))] (B.48)
Substituting for  = w in the equation above and using (B.47) yields:
(L
PRE   H
PRE)(w) =
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy + (K   1)
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy[1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy 
  (1   F(a))] + rH
PREFK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))]   wFK 2(w)[2F(w)+
+ (K   1)(1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy)] + wFK 2(w)[F(w) + (K   1)(1   F(a))] =
=
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy + (K   1)
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy[1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy 
  (1   F(a))] + rH
PREFK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))] 
  w[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))] = 0 =)
=)
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy + (K   1)
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy[1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy 
  (1   F(a))] = (w   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))]
(B.49)
By using this last equation along with (B.47), equation (B.48) becomes:
(L
PRE   H
PRE)(w    a) =  
Z 
w
FK 1(y)dy + (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
w
FK 2(y)dy 
  2
Z 
w
ym(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy   (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z 
w
ym(y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy 
 
Z 
w
Z a
y2
y2(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2+
+ FK 2()[F() + (K   1)(1   F(a))]   wFK 2(w)[F(w) + (K   1)(1   F(a))] = 0
(B.50)
The system of equations (B.47) and (B.49) gives a solution for the two cut-o points,
w and a. However, we can eliminate a and nd w directly. Then, we can use this210 Appendix B Supplement for Chapter 6
solution to nd the appropriate value for a using any of these two last equations. More
specically, if we set xa = 1   F(w)  
R a
w m(y)f(y)dy   (1   F(a)), (B.47) becomes:
FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))] = FK 2(w)[F(w) + (K   1)xa] =)
=) (K   1)FK 2(w)xa = FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))]   FK 1(w)
(B.51)
Similarly, (B.49) becomes:
xa(K   1)
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy = (w   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE)+
+ (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))]  
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy (B.52)
Eliminating xa from these two last equations yields:
FK 2(w)
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy   FK 1(w)
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy =
= [(w   rH
PRE)FK 2(w)  
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy]FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))]
(B.53)
and then a can be found from (B.47) for the provided w.
Using equations (B.46), (B.47), (B.49) and B.50, (B.45) can be signicantly simplied,
giving:
(L
PRE   H
PRE)(a <   1) =
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy + (K   1)
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy[1   F(w) 
 
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy   (1   F(a))] + rH
PREFK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))] 
  wFK 2(w)[2F(w) + (K   1)(1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy)]  
Z a
w
FK 1(y)dy 
  (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z a
w
FK 2(y)dy   2
Z a
w
ym(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy 
  (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z a
w
ym(y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy 
 
Z a
w
Z a
y2
y2(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 
  (1   2)
Z 
a
FK 1(y)dy + aFK 2(a)[2F(a) + (K   1)(1   F(a))]+
+ 

  FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))] + FK 2(w)[2F(w)+
+ (K   1)(1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy)] + 2
Z a
w
m(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy+Appendix B Supplement for Chapter 6 211
+ (K   1)(1   F(a))
Z a
w
m(y)f
(K 2)
1 (y)dy+
+
Z a
w
Z a
y2
(m(y2)   m(y1))f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 
  FK 2(a)[2F(a) + (K   1)(1   F(a))]

=
= (w   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE) + (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))] + r2FK 2(rH
PRE)[F(rH
PRE)+
+ (K   1)(1   F(rH
PRE))]   wFK 2(w)[2F(w) + (K   1)(1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy)]+
+ wFK 2(w)[F(w) + (K   1)(1   F(a))]   aFK 2(a)[F(a) + (K   1)(1   F(a))] 
  (1   2)
Z 
a
FK 1(y)dy + aFK 2(a)[2F(a) + (K   1)(1   F(a))]+
+ 

FK 2(a)[F(a) + (K   1)(1   F(a))]   FK 2(a)[2F(a) + (K   1)(1   F(a))]

=
=  wFK 2(w)[F(w) + (K   1)(1   F(a))] + wFK 2(w)[F(w) + (K   1)(1   F(a))] 
  aFK 2(a)[F(a) + (K   1)(1   F(a))]   (1   2)
Z 
a
FK 1(y)dy+
+ aFK 2(a)[2F(a) + (K   1)(1   F(a))] + 

FK 2(a)[F(a) + (K   1)(1   F(a))] 
  FK 2(a)[2F(a) + (K   1)(1   F(a))]

=
=  (1   2)
Z 
a
FK 1(y)dy + (   a)FK 2(a)[F(a) + (K   1)(1   F(a))] 
  (   a)FK 2(a)[2F(a) + (K   1)(1   F(a))] =
=  (1   2)[
Z 
a
FK 1(y)dy   (   a)FK 1(a)] (B.54)
After all derivations, the nal expressions for the expected surplus of a buyer from the
two intermediaries in equilibrium will be:
L
PRE(rL
PRE   < rH
PRE) =
Z 
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy (B.55)
L
PRE(rH
PRE   < w) =
Z 
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy + (K   1)[
Z 
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy 
  (   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)][1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy   (1   F(a))] (B.56)
H
PRE(rH
PRE   < w) = (   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)fF(rH
PRE) + (K   1)[F(w)   F(rH
PRE)+
+
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy + (1   F(a))]g (B.57)212 Appendix B Supplement for Chapter 6
L
PRE(w    a) =
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy + (   w)FK 1(w) + (K   1)[
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy+
+ (   w)FK 2(w)   (   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)][1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy   (1   F(a))]+
  (K   1)(K   3)
Z 
w
(   y)m(y)FK 2(y)f(y)dy+
+ (K   1)(K   2)[1   (1   F(a))]
Z 
w
(   y)m(y)FK 3(y)f(y)dy 
  (K   1)(K   2)
Z 
w
(   y2)m(y2)FK 3(y2)f(y2)dy2
Z a
y2
m(y1)f(y1)dy1 (B.58)
H
PRE(w    a) = (   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)fF(rH
PRE) + (K   1)[F(w)   F(rH
PRE)+
+
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy + (1   F(a))]g +
Z 
w
FK 1(y)dy   (   w)FK 1(w)+
+ (K   1)[1   F(a)][
Z 
w
FK 2(y)dy   (   w)FK 2(w)] 
  (K   1)
Z 
w
(   y)m(y)FK 2(y)f(y)dy 
+ (K   1)(K   2)[ (1   F(a))
Z 
w
(   y)m(y)FK 3(y)f(y)dy+
+
Z 
w
(   y2)FK 3(y2)f(y2)dy2
Z a
y2
m(y1)f(y1)dy1 
 
Z 
w
(   y2)m(y2)FK 3(y2)f(y2)dy2
Z a
y2
m(y1)f(y1)dy1 (B.59)
L
PRE(a <   1) =
Z w
rL
PRE
FK 1(y)dy + (   w)FK 1(w)+
+ (K   1)[
Z w
rH
PRE
FK 2(y)dy + (   w)FK 2(w)   (   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)]
[1   F(w)  
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy   (1   F(a))] + [
Z 
a
FK 1(y)dy   (   a)FK 1(a)]+
+ (K   1)(1   )[
Z 
a
FK 2(y)dy   (   a)FK 2(a)] 
  (K   2)(1   )[
Z 
a
FK 1(y)dy   (   a)FK 1(a)]+
+ (K   1)(K   3)
Z a
w
(   y)m(y)FK 2(y)f(y)dy+Appendix B Supplement for Chapter 6 213
+ (K   1)(K   2)f[1   (1   F(a))]
Z a
w
(   y)m(y)FK 3(y)f(y)dy 
 
Z a
w
(   y2)m(y2)FK 3(y2)f(y2)dy2
Z a
y2
m(y1)f(y1)dy1g (B.60)
H
PRE(a <   1) = (   rH
PRE)FK 2(rH
PRE)fF(rH
PRE) + (K   1)[F(w)   F(rH
PRE)+
+
Z a
w
m(y)f(y)dy + (1   F(a))]g +
Z 
w
FK 1(y)dy   (   w)FK 1(w)+
+ (K   1)(1   F(a))[
Z a
w
FK 2(y)dy + (   a)FK 2(a)   (   w)FK 2(w)] 
  [
Z 
a
FK 1(y)dy   (   a)FK 1(a)]+
+ (K   1)(1   )[
Z 
a
FK 2(y)dy   (   a)FK 2(a)] 
  (K   2)(1   )[
Z 
a
FK 1(y)dy   (   a)FK 1(a)] 
  (K   1)
Z a
w
(   y)m(y)FK 2(y)f(y)dy+
+ (K   1)(K   2)[ (1   F(a))
Z a
w
(   y)m(y)FK 3(y)f(y)dy+
+
Z a
w
(   y2)FK 3(y2)f(y2)dy2
Z a
y2
m(y1)f(y1)dy1 
 
Z a
w
(   y2)m(y2)FK 3(y2)f(y2)dy2
Z a
y2
m(y1)f(y1)dy1] (B.61)
B.1.6 Mixed-Strategy Bayes-Nash Equilibrium Example: The Uni-
form Distribution U(0;1)
In this case, F() = ;f() = 1;8 2 [w;a]. Then the second-order derivative condition
becomes:
[2 + (K   2)(1   )]m() = (K   2)
Z a

m(y)dy + (K   2)(1   a) +  (B.62)
where m(a) =
(K 2)(1 a)+a
2a+(K 2)(1 a) . Equation (B.62) can be written as:
[2 + (K   2)(1   )]m() + (K   2)
Z 
a
m(y)dy = (K   2)(1   a) +  (B.63)214 Appendix B Supplement for Chapter 6
We set:
m() =
Z 
a
m(y)dy =  
Z a

m(y)dy =  [
Z a
0
m(y)dy  
Z 
0
m(y)dy] =
=
Z 
0
m(y)dy  
Z a
0
m(y)dy (B.64)
So, from the rst fundamental theorem of calculus 0
m() = m(). Equation (B.63)
can now be written in terms of m() as:
[2 + (K   2)(1   )]0
m() + (K   2)m() = (K   2)(1   a) +  (B.65)
The form of the dierential equation changes for K = 4 so we have to consider two
cases: i) K 6= 4 and ii) K = 4.
We start with the latter case (K = 4). Dividing by 2 and multiplying both sides with
exp() yields:
exp()0
m() + exp()m() =  exp()( (1   a)  

2
) (B.66)
Then, we substitute with (exp())0 = exp() in the left-hand side gives:
exp()0
m() + (exp())0m() =  exp()( (1   a)  

2
) (B.67)
Applying the reverse product rule (f
dg
dx +
df
dxg = d
dx(fg)) to the left-hand side yields:
(exp()m())0 =  exp()( (1   a)  

2
) (B.68)
where integrating both sides with respect to  gives:
exp()m() =
1
2
exp()[2(1   a) +    1] + k4 (B.69)
where k4 is an arbitrary constant. Then, dividing both sides with exp() yields:
m() = k4 exp( ) + (1   a) +
   1
2
(B.70)
So,
m() = 0
m() =
1
2
  k4 exp( ) (B.71)
where the initial condition m(a) =
2(1 a)+a
2 gives k4 =
(1 2)(1 a)
2exp( a) , hence:
m() =
1
2
 
(1   2)(1   a)
2exp( a)
exp( ) (B.72)Appendix B Supplement for Chapter 6 215
Similarly, we will solve (B.65) for the general case (K 6= 4). Dividing by  [2 + (K  
2)(1   )] = (K   4)   (K   2) and rearranging gives:
0
m()  
K   2
(K   4)   (K   2)
m() =  
(K   2)(1   a) + 
(K   4)   (K   2)
(B.73)
Multiplying both sides by exp(
R  (K 2)
(K 4) (K 2)d) = [(K   4)   (K   2)]
  K 2
K 4 gives:
[(K   4)   (K   2)]
  K 2
K 40
m()   (K   2)[(K   4)   (K   2)]
  K 2
K 4 1m() =
=  [(K   2)(1   a) + ][(K   4)   (K   2)]
  K 2
K 4 1 (B.74)
We then substitute  (K 2)[(K 4) (K 2)]
  K 2
K 4 1 = d
df[(K 4) (K 2)]
  K 2
K 4g:
[(K   4)   (K   2)]
  K 2
K 40
m() +
d
d
f[(K   4)   (K   2)]
  K 2
K 4gm() =
=  [(K   2)(1   a) + ][(K   4)   (K   2)]
  K 2
K 4 1 (B.75)
Applying the reverse product rule to the left-hand side yields:
d
d
f[(K 4) (K 2)]
  K 2
K 4m()g =  [(K 2)(1 a)+][(K 4) (K 2)]
  K 2
K 4 1
(B.76)
and afterwards integrating both sides with respect to  gives:
[(K 4) (K 2)]
  K 2
K 4m() =
1
2
[2(1 a)+ 1][(K 4) (K 2)]
  K 2
K 4+kn (B.77)
where kn is an arbitrary constant. Finally, dividing both sides by [(K 4) (K 2)]
  K 2
K 4
produces the following solution for m():
m() = (1   a) +
   1
2
+ kn[(K   4)   (K   2)]
K 2
K 4 (B.78)
and hence:
m() = 0
m() =
1
2
+ kn(K   2)[(K   4)   (K   2)]
2
K 4 (B.79)
Finally, using the fact that m(a) =
(K 2)(1 a)+a
2a+(K 2)(1 a) , we get that kn =
(1 2)(1 a)
2[(K 4)a (K 2)]
K 2
K 4
,
so the nal form of m() will be:
m() =
1
2
+
(K   2)(1   2)(1   a)
2[(K   4)a   (K   2)]
K 2
K 4
[(K   4)   (K   2)]
2
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Then, equations (B.38), (B.41), (B.50) and (B.54) yield:
(L
PRE   H
PRE)(rL
PRE   < rH
PRE) =
K   rL
PRE
K
K
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For K 6= 4:
(L
PRE   H
PRE)(rH
PRE   < w) =
K   rL
PRE
K
K
  (   rH
PRE)rH
PRE
K 2
[rH
PRE + (K   1)(1   rH
PRE)]+
+ (K 1   rH
PRE
K 1
)[
1   w
2
+
(1   2)(1   a)
2[(K   4)a   (K   2)]
K 2
K 4
[(K   4)w   (K   2)]
K 2
K 4]
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For K = 4:
(L
PRE   H
PRE)(rH
PRE   < w) =
4   rL
PRE
4
4
  (   rH
PRE)rH
PRE
2
[rH
PRE + 3(1   rH
PRE)]+
+ (3   rH
PRE
3
)[
1   w
2
+
(1   2)(1   a)
2exp( a)
exp( w)] (B.83)
(L
PRE   H
PRE)(w    a) = 0 (B.84)
(L
PRE   H
PRE)(a <   1) =  (1   2)[
K   aK
K
  (   a)aK 1] (B.85)
Moreover, the conditions of equations (B.53), (B.47) yield:
[wK 1   rH
PRE
K 1
  (K   1)(w   rH
PRE)wK 2]rH
PRE
K 2
[rH
PRE + (K   1)(1   rH
PRE)]+
+
K   1
K
wK 2(wK   rL
PRE
K
)   wK 1(wK 1   rH
PRE
K 1
) = 0 (B.86)
and for a, when K 6= 4:
wK 2fw + (K   1)[
1   w
2
+
(1   2)(1   a)
2[(K   4)a   (K   2)]
K 2
K 4
[(K   4)w   (K   2)]
K 2
K 4]g 
  rH
PRE
K 2
[rH
PRE + (K   1)(1   rH
PRE)] = 0 (B.87)
whereas when K = 4:
w2fw + 3[
1   w
2
+
(1   2)(1   a)
2exp( a)
exp( w)]g 
  rH
PRE
2
[rH
PRE + 3(1   rH
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B.2 Derivations for Buyer PRE - POST Duopoly Intermedi-
ary Selection
We can write:
Z rH
POST
y2=0
Z 1
y1=y2
(y1)f
(K 1)
1;2 (y1;y2)dy1dy2 =
=
Z rH
POST
0
Z rH
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Z rH
POST
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Z 1
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=
Z rH
POST
0
Z y1
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Z 1
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Z rH
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Z 1
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POST
(y)f(y)dy =
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=
Z rH
POST
0
(y)f
(K 1)
1 (y)dy + (K   1)FK 2(rH
POST)
Z 1
rH
POST
(y)f(y)dy (B.90)
We can also write:
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This means that equation (6.67) can be written as:
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